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Struggles over Legitimate *Diplomathood*: The United States Foreign Service, the State Department and Other Government Agencies in Contemporary American Diplomacy

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Résumé

Au cours du dernier demi-siècle, le nombre d'acteurs gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux jouant un rôle de représentation politique et de gouvernance à l'échelle internationale s'est considérablement accru. Malgré cette évolution, les chercheurs en Relations internationales tendent à perpétuer la distinction conventionnelle entre les « diplomates » - principalement associés aux représentants de l'État issus des ministères des affaires étrangères - et d'autres types d'acteurs internationaux, qu'ils soient gouvernementaux ou non étatiques. Cette thèse problématise cette distinction en étudiant de façon inductive comment la « frontière » entre diplomates et non-diplomates est socialement construite.

Mobilisant un cadre théorique inspiré de la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu et des concepts d'autres sociologues (Max Weber, Andrew Abbott, Michèle Lamont), je soutiens que les diplomates se constituent et se reproduisent comme groupe de statut à travers des luttes sociales et symboliques. Ces luttes impliquent la (re)production de distinctions symboliques (frontières symboliques) et la revendication du contrôle légitime d'un ensemble de tâches (revendications juridictionnelles). Le statut de diplomate dépend de la légitimité sociale conférée à ces frontières et revendications. L'argument théorique est démontré à travers une étude de cas de la diplomatie américaine contemporaine. L'étude s'appuie sur une trentaine d'entretiens semi dirigés, notamment avec des agents du Service extérieur américain, et sur un ensemble de sources écrites primaires et secondaires.

La thèse montre que le corps d'agents du Service extérieur cherche à se reproduire comme groupe de statut de la diplomatie américaine à travers la (re)production de frontières symboliques et de revendications juridictionnelles vis-à-vis trois autres groupes d'acteurs: la fonction publique régulière du Département d'État; les fonctionnaires de celui-ci issus de nominations politiques (e.g. ambassadeurs politiques); et les fonctionnaires des autres agences ou bureaucraties du gouvernement fédéral. Les agents du Service extérieur reproduisent également des frontières symboliques et sociales entre eux, et donc des hiérarchies informelles au regard du statut de diplomate, en fonction de leur champ de spécialisation. À l'encontre de

ces hiérarchies internes, l'esprit de corps du groupe est constamment en travail grâce notamment au rôle joué par l'association professionnelle du Service, qui met l'accent sur l'identité du corps comme élite professionnelle et réclame en leur nom un certain nombre de monopoles dans la gestion et la conduite de la diplomatie américaine.

Les efforts des agents du Service extérieur et de leurs organisations visant à la reproduction du corps comme groupe de statut de la diplomatie américaine apparaissent partiellement réussis. Ils parviennent dans une large mesure à reproduire leur domination sociale et symbolique par rapport aux fonctionnaires réguliers du Département d'État. Leurs revendications juridictionnelles sont toutefois contestées par le personnel issu de nominations politiques et par les fonctionnaires d'autres bureaucraties gouvernementales impliquées dans les relations extérieures américaines. En somme, la thèse contribue à la compréhension, au sein de la discipline des Relations internationales, des processus sociaux et symboliques qui constituent les diplomates, groupe d'acteurs clés de la politique mondiale.

Mots-clés : Diplomatie, États-Unis, Service extérieur, Département d'État, Frontières symboliques, Sociologie, Pierre Bourdieu, Groupe de statut

Abstract

The last half-century has been characterized by the multiplication of state and non-state actors involved in political representation and governance at the international or global level. Despite this evolution, International Relations scholars tend to perpetuate the conventional distinction between "diplomats" - mainly thought of as state representatives from foreign ministries - and other types of international actors. This thesis problematizes such distinction by looking inductively at how "diplomathood" is constituted and reproduced in practice.

Combining theoretical insights from Pierre Bourdieu and other sociologists (Max Weber, Andrew Abbott, Michèle Lamont), I argue that diplomats create and reproduce themselves as a status group through symbolic and social struggles. These struggles over legitimate *diplomathood* involve the (re)production of symbolic boundaries (boundary work) and jurisdictional claims, whereby agents claim legitimate control of a set of tasks. *Diplomathood* is contingent on the social legitimacy conferred to these boundaries and jurisdictional claims. The argument is demonstrated through a case study of American diplomacy, building on over thirty semi-directed interviews, notably with Foreign Service officers (FSOs), and a set of primary and secondary written sources.

The dissertation shows that the American corps of FSOs seeks to constitute and reproduce itself as a status group of United States diplomacy through boundary work and jurisdictional claims vis-à-vis three other groups of foreign affairs actors: State Department civil servants; political appointees as ambassadors or domestic officials of the State Department; and public servants from other agencies or bureaucracies of the federal government. FSOs from different functional specializations also reproduce informal social and symbolic hierarchies among themselves with respect to diplomathood. Against these internal hierarchies, which put political officers in a dominant position, Foreign Service organizations (e.g. the Service's professional association) foster the esprit de corps of the group by emphasizing its collective identity as an elite corps of professional diplomats and by claiming control in its name of a number of diplomatic and foreign policy tasks.

On balance, the efforts of FSOs and their organizations aimed at constituting the former as a status group of US diplomacy appear partly successful. They have so far managed to reproduce their social and symbolic domination vis-à-vis civil servants of the State Department. However, their jurisdictional claims are contested by political appointees and public servants from other agencies involved in US foreign relations. In sum, the thesis contributes to knowledge, within the discipline of International Relations, on ongoing social and symbolic processes that constitute diplomats, arguably the most important social collective in world politics.

Keywords: Diplomacy, United States, Foreign Service, Department of State, Boundary Work, Jurisdictional Claims, Pierre Bourdieu, Status Group

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAD	American Academy of Diplomacy
ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AFSA	American Foreign Service Association
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CAA	Council of American Ambassadors
CBP	Customs and Border Protection Agency
CEO	Chief executive officer
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM	Combatant Command
COM	Chief of mission
DCM	Deputy chief of mission
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOE	Department of Energy
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
EEAS	European External Action Service
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAOs	Foreign affairs officers
FAS	Foreign Agricultural Service
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCS	Foreign Commercial Service
FM	Foreign ministry
FS	Foreign Service
FSI	Foreign Service Institute

FSO	Foreign Service officer
FSOT	Foreign Service officer test
G7/G8	Group of Seven / Group of Eight
GS	General Schedule (category of the federal civil service)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
Int.	Interview
IO	International organizations
IR	International Relations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS	National Diplomatic System
NGO	Non-governmental organization
NSC	National Security Council
NWC	National War College
OAS	Organization of American States
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OES	Oceans, Environment, and Science (bureau in State Department)
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PD	Public diplomacy
QDDR	Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review
QEP	Qualifications evaluation panel
SES	Senior Executive Service
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
US	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USIA	United States Information Agency
USTR	United States Trade Representative

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Introduction

"We should consider abolishing the separate cadre of diplomats altogether. ... The existence of diplomats reaffirms the separated nature of diplomacy and international relations from other areas of policy, when in fact they are inextricably connected." (Carne Ross 2007, 209-218)

For the most part of the last 300 years, diplomacy has been closely associated with a specific group of national public servants, namely members of diplomatic services. The origin of this group lies in the formation of the modern state system in Europe and the development of the institution of permanent diplomacy around the fifteenth century (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). Those who were sent by European sovereigns as resident diplomatic agents to foreign courts were progressively recognized as a distinct professional group, from the seventeenth century onward (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). Until the second half of the twentieth century, members of this group - whose social composition became more diversified in the meantime - held a privileged position, among national bureaucracies and in society in general, as managers of the interface between the domestic and international realms and as managers of world affairs in general.

This privileged position has been increasingly challenged in the last decades. Globalization and other processes intensifying linkages across borders have resulted in the multiplication and diversification of international actors and in the expansion of the domain of international relations to virtually every area of public policy. State officials from a broad range of government departments and from different branches and levels of jurisdiction now staff national embassies, partake in global and regional processes of governance and are involved in issue-specific transnational policy networks (Slaughter 2004). A myriad of nonstate actors -

such as international organization officials, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society groups, multinational corporations and business leaders - are also active participants in global governance, notably in multilateral processes of negotiation over transnational problems like climate change.

While a plurality of actors are involved in political representation and governance at the international or global level, as scholars and citizens, we tend to perpetuate the distinction between "diplomats" and other kinds of international actors. Global governance scholars present non-foreign ministry and nonstate actors playing a role in world affairs as "global governors" or "transnational policy networks", for instance, reserving the appellation of diplomats for foreign ministry officials or state leaders (Avant, Finnemore and Sell 2010; Karns, Mingst and Stiles 2015; Slaughter 2004). This thesis problematizes such distinctions by looking inductively at how social and symbolic boundaries between diplomats and non-diplomats are produced and reproduced.

More specifically, the research question that I investigate is: *How do diplomats create and reproduce themselves as a group?* To answer this question, I draw on the work of sociologists - Pierre Bourdieu, Andrew Abbott (1988), Max Weber (1968[1922]) and Michèle Lamont and Molnár (2002) - who have pursued an intimately related and fundamental line of inquiry in social sciences, namely the study of the conditions of existence and formation of social groups. Similarly, I seek to understand the conditions of existence of diplomats as a social group, arguably the most important social collective in international relations.

I argue that diplomats create and reproduce themselves as a social group through symbolic and social struggles. These struggles over legitimate "diplomathood" involve boundary work and jurisdictional claims. Through the latter, agents claim control of a set of tasks (Abbott 1988), while boundary work implies the creation, enforcement or contestation of symbolic boundaries, which are intersubjective conceptual distinctions that include and exclude some people, groups and things (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). Boundary work and jurisdictional claims both constitute groups by shaping their identity and social position. But groups who successfully claim legitimate diplomathood are those whose boundary work and jurisdictional claims are endowed with symbolic capital, a resource consisting of social recognition and legitimacy (Bourdieu 1989). Such groups are what Weber (1968[1922], 304) called status groups, that is, groups who "successfully claim a special social esteem, and possibly also, status monopolies".

Struggles over legitimate diplomathood in American diplomacy

I investigate struggles over legitimate diplomathood through a case study of relations among the governmental actors of American foreign relations. While struggles over legitimate diplomathood do not necessarily occur only among state actors, relations among the latter are certainly an important locus of such struggles and therefore deserve attention in their own right. Relations among actors of American foreign affairs present particular interest in this regard given the country's status as the world's superpower and the related high density and plurality of actors within the field of United States (US) foreign affairs. US officials from a wide range of federal government bureaucracies are entangled in networks of relations across the globe. The Department of State, the traditional diplomatic institution of the United States,

is also among the largest foreign ministries in the world and has one of the biggest corps of Foreign Service officers as well (Hocking 2013)[1].

The dissertation is focused in particular on Foreign Service officers (FSOs) and their relations to other groups of American foreign affairs actors. I focus on FSOs to study the constitution of diplomathood in the US context because this group, which today has about 8000 members, is formally designated, since almost a century, as the United States' professional cadre of diplomatic officials (Department of State 2016a). It constitutes the American incarnation of the movement toward career continuity and professionalization that spread among European diplomatic services from the seventeenth century onward and in other parts of the world later on (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). The value-added of paying special attention to the Foreign Service is to see how members of this group, whose broad function is to represent US interests vis-à-vis foreign governments and international organizations, negotiate in practice their identity and social position in the current context where their occupational domain is colonized by a plurality of other government actors.

The dissertation shows that the FSO corps seeks to constitute and reproduce itself as a status group of United States diplomacy and foreign policy, through boundary work and jurisdictional claims. The institutionalization of the Foreign Service, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, as a career corps regulated by merit principles, formally gave it a privileged access to US diplomatic positions and endowed FSOs with special legitimacy as US

[1] The overall workforce of the State Department numbered 74,700 as of June 2016, including 14,000 Foreign Service members (5700 of which are support personnel), 11,000 civil servants and 49,700 locally employed staff, who are foreign nationals employed in US diplomatic missions and consulates (Department of State 2016a).

diplomats. However, despite the institutionalized character of the group, the reproduction of its social position and identity still depends on ongoing practices of boundary work and jurisdictional claims. Through these practices, members of the Foreign Service seek social recognition of symbolic and jurisdictional boundaries that define their diplomathood as superior in relation to three other groups engaged in US diplomacy and foreign policy: State Department civil servants; political appointees serving as ambassadors or domestic officials of the State Department; and public servants from the various other agencies or bureaucracies of the US federal government.

Some contextual information is required about each of these three groups. First, in contrast with the Foreign Service, State Department civil servants are part of the federal-wide civil service system of the US government and serve essentially in domestic positions, although some of them travel periodically to participate, for instance, in international negotiations. While civil servants have always formed part of the agency's personnel, their number increased steadily since the 1980 (AFSA 2013b). Representing 11,000 employees out of the 25,000 American workforce of the State Department (Department of State 2016a), part of them are professionals such as lawyers, economists or mathematicians, while others work as foreign affairs officers, or as public diplomacy, consular or management professionals, like FSOs.

Political appointees, for their part, are individuals who are not career members of the foreign or civil services, but are appointed, normally for the duration of one or two presidential terms, as ambassadors or as domestic officials (mostly high-level ones) of the State Department.

While in most Western countries the professionalization of foreign services from the nineteenth century onwards has largely replaced appointments of non-career individuals in ambassadorships, in the United States they have always continued to occupy part of these positions. Since the 1950s, they have occupied about 30% of ambassadorial appointments under all presidents (Leguey-Feilleux 2009, 141). Political appointees in domestic positions of the bureaucracy are also much more numerous than in other Western countries and, according to the American Academy of Diplomacy, their number has increased significantly since the 1970s (Lewis 2008, 3; AAD 2015).

The third group is composed of the myriad of non-State Department officials who, notably as a result of globalization, interdependence and transnationalism, are involved in foreign relations on behalf of a federal executive government agency or on behalf of the White House. The great majority of executive departments have some foreign relations responsibilities, which in many cases are overseen by their own bureau or office for external affairs (Plischke 1999, 471). In 2016, a total of 32 agencies or subagencies deployed staff in US diplomatic missions abroad, State Department FSOs representing less than one third of the staff in the larger embassies (Department of State 2016a; CSIS 2007). Non-State Department officials also act as US representatives in international organizations and in other multilateral contexts, such as negotiations on the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Moreover, in the last seven decades, the White House-based National Security Council (NSC) staff and the Defense Department have played a key role in the formulation and conduct of US foreign policy.

FSOs' status group claim faces unequal challenges on the part of the three groups just presented - State Department civil servants, political appointees and other agencies and bureaucracies. While, in recent years, State Department principals have been considering ways to weaken social boundaries between their foreign and civil services, these objective boundaries remain strongly institutionalized, which favors the domination of FSOs. The latter have a much better access to ambassadorships, other senior positions in the department, and they tend to occupy positions in the most prestigious bureaus. Hence, FSOs' boundary work and jurisdictional claims vis-à-vis their civil service colleagues are oriented toward the preservation of their dominant position. In that perspective, they notably invoke their nomadic lifestyle, the prestige of their employment conditions and their more generalist cultural capital as justifications of their higher status as diplomats.

FSOs' status group claim is more challenged by political appointees, since the latter occupy high-level positions that they consider as part of their jurisdiction and challenge their definition of what counts as symbolic capital for legitimate diplomathood. FSOs and their representative organizations constantly struggle against the practice of political appointments by drawing symbolic boundaries defining the competences and experience required for ambassadorships and other diplomatic positions, competences such as host-country knowledge and general foreign policy proficiency. While FSOs have not managed so far to protect their claimed jurisdiction from political appointees, social dynamics on the workplace can put them in a dominant symbolic position when non-career appointees seek social recognition from them as competent diplomats.

Vis-à-vis other US foreign affairs actors, FSOs and the State Department in general have seen, over the last decades, their role and influence on the formulation and conduct of foreign policy decline in favor of the White House and the Defense Department. FSOs nonetheless continue to claim a role in the formulation of policy and, in recent years, retired officers and Foreign Service organizations have called for a rebalancing of national security resources and instruments in favor of the State Department. FSOs feel less challenged by other civilian agencies performing foreign affairs functions. They tend to draw symbolic boundaries portraying many of them as more peripheral to US diplomacy and foreign policy, notably given the narrower focus of their domain of intervention in the international realm. At embassies abroad, however, FSOs' jurisdictional claim on the coordination and direction of all US government activities abroad faces some shortcomings, as other agencies do not necessarily recognize their legitimacy to play these roles.

While FSOs' status group claim is only partly successful overall, their boundary work and jurisdictional claims shape their collective identity and sustain their sense of self-worth despite there being many other foreign affairs actors across the US government. FSOs pride themselves of being a special group of public servants, whose conditions of employment are more prestigious and rigorous than those of many other public servants and whose skills and experience make them particularly well-rounded foreign affairs professionals. Foreign Service organizations (notably the union and professional association of the Service) play a particularly important role in fostering, through their boundary work and jurisdictional claims, the collective identity and esprit de corps of the group. This group-making counterbalances the social and symbolic hierarchies within the FSO corps itself, which are the result of

accumulated struggles among its members over legitimate diplomathood. In continuity with tradition, political officers tend to stand at the apex of the Foreign Service hierarchy with the most symbolic capital as diplomats, although economic officers are not far behind, followed by public diplomacy officers and, at the bottom, consular and management officers. Against these internal hierarchies, Foreign Service organizations emphasize the identity of all FSOs as professional diplomats.

Why it matters

Studying struggles over legitimate diplomathood or, in other words, processes through which agents are constituted as diplomats, is important because diplomatic standing brings with it entitlements. While today various actors who are not considered diplomats play an active role in international relations, those with the status of diplomat still enjoy special rights and privileges. In multilateral organizations and forums, for instance, the diplomathood conferred upon state representatives gives them a seat at the table, a vote and privileged access to information, while citizens and non-governmental organizations remain largely excluded from deliberations and decision-making. Broadly speaking, diplomatic standing tends to be synonymous with prestige, notably for those holding the title of ambassador, who usually retain this title after retirement and may as a consequence continue to enjoy special deference[2]. At the national level, diplomatic standing tends to give those who enjoy it special legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of their fellow citizens at the international level. Recently, for instance, the mayor of Montreal, who wants to develop an "urban diplomacy", was criticized

[2] A retired ambassador interviewed for this research explained, for instance, how his ambassadorial title helped him obtain funding to set up an NGO after he retired and how it facilitated his access to active-duty US officials abroad long after his retirement (Interview 14).

in the press and by his political opposition for his many travels abroad (La Presse 2016; Radio-Canada 2016). While these criticisms may have been justified in some regards, they conveyed a reluctance to consider as legitimate that municipal officials be engaged in diplomacy.

Moreover, if diplomacy is a fundamental set of practices in world politics, studying struggles over legitimate diplomathood is also important because it concerns the constitution of authority among its main actors. As suggested by the English school (Wight 1977) and more recently by Sending, Pouliot and Neumann (2015), it is through diplomatic practices – i.e., practices of representation and communication across polities – that much of international relations and global governance unfold. Hence, diplomacy is not a separate area of global politics but, to a significant extent, makes it possible. In the academic literature, however, diplomacy has tended to remain a separate field of study. But in diplomatic studies as much as in the International Relations (IR) literature on the various actors of global governance, there has been, as remarked by Sending (2015), a lack of attention to the question of how actors become authoritative.[3] Our discipline has glossed over symbolic, social, and political processes that are important to understand the constitution of authority. The dissertation suggests, largely in accordance with Sending (2015), that agents constitute their authority as international actors by seeking social recognition of a set of symbolic distinctions and jurisdictional claims.

[3] In studies of global governance, authority is often defined and postulated a priori, as Sending notes (2015). For instance, Avant, Finnemore and Sell (2010) pre-define five sources of authority of "global governors".

Structure of the thesis

This thesis being focused on actors of state diplomacy, chapter one first traces the history of diplomatic institutions of the state system. This is followed, in the same chapter, by a review of the state of knowledge regarding, notably, what diplomacy is and how practitioners from traditional diplomatic institutions of the state negotiate changing dynamics of the international system. In chapter two, I lay out in more detail the theoretical framework that has been sketched above and which is inspired by the work of Bourdieu and other sociologists. Subsequently, I present the methods that I used, based on an interpretive methodology, to conduct the empirical research.

My case study starts in chapter three. I first present the historical background and genesis of the US corps of Foreign Service officers, as well as its current career system, composition and recruitment practices. This information is important to contextualize the boundary work and jurisdictional claims of FSOs. The chapter then turns to findings about internal hierarchies among FSOs and the work of Foreign Service organizations aimed at fostering the esprit de corps of the group.

Chapters four to six are devoted respectively to the relations between FSOs and civil servants of the State Department (chapter 4), the relations between FSOs and political appointees (chapter 5), and the relations between FSOs and actors of US foreign relations from other departments, agencies or office of the federal government (chapter 6). Within each chapter, the empirical analysis is preceded by a presentation of the contextual information required to better understand the social and symbolic dynamics between the two sets of actors examined.

In the conclusion, I wrap up the arguments and findings, address the contributions of the thesis and reflect on further avenues of research.

Chapter 1 - What is Diplomacy and Who Are the Diplomats?

While the conduct of relations between sovereigns through the sending of official emissaries has an ancient history[4], developments in Europe from the Middle Ages through the nineteenth century were of particular importance for today's (Western) national diplomatic apparatuses. These developments include, mainly, the formation of the modern state system, the emergence and diffusion of the institution of residential diplomacy, and the emergence of foreign ministries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

This chapter contextualizes the present study by first tracing the historical development of modern state diplomatic institutions, a narrative in which is incorporated a review of the main classic works on diplomacy, since they help us understand how certain ideas about diplomacy and diplomats developed over time. Second, I review the various conceptual and theoretical perspectives, within the existing literature, on diplomacy, diplomatic institutions and diplomats. This includes debates, notably, on what diplomacy is and whether and how traditional diplomatic institutions are adapting to a globalized and interdependent world. The last section of the literature review concentrates on what I call the "social studies of diplomacy", a newer body of research with which this dissertation has much affinity.

[4] Diplomacy actually goes back to the first systematic contacts between human collectives. According to Cohen (2013, 15), the origins of diplomacy can be found as early as the fourth millennium BC, although it was more thoroughly developed from the fourth century onwards, as the Roman empire declined and the Byzantine empire rose (Cohen 2013). The latter developed practices that influenced medieval Western European polities.

1. State Diplomacy: historical background and classic works

In medieval Europe, kings, popes, various dignitaries and corporate bodies (for instance, military orders or trading organizations) were all sending and receiving envoys, who eventually began to be called ambassadors (Cohen 2013, 24). The process by which the state progressively acquired a monopoly on diplomacy paralleled the development of permanent diplomacy. It was in the Italian city-states, in the second-half of the fifteenth century, that emerged the key institution for permanent diplomacy, namely the resident ambassador, an official envoy remaining stationed at a foreign city until replaced (Cohen 2013, 25). Previously, ad-hoc emissaries had prevailed. The institution of resident ambassadors spread around Europe from the end of the fifteenth century into the mid-sixteenth century (Robert 2009, 9). As noted by Robert, "in the atmosphere of the developing nation states, shifting alliances, and the dynastic struggles for power, the resident diplomatic agent was invaluable in keeping his master supplied with information and acting as a barometer to register every evidence... of impending change" (2009, 9). Italian city-states put in place chanceries to administer their diplomatic network and this innovation too influenced other European polities, but it was mostly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that foreign ministries were first institutionalized in Europe (Cohen 2013; Neumann 2012).

Writings by commentators and diplomatic practitioners contributed to theorize the function of ambassadors and construe diplomacy as a distinct professional activity. According to Hamilton and Langhorne (2011, 37), already at the end of the fifteenth century some authors (e.g. Bernard du Rosier) started to discuss "the most desirable characteristics, the most suitable training, the most correct behaviour of ambassadors". This genre of writing was pursued in

subsequent centuries, notably with L'ambassadeur et ses fonctions (1680), from Abraham de Wicquefort, and Cardinal Richelieu's Testament politique (1688 (1638]), which underlined the importance of having good ambassadors to conduct continuous negotiations with European allies and adversaries (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). Particularly influential was a manual on diplomacy published in 1716 by François de Callières, De la manière de négocier avec les souverains, de l'utilité des négotiations, du choix des ambassadeurs et des envoyés, et des qualités nécessaires pour réussir dans ces emplois. De Callières portrayed international relations as a distinct political activity that required the intelligence (both in terms of information gathering and in terms of perceptiveness) of the ambassador, his ability in generating trust and in the "art of persuasion" (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 75).

In a further book on the practice of diplomacy published in 1737, Antoine Pecquet, a French diplomat, argued that the set of diplomatic representatives stationed at any capital or court constituted a body, a corps diplomatique (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 76). Members of this corps "would treat each other in a civilized way even when their principals were at war... shared the same privileges and would jointly defend any of their number whose rights has been infringed" by the receiving government (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 76). Beyond Pecquet's writing, the term "diplomatic body", or corps diplomatique, started to be used around the middle of the eighteenth century in Europe (Satow 1917). The fact that, well into the nineteenth century, members of the diplomatic body were all aristocrats, often "linked by ties of friendship, blood and marriage", fostered a transnational esprit de corps among them (Jonsson and Hall 2005, 41; Roberts 2009, 11).

Foreign ministries emerged across Europe mostly in the second half of the eighteenth century based on the French model set forth by Cardinal Richelieu, who put in place the first such bureaucracy in 1626 in order to ensure more consistency and unified direction in the formulation and implementation of French foreign policy and to better preserve archives (Berridge 2005, 5). The emergence of foreign ministries replaced the former common practice of combining both foreign and domestic policy in the same government department (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). However, even in the nineteenth century, ministries of foreign affairs were not necessarily without bureaucratic rivals for the conduct of the state's external relations; notably, heads of state or government, war offices and trade ministries also assumed or claimed, to varying degrees in different countries, a role in these matters (Berridge 2005, 7; Hocking 2013, 128).

The Congress of Vienna in 1815 codified and formalized a set of diplomatic practices and it was agreed that only sovereign polities were diplomatic subjects (Batora 2005; Neumann 2012, 48). The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, following the Congress of Vienna, also standardized diplomacy by defining four categories of diplomatic representatives and by formalizing rules of precedence among multi-national diplomatic corps (Batora 2005). Neumann (2012, 51) notes that, in addition to the adoption of these common rules and standards, a common practice of states in the eighteenth century and beyond has been to exchange information about how they organize their foreign ministries, which has fostered a certain homogeneity of their institutional structures.

Until the second half of the nineteenth century, in most European countries members of the diplomatic service were permanently posted abroad and had little to do with the consular service, which formed a separate corps (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 122). In the latter part of the nineteenth century (or later in some cases), diplomats started to rotate between postings in foreign missions and in the foreign ministry (Neumann 2012). According to Neumann (2012), the merging of the diplomatic service with the foreign ministry, more bourgeois-dominated, contributed to diminish the domination of the aristocracy in state diplomacy. This evolution was further reinforced with the merger, from the beginning of the twentieth century, of the diplomatic and consular services, the latter being composed mostly of members of the bourgeoisie. For Neumann (2012, 35), "The merging of these three entities was a crucial turn in the genealogy of today's foreign service".

In the second half of the nineteenth century, several European governments started to implement administrative reforms aimed at the recruitment and promotion of diplomats on the basis of merit and the possession of certain educational qualifications, rather than social rank (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). Competitive entrance examinations were introduced and a set of rules governing diplomatic careers were adopted. However, it was not before the twentieth century that the recruitment of diplomats started to be more genuinely meritocratic and that categories of people - middle classes, women, etc. - that had until then been barred from the diplomatic service became legally entitled to join its ranks (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 94; Neumann 2012, 131).

While foreign services became more socially diversified in the twentieth century, Harold Nicolson, a seasoned English diplomat, pointed out in his seminal handbook on diplomacy published in 1939, that members of the different national diplomatic services shared a “corporate feeling", a transnational professional solidarity (1988[1939], 40). For Nicolson, ever since the beginning of the nineteenth century, “the diplomatic services of [European] nations had been recognized as a distinct branch of the civil service in each country" and "a definite profession had been established, possessing its own hierarchy and rules, and destined ... to evolve its own freemasonry and conventions" (1988[1939], 14).

While Nicolson and other practitioner-writers before him portrayed diplomacy as a profession, at a broader level they also construed it, in line with their first-hand experience of it, as the management of relations between sovereign states (Nicolson 1939). Nicolson emphasized negotiation as the principle by which these relations were managed and distinguished between foreign policy, formulated by governments, and diplomacy, a method to carry out foreign policy. Before Nicolson's, another influential handbook had been published by Ernest Satow in 1917. In his Guide to diplomatic practice, Satow defined diplomacy as the "application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states... or, more briefly still, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means" (Satow 1917). The first part of this definition emphasizes the soft skills of diplomacy, skills that earlier writers in previous centuries as well as Nicolson, in his description of the "ideal diplomatist", also elaborated on in a prescriptive style.

2. Conceptual perspectives and theories on diplomacy

In the discipline of International Relations (IR), the two classical schools of realism and liberalism, as well as their "neo" variants (neorealism and neoliberalism), have paid very little attention to diplomacy and diplomats, tending to regard them as an epiphenomenon of world politics (but see Kissinger below). Diplomatic studies have tended to be marginalized in IR, a situation probably compounded by the lack of theorization of scholarly work in that field. In this regard, it has often been remarked that the literature on diplomacy offered "an abundance of taxonomies and typologies, but a shortage of theories" (Jönsson 2002; Murray 2011; Sending et al. 2015). This situation has greatly improved in recent years, with the emergence of a number of practice-based studies of diplomacy in the context of a "practice turn" in IR (e.g. Neumann 2002, Pouliot 2010). Before addressing this newer wave of research, a review of the previous literature is in order.

2.1 From State-Based to Pluralist Conceptions of Diplomacy

The English school is arguably the only classical tradition of IR that has included a theoretical reflection on diplomacy. Scholars in this tradition theorized diplomacy as a key institution of the international society of states that creates order through rules and practices facilitating inter-state relations (Bull 1977; Watson 1982; Wight 1986). Emphasizing the functions of diplomacy, Watson (1982) defined it as “the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue theirs purposes by means short of war". Bull, for his part, defined diplomacy as "the conduct of relations between states and other entities with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means" (1977, 156). For Bull, diplomacy is one of the five institutions underlying and maintaining international

order, alongside the balance of power, international law, war and great powers. Further, diplomacy, in his view, presupposes and symbolizes the existence of a society of states (or "international society"), that is, a group of states considering themselves bound by a set of common rules and collaborating through common institutions. Seeing diplomats themselves, or "the diplomatic profession", as "custodian[s] of the idea of international society", Bull made passing mentions of "the solidarity of the diplomatic profession" and the existence of a diplomatic culture based on "the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official representatives of states", but he did not elaborate more on these aspects (Bull 1977).

One of the most well-known textbooks on diplomacy, Berridge's *Diplomacy: Theory and Practice* (2005, 2015 for the fifth edition), displays affinity with the English school by portraying diplomacy as essentially a state activity and institution. "Together with the balance of power, which it both reinforces and reflects, diplomacy is the most important institution of our society of states", writes Berridge (2005, 2015). As "an essentially political activity" whose "chief purpose is to enable states to secure the objectives of their foreign policies without resort to force, propaganda or law", diplomacy involves, for this author, "communication between professional diplomatic agents and other officials designed to secure agreements" (Berridge 2015). Echoing early conceptions of diplomacy by Cardinal Richelieu and others, Berridge (2005, 2015) identifies negotiation, or the "art of negotiation", as the most important diplomatic activity.

With respect to American writers on diplomacy specifically, there has been a tendency, as noted by David Clinton (2012), to use the term diplomacy as a synonym of foreign policy or

statecraft, in contrast with Nicolson's distinction between the two. Henry Kissinger's *Diplomacy* (1994) is a classic example of this usage, being focused on Western foreign policies and grand strategies. While Kissinger's book is dedicated to "the men and women of the United States Foreign Service", whom he headed as former Secretary of State, it features prominently, as remarked by Neumann (2012), the statesman instead of the career diplomat and suggests, in line with the realist tradition of IR, that diplomacy (or rather foreign policy) should be based on *realpolitik* and the "careful and deliberate tending" of a balance of power. Beyond Kissinger, other American studies featuring "diplomacy" in their title are also often more macroscopic examinations of national foreign policy and statecraft[5].

Being concerned that too much scholarly and policy attention is paid to the grand strategy and foreign policy of the Unites States as opposed to its diplomacy, Sharp and Wiseman (2012) edited a collection of essays on American diplomacy understood as "the institutions and processes by which the country represents itself and its interests to the rest of the world" (p. vii)[6]. Some chapters of the book are also concerned with diplomacy as an approach to foreign policy that is less coercive and military-based, a common usage in the American political and policy discourse[7].

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[5] George, A. 1991, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War;* Art, R. and P. Cronin, eds. *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy;* Schulzinger, R. 1998, *US Diplomacy Since 1900;* Freeman, C. 1997 *Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy;* Kennan, G. 1984, *American Diplomacy.*

[6] This collection of essays first appeared in 2011 as a special issue in the *Hague Journal of Diplomacy*.

[7] For instance, the chapter by Sharp on "Obama, Clinton and the Diplomacy of Change".

Diplomacy as an institution and concept transcending the state

Over the last 25 years or so, several scholars rejected the dominant conception of diplomacy as a state-bound practice and institution. For Paul Sharp (1999, 2009), diplomacy "expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years" (1999, 51). It is a distinct practice of representation in response to "a common problem of living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others" (Sharp 1999). More recently, Sharp (2009) argued that diplomatic practice generates a distinctive "diplomatic tradition of international thought", characterized notably by a value placed on peoples living in conditions of separateness and on the plural character of human ideas and arguments. While rejecting the state-centric conception of diplomacy of the English school authors presented above, Sharp (2009) does take inspiration from some English school authors (Wight and Watson in particular), notably through his use of Wight's idea of three Western traditions of thought about international relations.

Sharing Sharp's view of diplomacy as an existential phenomenon transcending the modern state system, Jönnson and Hall (2005) argue that diplomacy is "a perennial international institution" that is constitutive of any international society and that it can be analyzed as the mediation of universalism and particularism (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 3-4). Seeking to capture diplomacy's "essence", they identify three essential (i.e. perennial) dimensions of diplomacy: communication, representation and the reproduction of international society, the latter dimension referring to the processes by which polities or groups of polities maintain themselves as such. Jönsson and Hall also draw partly on the English school with the concept

of international society and with their conceptualization of diplomacy as an international institution.

While the two previous works imply the view that diplomacy facilitates relations among peoples, a poststructuralist genealogy of diplomacy by Der Derian (1987) emphasized the idea that diplomacy produces and reproduces estrangement or alienation, instead of merely reducing it. As the "mediation between estranged individuals, groups or entities", diplomacy implies the symbolic construction of estranged identities (Der Derian 1987). Another poststructuralist contribution is Constantinou's (1996) deconstruction of diplomacy, premised on a critical analysis of "the politics of its language" and the retrieval of its historically concealed and forgotten meanings. Constantinou notably argues that diplomacy exists wherever "there are boundaries for identity and those boundaries of identity are crossed" - an argument that seems to have influenced Sharp (1999, 2009) - and that to practice diplomacy is by definition to theorize diplomacy.

In a very different perspective, albeit also challenging the traditional state-based conception of diplomacy, several scholars have suggested that in the contemporary context marked notably by globalization and interdependence, diplomacy is not declining but has become a more pluralized institution, encompassing interactions between a diverse set of actors, not just state agents, and a broad set of practices beyond traditional political and security-related diplomatic activities (Hocking 1999; Cooper and Hocking 2000; Devin 2002; Wiseman 2004, 2011; Cooper et al. 2013). Wiseman (2004) argues that "polylateralism", which he defined as the conduct of relations between official state representatives and non-state agents, now

constitutes a third type of diplomacy alongside bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Hocking (1999a), for his part, coined the term "catalytic diplomacy" to conceptualize new patterns of relations between state and non-state agents in which the former build coalitions with the latter to deal with transnational issues and act as mediators among stakeholders. Another conceptualization distinguishes between "club diplomacy" and "network diplomacy", the former referring to a traditional and hierarchical mode of diplomatic interaction restricted to a small number of players (state agents) and the latter involving interactions among a broader set of actors (state and non-state), a flatter structure and greater transparency (Cooper 2013; Heine 2008). Cooper (2013) and Heine (2008) suggest that "club diplomacy" tends to be replaced by network diplomacy.

Other new concepts arose in the scholarly literature to make sense of contemporary diplomatic interaction involving non-traditional actors and methods, for instance: public diplomacy[8] (e.g. Melissen 2013), celebrity diplomacy (Cooper 2008), digital diplomacy (Bjola and Holmes 2015), NGO diplomacy (Betsill and Corell 2008) and track-two diplomacy (Kerr and Taylor 2013). Kelley (2014, 2010) argues that there is an "agency change" in diplomacy, which implies a "relocation of diplomatic power" to non-state actors who have diplomatic capabilities and a decline of the "diplomacy of status" which has traditionally favored accredited state representatives. Therefore, in his view, state diplomacy is declining. By contrast, most authors addressing new dynamics in diplomacy, instead of talking about a decline of state-based diplomacy, suggest that the latter displays adaptive capacities through

[8] Public diplomacy, in particular, has been a burgeoning field of study in the last decade (Mellissen 2013).

the development of new practices (e.g. Mellissen 1999; Hocking 1999a; Cooper et al. 2013; Wiseman and Kerr 2013).

2.2 Foreign Ministries and Transnational Communities of Diplomats

Since the turn of the millennium or so, a line of research on diplomacy has focused, in an institutionalist perspective, on how foreign ministries are responding to broad trends such as globalization, the rise of non-state actors, the blurring of domestic and foreign policies and the information revolution (Hocking 1999b, Batora 2008), or to the regionally specific reality of European integration (Hocking and Spence 2005; Hocking and Batora 2009; Batora 2005).

Brian Hocking (1999b) and Hocking and Spence (2005) emphasize the capacity of adaptation of foreign ministries (FM) in reaction to international interdependence and other changes in the environment of diplomacy, thereby countering arguments according to which such changes are causing a decline in the role and relevance of FMs. Based on case studies from around the world, Hocking (1999b) argues that FMs display an ability to respond to new demands posed by globalization and international interdependence. For Hocking (1999b), the assumption that FMs historically enjoyed the position of "gatekeeper" with respect to their government's interaction with the world is of questionable accuracy, at least in a number of national cases. Further, "the functions, role and behaviour of FMs are far more complex" than the gatekeeping image suggests (Hocking 1999b). In that perspective, disaggregating the functions performed by FMs provides a more nuanced picture of the contemporary role and significance of these institutions, some of their functions, like policy advice, being more challenged than others, like the administration of the diplomatic network or consular functions.

In Hocking and Spence (2005), an edited book on the foreign ministries of European Union member states, Hocking introduces the notion of FMs as "boundary-spanners", a notion implying the following set of ideal-typical characteristics in terms of institutional behaviour: "an awareness of the limits of control combined with the needs of access and presence"; a facilitative role in the management of issue-directed coalitions; the development of cooperative relationships with public and private agencies through policy networks; coordination defined as facilitating information flows and sharing lead department status on international issues. For Hocking, the boundary-spanner image provides in many contexts, notably in the EU context, a more relevant set of criteria to assess the role of the foreign ministry than the gatekeeper image.

Moreover, regarding the growing international involvement of various government ministries and agencies, Hocking (2005, 2013) argues that we should think of the institution of the foreign ministry as being part of, but not coterminous with, the "national diplomatic system" (NDS). The NDS refers to the "set of institutions and actors configured for the management of a state's international environment" (Hocking 2013, 127). Hocking (2013) suggests that foreign ministries have to cope with a changing place in the NDS by redefining their role and relations with other bureaucratic actors of this system. According to him, two tendencies in how FMs have adapted to changed circumstances are the development of more specialist skills among their diplomats and a greater importance attached to the functional sections of the ministry (as opposed to geographic sections) (Hocking 2013).

In an article conceptualizing diplomacy and its change in the European Union region, Batora (2005) argues, for its part, based on a new institutionalist approach, that foreign ministries around the world constitute a transnational organizational field with a common set of standards and notions of appropriateness. The latter refer to shared meanings, identities and expectations. Members of the different national diplomatic services thus form "a global professional community with a shared set of values, practices, behavioral patterns, professional language and identity, perpetuated by similar recruitment methods and socialization" (Batora 2005). This is in addition to the specific national identity and organizational culture of each foreign ministry, which also socialize diplomats. For Batora, European integration challenges established notions of appropriateness within the diplomatic organizational field, more specifically: rules and norms designating legitimate diplomatic conduct, participants and situations; professional values, norms and language; and legitimate working procedures and methods.

Drawing on conventional constructivism and network theory, Cross (2007) also highlights the sharing of common professional norms among diplomats from different countries, albeit for a different purpose than the analysis of change in diplomacy. Against the standard view in International Relations that diplomats are merely a "transmission belt" for governments, she argues that diplomats are actors in their own right and can have an independent impact on international negotiations. More precisely, her argument is that diplomats, defined as "high-level government officials engaged in professional interaction as plenipotentiaries on the transnational level", constitute an epistemic community, that is, "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to

policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area" (Cross 2007, 1). The sharing of professional norms in terms of protocol, procedure, and norms of consensus help constitute diplomats as an epistemic community, but the latter's cohesion also depend on four factors: the social background of diplomats (class- and education-based); their professional status; the frequency of their meetings; and their training. The less variation there is regarding these factors within the community of diplomats, the more this community can exercise agency during international meetings, by going beyond their delegated autonomy to act in ways not anticipated by their government principals. Cross applies her framework to multilateral European diplomacy, with four case studies ranging from the 17th century to the late 20th century.

2.3 American Diplomats

Most of the studies discussed in the previous section are empirically focused on European foreign ministries and diplomats. Regarding the literature having as its primary research object the United States' diplomatic service and State Department, existing studies offer many empirical contributions - a number of them dating back from the 1960s, 1970s or 1980s - but relatively few theoretical insights[9]. An old sociological study on the US corps of Foreign Service officers is *The Professional Diplomat*, by Harr (1969), who analyzed how this corps of professionals responded to contemporary pressures for change. Harr documented the social

[9] This literature includes studies on the history of the US Foreign Service and the Department of State: Illchman (1961); Schulzinger (1975); Plischke (1999); Weisbrode (2009). Other studies include: Scott (1969), on the formal organization and informal culture of the State Department; Bacchus (1983), an analysis of the needs for reform of the personnel systems of the State Department and the obstacles to reform; East and Dillery (1999), in Hocking (1999), documenting attempts to reform the institutional structures and processes of the State Department under the Bush I and Clinton administrations; Jett (2014), an empirical examination by a former career ambassador of the bureaucratic process and determinants of ambassadorial appointments in the US.

composition and characteristics of the corps as well as its norms and values. Anchored in a functionalist understanding of professions, Harr's study naturalizes the status of profession of the FSO corps. By contrast, as part of a journal's special issue on the "professions in government", Bacchus (1977) argued that it was difficult to identify a profession among US civilian foreign affairs officials. The latter, including the Foreign Service, were unable "to establish a monopoly over knowledge necessary for the conduct of foreign affairs"; thus "it has been impossible for them to sustain claims to be the sole practitioners of their trade" (642-643). For Bacchus, this situation was likely to be accentuated in years ahead. A close observer of the Foreign Service as a consultant for the State Department, he also remarked that, "perhaps the most fundamental adaptation facing FSOs collectively will be perceptual, in bringing their self-assigned roles into greater congruence with existing realities" (648).

Much more recently, and in a different line of research, Sharp and Wiseman (2012) edited a book, as already mentioned above, on the institutions and processes of American diplomacy. While the book offers mostly an empirical rather than theoretical contribution, arguments made in Wiseman's chapter (also in Wiseman 2011) are worth mentioning. He argues that US diplomats take part in the international society's diplomatic culture in a distinctive way and this distinctiveness stems from seven interrelated factors, the first of which is the general distrust and negative view of diplomats and diplomacy among the American population and political class. This has contributed, he argues, to the neglect and sidelining of the State Department in US foreign policy-making. Other factors identified by Wiseman include "a high degree of domestic influence over foreign policy, a tendency to privilege hard power over soft power in foreign policy; a preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy; ... [and] a

tradition of appointing a relatively high proportion of political rather than career ambassadors" (Wiseman 2012, 1). These characteristics impact how American diplomats represent the US abroad and the consequence according to Wiseman is that American diplomacy tends to be less effective.

While certainly insightful, Wiseman's (2012) analysis is of a macroscopic type, reflecting attitudes and practices of US political leaders and their administrations as well as those of the American public. He does not address the practices and attitudes of the Foreign Service or the organizational culture of the State Department. It is within a different line of research, namely studies of the US foreign policy decision-making process, that we find theoretical and empirical insights on practices and representations within the State Department and its Foreign Service. I am referring here more specifically to studies based on a bureaucratic politics approach, in particular Halperin (1974) and Halperin and Clapp (2006)[10]. While they seek to explain how decisions are made within the American executive government machinery, a research purpose that lies outside the scope of this dissertation, Halperin and Clapp (2006) make relevant arguments to understand how career diplomats preserve themselves as a group. Arguing that bureaucrats involved in policy-making are driven by their agency interests, they contend that these interests are shaped by bureaucrats' organizational essence, which they define as follows: "the view held by the dominant group in an organization of what its

[10] Halperin and Clapp (2006) is the revised edition of Halperin (1974), but the theoretical framework is basically the same. Allison (1971) has of course pioneered the bureaucratic politics approach, but he paid scant attention to the State Department as an organization in his analysis of the Cuban missile crisis based on the model of bureaucratic politics. More recent studies on US foreign policy decision-making, that use a bureaucratic politics approach or other approaches, also tend to pay little attention to the State Department and a lot of attention to the White House and its National Security Council staff (e.g. David 2015).

missions and capabilities should be. Related to essence are convictions about what kind of people with what expertise, experience and knowledge should be members of the organization" (Halperin and Clapp 2006, 27). Bureaucratic organizations seek to defend, preserve and promote their essence; as a corollary they seek to protect what they consider to be their turf. This notably implies that an organization will resist efforts to take away from it those functions viewed as part of its essence, but will often be indifferent to functions not seen as part of its essence. It also implies that bureaucrats seek autonomy and influence for their organization so as to preserve and promote their essence.

Moreover, in their discussion of organizational morale and its importance for the effective functioning of an organization, Halperin and Clapp (2006) argue that career bureaucrats need to feel that what they are doing makes a difference and promotes the national interest, that their role "in the scheme of things" is not diminishing and that the organization controls its own resources (54). Most importantly, "the career official must believe that there is room for advancement in the organization" and he or she "strives to ensure that top jobs are held primarily by its own career officials" (54). Further, a career official's view is shaped in substantial part by his desire for promotion (85).

As part of their analysis of the organizational essence of US agencies involved in national security decision-making, Halperin (1974) and Halperin and Clapp (2006) assert that the essence of the State Department, as defined by Foreign Service officers (FSOs), is seen as "reporting on the activities of foreign governments that have relevance to the United States, general representation of American interests abroad, and negotiation of special issues when

directed by the government" (Halperin and Clapp 2006, 35; Halperin 1974, 36). They also note that FSOs "view their enterprise as an elite organization composed of generalists" and that they resist the introduction into the department of new functions and of experts to perform those functions (2006, 35; 1974, 36).

2.4 The Social Studies of Diplomacy

Over the last 15 years, a body of literature, which we may call "social studies of diplomacy" or "practice theories of diplomacy", has developed using social theories focused on practices at the micro-level (Pouliot and Cornut 2015). Iver Neumann played an important role in this development, notably in an article making the case for a practice turn in the discipline of International Relations (Neumann 2002). Other key authors of the social studies of diplomacy are Pouliot (2010, 2015, 2016), Adler-Nissen (2008, 2014a, 2014b), Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014), Pouliot and Cornut (2015), Sending et al. (2015), and Kuus (2014, 2015). In contrast with much of the works reviewed in previous sections, this literature has notably contributed to integrating power considerations in diplomatic studies without loosing sight of the cultural dimension of diplomatic practices and settings.

Using interpretive methods, including ethnography in the Norwegian foreign ministry, Neumann (2005, 2007, 2008, 2012) called attention to the everyday practices of traditional state diplomats and to the discourse underlying these practices. As part of his inquiry into how diplomats experience the world, he argued that the juggling of three scripts of self - the bureaucratic script, the heroic script and the self-effacing one of the mediator - is central to being a diplomat (Neumann 2005, 2012). While they do a lot of bureaucratic, routine work,

especially when based in their home ministry, diplomats are "very particular about being different from and something more than bureaucrats" (Neumann 2012, 177). They like to emphasize negotiation, part of the heroic script, as the core of their work although this is only a very little part of what they actually do in general (Neumann 2012, 94-125). Neumann also showed that, while Western national diplomatic corps have become more representative of their societies, there is still, at least within the Norwegian foreign ministry, a gender- and class-based hierarchy among them, the upper bourgeois male remaining dominant (Neumann 2012, 2008).

Adler-Nissen (2008, 2014b), Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) and Sending et al. (2015) suggest that diplomatic practices have a constitutive effect, and sometimes a counter-intuitive one, on patterns of world politics. Adler-Nissen (2008, 2014b) has argued that in the EU, national representatives from member states applying "opt-outs" in certain domains tend to use compensatory strategies to manage the "stigma of opting out", which results in fostering integration rather than preserving national sovereignty. In their analysis of the multilateral negotiation process that led to the intervention in Lybia in 2011, Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) argue that the struggles of state representatives to establish themselves as competent diplomats ended up playing an important role in the decision to intervene. In line with such findings, Sending et al. (2015) and the contributors to their book argue that world politics and global governance are constituted in and through diplomatic practice, since diplomacy is what makes other social processes possible.

Several social studies of diplomacy have drawn on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu - with his keys concepts of field, habitus and capital - to study diplomatic processes and practices in the multilateral settings of the European Union (EU), NATO and the United Nations (UN) (e.g. Adler-Nissen 2013, 2014; Pouliot 2010, 2016; Kuus 2015). In doing so, they have notably shown the importance of symbolic power and symbolic struggles in diplomacy, systems of meaning being also systems of domination in a bourdieusian perspective (Pouliot and Mérand 2013). Symbolic power refers to the ability of certain social agents to tacitly impose particular perceptions upon other agents, the latter regarding as natural or legitimate these arbitrary constructions (Bourdieu 2001). For Kuus (2015), for instance, symbolic power operates notably through informal resources inscribed in diplomats' habitus (embodied dispositions), such as ease, poise, composure and a certain dress code. Examining the workings of such cultural traits in EU diplomatic circles, Kuus shows that these informal resources are not equally distributed among diplomats of the different member states, but tend to be recognized by all as defining superiority in style. Hence, for Kuus, differences of style are constitutive elements of the relations of power among the professionals from the different member states.

Adler-Nissen (2014a) argued that symbolic power is key to understanding the controversy provoked, among EU member states and their national foreign services, by the establishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010. The latter does not really challenge national diplomacies in a material or institutional sense, but calls into question the state's monopoly of symbolic power with respect to the conduct of diplomacy; in other words, it questions the power of the state to define what diplomacy is, how it is organized and who may be called a "diplomat". The establishment of the EEAS has produced a "struggle for

diplomatic capital", the latter including material and symbolic resources, especially a classificatory struggle to define "what it takes to be 'genuine' diplomat in Europe" (6, 15). Being in a dominant position in the "European diplomatic field" thanks to the state's symbolic power, and having consequently superior "diplomatic capital", national diplomats tend to withhold recognition of EEAS diplomats as "real" diplomats (16). The latter must struggle to gain recognition of their legitimacy and competence as diplomats. Thus, Adler-Nissen argues that the category "diplomat" must be understood in a relational rather than substantive manner: it "is not an individual property but rather 'an accomplishment resulting from collective sense-making'... an honor or measure of prestige granted by the field" (16, 25).

In line with Adler-Nissen (2014a), Sending et al. (2015) argue in favor of a relational perspective in which diplomats and diplomacy are defined through authority claims and acts of social recognition. Hence, "what makes a diplomat is a claim to jurisdictional control over certain tasks that are sanctioned by the state and recognized in international law" (Sending et al. 2015, 7). They define broadly diplomacy as "a claim to represent a given polity to the outside world", a definition underlying the idea that "diplomacy is a process of claiming authority and jurisdiction", in addition to involving political representation and governing across polities (7). Moreover, Sending et al. (2015) analyze the *configurations of relations* between state and non-state actors, which allows for an understanding of "the relative significance of traditional diplomats", in contrast with the "actor-centric focus" of the recent diplomacy literature (10-11).

Conclusion

Seeking to contribute to the social studies of diplomacy, this dissertation shares a conception of diplomacy involving a "process of claiming authority and jurisdiction" (Sending et al. 2015, 7). Like Adler-Nissen (2014a), I also call attention to symbolic struggles among different groups of diplomatic actors over what being a "genuine" diplomat means. However, while social studies of diplomacy have tended to be focused on multilateral settings or to apprehend national diplomatic services in isolation from other national diplomatic players, I argue that relations among the diverse diplomatic actors within the state are a key locus of symbolic struggles and authority claims that requires attention. The next chapter presents my theoretical framework to contribute to filling this gap.

Chapter 2 - The Social (Re)production of *Diplomathood* through Boundary Work and Jurisdictional Claims

The question examined in this dissertation, namely how diplomats create and reproduce themselves as a group, involves an inquiry into social and symbolic dynamics of group-making. To do so, I draw notably on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, who as Wacquant (2013, 274) points out, called attention to the politics of group-making and "question[ed] the ontological status of collectives". For Bourdieu, "the question of the existence and mode of existence of collectives is the one by which every sociology should start" (2001, 321). The work of other sociologists - Lamont and Molnar (2002), Abbott (1988) and Weber (1978[1922]) - also provide me with additional concepts that present an affinity with a bourdieusian framework. Building on these various authors, the first two sections of this chapter delineate the analytical framework of the thesis. This is followed by the presentation of the methodology of the empirical inquiry, which includes the justification of the case study and the presentation of the methods and sources used.

1. The Constitution of Social Groups

In a bourdieusian perspective, the genesis of social groups stems firstly from their members occupying a common social position in a given configuration of relations (a field or the social space at large), this position being determined by the volume and type of "capital" that they have (Bourdieu 1989a). Capital is any resource - notably economic, social, cultural or symbolic resources - that its holders can draw upon in the context of their relations and contests with other agents. Capital is at the same time the object of struggles among the latter.

Further, agents occupying a common social position, being exposed to similar social conditionings, share a common set of dispositions to think, perceive and act in certain ways, dispositions that constitute their habitus (Bourdieu 1990, 52-56).

Agents sharing common dispositions are bound to produce similar practices and mark their difference relative to agents with a different habitus "by maintaining distances, relations of order" (Bourdieu 1994b, 6; Bourdieu 1979). Habitus disposes agents to make certain classifications among people, things and practices, which is why Bourdieu wrote that they are "classificatory schemes, principles of classification and principles of vision and division" (Bourdieu 1994a, 23). The notion of "symbolic boundaries" is a useful concept to refer to such classificatory patterns of habitus; symbolic boundaries are intersubjective conceptual distinctions that include and exclude some people, groups and things (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). Hence, through their practices, agents (re)produce symbolic boundaries associated to their social position.

While common dispositions create a degree of similar practices and representations among a group of agents occupying a common social position, this is not, in itself, a sufficient condition for the existence of a group whose members consciously feel an adherence to this group and its interests. A political work of group-making is required, entailing "the inculcation and deployment of schemes of perception" that draw and enforce the symbolic boundaries of the group vis-à-vis other groups (Wacquant 2013, 276). When groups are institutionalized, these symbolic boundaries are turned (at least partly) into social boundaries, thereby objectifying symbolic distinctions by giving them a constraining character (Lamont and

Molnar 2002, 168). However, despite the existence of social boundaries, efforts must still be made to inculcate in group members feelings fostering an esprit de corps - i.e. "a cohesion generating solidarities and a vital adherence to the existence of the group and its interests" - so as to counterbalance the tendency of any social group to operate as a field, that is, as a hierarchical and agonistic social and symbolic space (Bourdieu 1994b, 11).

The production and reproduction of the identity and social position of a group entail symbolic struggles as its members compete with other agents, within a field, over alternative representations of the social world ("principles of vision and division") and seek to impose their vision of the hierarchies within the field and their position in it (Bourdieu 2001, 293-323). The creation, enforcement or contestation of symbolic boundaries in which agents engage as part of these struggles is called "boundary work" or "boundary-drawing" (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). Through boundary work, groups can "acquire status and monopolize resources" (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168).

Social groups who seek control of an occupational domain create and reproduce themselves not only through boundary work but also through what the sociologist of professions Andrew Abbott (1988) termed "jurisdictional claims". These are explicit or implicit claims of an occupational group to legitimately control a set of tasks (Abbott 1988). They are inherent to a group's claim to constitute a profession and are enacted - in the public, workplace or legal arena - as part of struggles with other occupational groups over their respective boundaries (Abbott 1988).

Jurisdictional claims involve an attempt to enforce *social* boundaries, so as to concretely limit outsiders' access to the jurisdiction claimed by a professional group. Social boundaries are "objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities" (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 168). While jurisdictional claims aim to enforce social boundaries, they necessarily imply the prior drawing of symbolic boundaries. Boundary work can also be used to "enforce, maintain, normalize, or rationalize social boundaries" or "to contest and reframe the meaning of social boundaries" (Lamont and Molnar 2002, 186).

When they engage in boundary work and jurisdictional claims, agents mobilize or claim symbolic capital, a form of capital made up of social recognition and legitimacy. Symbolic capital is a special type of resource since it is "the form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1989a, 17). Agents can reproduce their social position by drawing on the varied forms of capital at their disposal (social, cultural, economic, etc.), but this capital must be socially recognized to be a source of power; it must be converted into symbolic capital. Those agents who hold the highest volume of symbolic capital in a given social configuration - and who thereby enjoy honor and prestige - are in a position to exert symbolic power. The latter involves a form of domination that tends to be misrecognized as such by dominated agents, who more or less implicitly recognize the legitimacy of existing hierarchies, classificatory schemes and other dominant systems of meaning (Bourdieu 2001).

The dynamics through which a social group constitutes itself through boundary work and claims jurisdiction of some occupational domain are reflected in the Weberian concept of "status group" (Weber 1968[1922]). Max Weber defined the latter as a “plurality of persons who, within a larger group, successfully claim a special social esteem, and possibly also, status monopolies” (Weber 1968, 304). Members of status groups, who cultivate a sense of honor, typically share a common lifestyle, formal education, and occupational prestige. They draw symbolic boundaries vis-à-vis other groups on the basis of such cultural characteristics and these boundaries are recognized by the latter as signs of a superior status (superior symbolic capital, in bourdieusian terms) (Lamont et al. 2015). Further, status groups "invoke their higher status and shared rules of life to justify their monopolization of resources" (Lamont et al. 2015). Hence, symbolic boundaries partake in the reproduction, not only of a group's identity, but also of its privileges (its social position).

In sum, a social group is primarily a symbolic construction; it hinges on the production and reproduction of symbolic boundaries. On the basis of such symbolic distinctions, an occupational group seeks, in addition, to enforce social boundaries as part of its claims to control a set of tasks (a jurisdiction). Both boundary work and jurisdictional claims constitute groups by shaping their identity and social position.

2. Struggles over Legitimate *Diplomathood*

From Diplomats to Diplomathood

Building on the conceptual apparatus just presented, I argue that diplomats also come into being and socially reproduce their identity and social position as a status group through

boundary work and jurisdictional claims. Those who are considered diplomats are those whose boundary work and jurisdictional claims are recognized as legitimate, which gives them symbolic power as diplomats. Hence, while we generally essentialize the category "diplomat", by treating it as an intrinsic quality and as a category relatively fixed and given, who is a diplomat and what makes one a diplomat are contingent on processes that are at once historical, social, symbolic and political.

Given the contingent character of "diplomat", it seems appropriate to use the analytical category *diplomathood* to call attention away from understanding diplomats as an essentialized group and instead keep in mind that being a diplomat is a condition that is contingent on the social recognition of symbolic constructions and jurisdictional claims. This is akin to the argument made by Rogers Brubaker who, against the tendency to reify ethnic groups, nations and races, called for "taking as a basic analytical category not the 'group' as an entity but groupness as a contextually fluctuating conceptual variable" (Brubaker 2002, 167-68). Talking of diplomathood enables, like groupness, to treat it "as an event, as something that 'happens'" and as something that is claimed and struggled over (Brubaker 2002, 168).

Struggles around Diplomathood

For the most part of the past 300 years, diplomathood has been primarily associated with the state. Amid boundary work and jurisdictional claims of specific agents, national governments institutionalized, in the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (see section one of chapters one and three), social boundaries that gave foreign ministries and their diplomatic service jurisdiction over the conduct of relations with foreign polities. They have thereby endowed these institutions with substantial symbolic capital (or symbolic power) in terms of

diplomathood, insofar as state institutions are endowed with legitimacy by virtue of being sanctioned as state institutions (Adler-Nissen 2014a).

However, to varying degrees depending the specific national contexts, the symbolic capital and the jurisdictions of foreign ministries and diplomatic services have been increasingly challenged over the last half-century as other agents have increased their involvement in national foreign affairs and international relations in general. Within states (and again to varying degrees depending the national cases), various individual and collective agents compete for the control of diplomatic tasks and resources, that is tasks and resources related to the conduct of the state's foreign relations. For these jurisdictional claims to be successful, they need to be socially recognized as legitimate; they need to secure symbolic capital. Hence, I call the struggles over diplomatic jurisdiction struggles over legitimate diplomathood.

In the case under study in this dissertation, namely American diplomacy, contests over legitimate diplomathood do not only occur between the State Department and the Foreign Service, on the one hand, and other actors of the US government. The State Department is itself a site of struggles over legitimate diplomathood and the Foreign Service as well. Thus, three overlapping social fields are sites of contests over legitimate diplomathood: the government-wide foreign affairs field; the State Department field; and the Foreign Service. The foreign affairs field is populated by all the executive, legislative and non-governmental stakeholders in US foreign relations. Struggles in this field include contests over who speaks for the Unites States abroad, who is entitled to coordinate, lead and shape the definition of US foreign policy. Nested within the foreign affairs field, the State Department field includes the

three main groups of the department's employees: Foreign Service officers (FSOs), civil servants, and political appointees. The stakes of this field's competition over legitimate diplomathood include access to ambassadorships, other high-level positions and policy-making positions. For its part, the Foreign Service field is constituted by five main subgroups of officers with different functional specializations, who also compete for access to the most prestigious positions.

Within the three fields just presented, agents draw on different types resources to support their claim to legitimate diplomathood. First is cultural capital, which refers to "dispositions of the mind and body", such as competences, knowledge and know-how (Bourdieu 1986)[11]. Other species of capital involved are: social capital, consisting of "resources related to the possession of a durable network of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu 1980); political capital, resources stemming specifically from relations within the political class; economic capital, the material wealth of individual or collective agents; and institutional capital, which is the set of material and human resources as well as legal and regulatory prerogatives of government institutions involved in the foreign affairs field. While these various species of capital can help maintain or improve the position of agents in the above-mentioned fields, it is their recognition as legitimate and natural characteristics of diplomathood that can endow them with the most symbolic power as diplomats.

[11] Bourdieu defines three forms of cultural capital (embodied, objectified (cultural goods) and institutionalized (e.g. titles, diplomas)), but here I essentially use the concept to refer to the embodied form of cultural capital.

Research objectives

Against the theoretical background laid out, the objective of this thesis is to understand how, and to what extent, American Foreign Service officers (FSOs) create and reproduce their diplomathood, i.e. their existence as a status group, within the fields of the State Department and of US foreign affairs. This involves "reconstructing" the struggle over legitimate diplomathood between FSOs and other groups of the State Department and federal government by examining their respective boundary work, jurisdictional claims and overall attempt at gaining symbolic capital as diplomats. Admittedly, this dissertation examines more extensively the representations and practices of FSOs (in all chapters) and political appointees (chapter 5) in this respect, but for each set of relations examined I assess as much as possible the extent to which FSOs' boundary work and jurisdictional claims are successful, that is, recognized as legitimate by their contenders. Moreover, this thesis also looks, in chapter three, at dynamics within the Foreign Service field to understand how diplomathood is "distributed" among the five functional subgroups of officers and how, by contrast, Foreign Service organizations work to foster a common professional identity for FSOs.

3. Methodology

Like other social studies of diplomacy (e.g. Neumann 2012) and other research on symbolic boundaries (e.g. Lamont 1992), this dissertation has relied on an interpretive methodology, given the need to comprehend the situated meanings produced by the social agents studied (Pouliot 2007; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012). This section details the methods that were used to find out in an inductive fashion about these meanings and interpret and contextualize them. But first, I explain the rationale for the choice of the American setting as my case study.

3.1 The Case of the US Foreign Service and American diplomacy

One may legitimately wonder why having chosen to focus on a single national case to study relations between members of a national diplomatic service[12] and other national actors involved in foreign relations. My decision in this regard stemmed from the objective, in line with my interpretive methodology, to produce contextually grounded knowledge and an analysis that delves into details and complexity with respect to the social and symbolic dynamics studied. In this context, it was not feasible, in the framework of this dissertation, to examine more than one national case.

Four sets of considerations led me to choose as my case study the US Foreign Service and its relations with other American governmental actors. First, and most obviously perhaps, the United States' foreign affairs institutions present a particular interest by virtue of the country's status as the world's superpower. The American representatives affiliated to these institutions are, and have been for the past 70 years, key actors in networks of diplomatic relations throughout the globe and in the unfolding of world politics in general. Second, the State Department, its Foreign Service and its network of diplomatic missions are among the largest institutions of the sort in the world and have by far the biggest foreign ministry budget (Hocking 2013, 126-135). Despite the qualitative and quantitative importance of American

[12] While national diplomatic services may formally include, in some countries (as in Canada and the United States for instance), public servants from more than one government department, in this dissertation diplomatic services are understood as institutions attached to foreign ministries, while not necessarily forming the only category of personnel within the latter. This conceptualization is informed by the existing literature on the diplomatic services (see chapter one) of various countries and was validated by own findings on the social and symbolic boundaries that separate the State Department Foreign Service from other federal agencies' smaller Foreign Service corps.

diplomatic actors and institutions in the world, the theoretically informed literature on diplomacy and diplomats has paid, as seen in chapter one, relatively little attention to the US setting.

Third, the large scope of the United States' international activities and involvement implies that the country's foreign affairs field is populated by a very large and diverse crowd of federal government bureaucratic actors, probably more so than in many other countries. This very pluralistic foreign affairs environment and, in addition, the American tradition of political appointments in ambassadorial and other high level diplomatic functions, suggest, from an external vantage point, that conceptual distinctions between diplomats and non-diplomats are particularly blurred. This situation is particularly interesting to assess how members of a diplomatic service negotiate their identity and social position. That being said, while the plurality of diplomatic actors in the US context may be more important than in other countries, the dynamics of boundary work and jurisdictional claims conceptualized in this dissertation should have broad relevance beyond the American case, since they are fundamental to the constitution and reproduction of occupational groups.

Finally, access considerations further oriented my choice of the US case. As pointed out by Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, 70), in interpretive research, "choices of cases and access are often intertwined... given the research purpose of understanding meaning-making in particular sites". Personal characteristics - my relative proximity to the United States and my ability to understand and communicate in English - as well as the availability of a wealth of

primary sources on American diplomatic actors made research on the latter much more accessible than many other national cases that, in that abstract, could have been considered.

3.2 Method and Sources

Given my research question and my theoretical focus on symbolic boundaries and jurisdictional claims, I needed to gather data on the social representations and practices of the agents studied. The representations that I was particularly seeking to know about were conceptual distinctions (symbolic boundaries) regarding, notably, what and who is a diplomat, the different categories of foreign affairs actors, who should do what and who should be included or excluded from this or that aspect of foreign affairs management. I also needed to assess how the practices of FSOs and other groups of bureaucratic actors within the US foreign affairs field and the State Department field contribute to the production, reproduction or contestation of symbolic and social boundaries and, thereby, affect the constitution of FSOs' identity and their position within these fields.

To gather data on the representations and practices of Foreign Service officers and the groups with whom they interact in the foreign affairs field and the State Department field, I relied on 35 qualitative interviews with FSOs and other participants in these fields, as well as on a set of primary and secondary sources. Interviewing is commonly recognized as a good method to research the representations and practices of a group of people (Pouliot 2007, 2013; Lamont and Swidler 2014; Rubin and Rubin 2012). When studying boundary work specifically, interviews can be used to probe "people's sense of where they stand with respect to other groups" and the classifications that shape their self-concepts (Lamont and Swidler 2014).

My interviews were conducted in the Washington, DC metropolitan area in two phases: the first one in April and May 2013, the other one from March to May 2014[13]. While some interviews could have been conducted in Montreal and Ottawa with FSOs serving at the US consulate and embassy in these cities, I chose Washington as my interviewing site because of the larger pool of research-relevant people that I could meet over there. I interviewed 24 active-duty or retired FSOs. Seven of them were retired (one of them very recently) but in several cases had kept a relatively close relation to the US Foreign Service through other occupations. I sought to have, within my group of FSO interviewees, as much diversity as possible in terms of career stage, functional specialization, gender and professional trajectories. Twelve of my FSO interviewees had reached the senior ranks of the Service, four with the rank of ambassador. The other ones were mostly mid-level officers, with about eight to 20 years of experience in the Service. In terms of main functional specialization or "career track", the active-duty or retired officers interviewed were distributed as follows: nine were political officers; seven were in the economic track; six in the public diplomacy area; one in consular affairs and one in management. Officers specialized in consular affairs or management were harder for me to find and recruit, which explains their lesser representation in my group of Foreign Service interviewees. However, it must be noted that functional specialization tends to be less significant at the senior levels of the Service since the content of officers' work at these levels tends to involve more management functions, as in other bureaucratic or professional organizations.

[13] An additional interview was conducted in Montreal in July 2014. See the list of interviewees in appendix A.

Among my non-Foreign Service interviewees, six were or had been in the civil service of the State Department (only one was a former civil servant). Five of them were mid-level or senior officials, the other one being at a junior level. The six civil servants interviewed were involved either directly in the management and conduct of foreign affairs (four of them) or had jobs focused on the public representation and communication of what the State Department does. In another category, I interviewed three former political appointees who had served either as ambassadors or in positions within the State Department under a Republican or Democrat administration (one had served under Republican administrations, the two others under Democratic presidents). Finally, two of my interviews were with individuals who were both experts on some aspects of US diplomacy or foreign policy and former insiders of the Washington foreign affairs bureaucracy.

Having no prior contacts in the State Department or in other US government agencies, my strategy to recruit interviewees relied initially on contacting retired or active-duty FSOs who had affiliations with Washington-based educational and research institutions or other organizations linked in some way to the State Department. During my first research stay in the American capital, I had a formal affiliation to Georgetown University as an associate of one of its research centers, which opened my eyes to the presence in this institution of relevant interview participants: Foreign Service officers who were detailed temporarily from the State Department, retired FSOs, former diplomatic political appointees and current or former State Department civil servants. I could therefore recruit some of my interviewees through Georgetown University and other universities in Washington, and through other organizations

that included in their ranks current or former State Department officers. This included the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the professional association and union of FSOs, as well as the Council of American Ambassadors, the association of non-career US ambassadors. Other interviewees were identified and contacted using the State Department organizational directory, Foreign Service blogs and the so-called snowball method, whereby interviewees are referred to the researcher by other interviewees (Gusterson 2008).

Conducted either at the office of the participant or at some other agreed meeting place (e.g. a coffee shop or restaurant), interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 1:30 on average and all of them except one were recorded so as to enable their precise transcription afterwards. Some notes were also taken after interviews about relevant aspects of the interview situation such as, for instance, what I observed in the "self-presentation" of the interviewee or what meaningful things had happened before, during or after the formal interview. Such notes are useful to contextualize interviews when analyzing them later on and to understand the social identity (or habitus) of individual interviewees (Beaud and Weber 2010). When relevant, I also noted my observations about some of the places, like the State Department and the campus of the latter's Foreign Service Institute, where I had the chance to go for interviews or as part of my field research in Washington in general.

Interviews were semi-structured; a set of open-ended questions were prepared in advance, but the unfolding of the interview depended on the participant's responses and the extent to which he or she was talkative. As advised by Rubin and Rubin (2012, 38), the questions prepared in advance were not systematically the same in each interview, but were instead customized to

make them relevant to each participant's profile (position held at the time of the interview and overall professional trajectory) and to take into account what I had learned in previous interviews. I explored through various subthemes the representations, practices and relational dynamics constituting FSOs' identity and affecting their social position relative to other groups. Subthemes covered included, for instance, career management in the Foreign Service (e.g. formal and informal requirements for promotion, what are considered as the "dos and don'ts" to reach the highest levels); the participant's preferences in terms of type of work, assignment or posting and why; the extent of interagency cohesion in the embassies where he or she served; social life when posted abroad; their perception of other groups of the US foreign affairs field; the relations between FSOs and civil servants and between FSOs and political appointees. Throughout the interview process, I checked my evolving sense-making by probing my interlocutors, when relevant, on what I considered key insights from previous interviews.

After their transcription, I analyzed interviews by marking relevant (with respect to my research question) and interesting excerpts and by sorting them according to common themes. In accordance with the agreed parameters of their participation, interviewees are not identified by name, but in a generic way (e.g. professional title and/or position occupied) and are associated to a number in the text.

As already mentioned, in addition to my own interviews, this thesis draws on a fairly broad array of publicly available primary sources. These include, first, interview transcripts from the oral history collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, who has been

conducting interviews with retired senior US diplomatic officials for many years, as well as a recent interview series with serving American ambassadors by a Yale University student journal (*The Politic*). These interviews are used notably to complement my own interviews with political appointees. Second, I used a variety of documents and data produced by the State Department and various organizations associated to the US Foreign Service and American diplomacy and foreign affairs: the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), the American Academy of Diplomacy, the Council of American Ambassadors, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington think tank. Third, I drew on opinion pieces, research articles and books written by usually former, but sometimes active-duty, Foreign Service officers, State Department civil servants or political appointees (e.g. Jett 2014, Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, Grossman 2011). Fourth, newspapers and media interviews as well as secondary sources provided additional sources. Finally, the regular reading of the *Foreign Service Journal*, a monthly publication of AFSA, has been particularly useful to immerse myself into the life-world of FSOs. Also useful in this regard was the *Diplopundit* blog, maintained by an anonymous insider and which closely traces goings-on at the State Department.

The aforementioned sources have helped me to contextualize, objectify and historicize the subjective meanings collected through my interviews (Pouliot 2007). When I encountered, across my various sources, viewpoints from the social agents studied that nuanced or contradicted what I had identified as predominant views, I have included them in my account so as to offer as much as possible a nuanced and balanced analysis.

Conclusion

Laying out the theoretical framework of the thesis, this chapter has identified boundary work and jurisdictional claims as key processes for the constitution and social reproduction of diplomathood and, therefore, for the constitution of a status group of diplomacy. Boundary work involves the drawing, enforcement or contestation of symbolic boundaries, which are intersubjective conceptual distinctions, while jurisdictional claims imply attempts to enforce social boundaries in order to control a set of tasks. I have also argued that the notion of "diplomathood" is useful to eschew the essentialization of diplomats. It calls attention to the fact that diplomathood is a condition that is contingent on the social recognition of a group's symbolic constructions and jurisdictional claims.

Building on the theoretical apparatus and the interpretive methodology presented in this chapter, the dissertation examines struggles over legitimate diplomathood, and related jurisdictional claims and boundary work, in the fields of the State Department (chapters 4 and 5) and of US foreign affairs (chapter 6). Before, the next chapter contextualizes the jurisdictional claims and boundary work of the main group under study, FSOs, by tracing its genesis, presenting its career system and composition, and looking at how its esprit de corps is fostered. I also inquire into accumulated struggles within the FSO corps by looking at its informal hierarchies.

Chapter 3 - US Foreign Service Officers Then and Now: Genesis, Internal Hierarchies and Professional Identity

American diplomats predated the foundation of the United States. During more than a century prior to the declaration of independence in 1776, over sixty agents acted as representatives of the American colonies in Great Britain (Plischke 1999, 5). Some of these early diplomats, like Benjamin Franklin, were employed by the Continental Congress (1774-1789) to seek support in European courts for independence from Great Britain. It is often pointed out that this diplomacy played a key role by enlisting the support of France, which was instrumental in the military victory against British forces (Department of State 2014b). During much of the nineteenth century, however, foreign relations were a low priority for the American government. Accordingly, the US diplomatic establishment developed slowly and it was not until 1924 that a career Foreign Service was created.

Almost a century after its creation, the US Foreign Service now comprises over 16,000 members (AFSA 2016a). 14,000 of them are employees of the State Department, while the remaining number includes employees from the Agency for International Development, the Department of Commerce and the Department of Agriculture (Department of State 2016a). Among the 14,000 Foreign Service members serving in the State Department, 5,700 are professionals (called "Foreign Service specialists") hired to perform specific support functions at US missions around the world, in areas such as administrative services, facility management, information technologies and security (Department of State 2016a; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 45). The focus of this chapter, and the thesis as a whole, is on the State

Department's Foreign Service *officers* (FSOs), a corps of about 8,200 members, who serve in more than 270 missions abroad and in the department's headquarters in Washington (Department of State 2016a).

This chapter delves, in section one, into the genesis and history of the United States Foreign Service, showing that the institutionalization of the latter emerged following struggles against the domination of political considerations in diplomatic and consular appointments. I also show that the Service was created by amalgamating the previously separate diplomatic and consular services, despite the resistance of the old diplomatic service toward such move. Moving to the contemporary period, section two presents the composition, recruitment practices and career system of the FSO corps. In line with Bourdieu's insight that a social group always tends to function like a social field despite having mechanisms to foster its esprit de corps (Bourdieu 1989b), I demonstrate in section three that the FSO group is informally structured by symbolic and social hierarchies among its five functional sub-groups of officers. Political officers dominate the group, with the most symbolic capital as diplomats and the greatest share of career ambassadors. Economic and public diplomacy officers occupy an intermediate position, followed by consular and management officers. Against these boundaries and against the diversity of professional identity definitions among FSOs, section four shows that two Foreign Service organizations, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), are engaged in inculcating in all FSOs the notion that their common profession is diplomacy.

1. The Genesis and Historical Evolution of the FSO Corps

Building on the practices developed during the revolutionary period (1774-1789), the founding fathers of the United States established in 1789 the Department of State, the Secretary of State being designated as the senior Cabinet member and the president's chief administrative officer for the conduct of foreign relations (Plischke 1999, 37-40). The president was given the power to appoint "ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls", with the advice and consent of the Senate (Plischke 1999, 35). The title of ambassador was actually not used until 1893 since the leaders of the new republic saw it as a title of nobility that was inconsistent with republican values (Jett 2014, 12-13). Only the titles of minister and consul were given to senior American emissaries until 1893.

While the American government initially rejected the ethos and manners of European diplomacy, the first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, judged that some European practices had to be adopted if the United States was to be taken seriously abroad (Department of State 2014b). Among the European practices followed was the institutionalization of a strict separation between the diplomatic service and the consular service (Plischke 1999, 56). Members of the former were accredited to heads of state or government in foreign capitals and were responsible for reporting on developments in their country of assignment and executing instructions transmitted to them by the State Department (Department of State 2014b). Consular officers were posted in foreign cities to deal primarily with commercial matters and the needs of their country's private citizens. As suggested by table 3.1 below, the consular service grew much more quickly than the diplomatic service. During the nineteenth century, the US government attached more importance to its commercial overseas interests than to its

political relations with foreign governments, hence the much higher number of consular posts (Department of State 2014b).

Table 3.1 State Department overseas missions and personnel, 1781-1920

	Diplomatic posts*	Consular posts	Overseas personnel
1781	4	3	10
1790	2	10	20
1800	6	52	62
1810	4	60	56
1820	7	83	95
1830	15	141	153
1840	20	152	170
1850	27	197	218
1860	33	282	281
1870	36	318	804
1880	35	303	977
1890	41	323	1105
1900	41	318	1137
1910	48	324	1043
1920	45	368	514

Source: Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 13.

*Diplomatic posts are embassies and other overseas posts headed by a chief of mission.

Throughout the nineteenth century, there were little systematic arrangements for the staffing of overseas positions. Salaries were either non-existent or very low, there was no mobility of personnel from one post to the other and no security of tenure (Illchman 1961, 4). Overseas positions were filled mostly through the so-called "spoils system", whereby appointments and promotions depended on political connections and political patronage (Plischke 1999, 207). Under the spoils system, tenures were short and there was an important turnover of diplomatic and consular personnel as presidential administrations changed (Plischke 1999, 210).

Men who served in the highest diplomatic positions, as minister or chargé, were typically politicians or campaign contributors (Illchman 1961, 3). They generally served for about three

to four years and then returned to their main occupation or retired (Illchman 1961, 3). Since there were no adequate provisions for salaries, these diplomatic appointees were wealthy men who could use their own fortune to operate a mission abroad (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 11). Ministers and chargés had few subordinates, so-called secretaries of legation. The position of secretary also hinged on political and economic capital; secretaries had independent income and they received their post based on their connection (often a filial one) with the party in power or as compensation for political services (Illchman 1961, 11). Usually considering their diplomatic service as temporary, secretaries were often young politicians, missionaries, journalists or writers (Illchman 1961, 15). Consuls, for their part, were typically American businessmen and often defeated electoral candidates of the president's party (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 11). A few were writers and artists (Department of State 2014b). They were individuals from a lower social class than their diplomatic counterparts. Being allowed to engage in private business in parallel with their consular functions, consuls could live with these revenues as well as with the fees charged for their consular services (Illchman 1961, 69).

Struggles over the Reform of the Foreign Services

In the nineteenth century context, a denigration of diplomats and consuls accompanied the low importance that many members of the political class, including presidents, placed on foreign affairs (Department of State 2014b). Some congressmen expressed serious doubts about the need to have representatives abroad, while many saw diplomats and consuls as "lazy and under-employed" and as unfairly privileged individuals (Department of State 2014b). However, those assuming the necessity of the diplomatic and consular services became

increasingly numerous in the second half of the century and started to advocate for reforms (Illchman 1961, 41-84).

Various groups - including congressmen, journalists, members of the National Civil Service Reform League and former ministers or secretaries - were denouncing the spoils system and advocating for the removal of political considerations from appointment and tenure. One of their arguments was that sending all kinds of men abroad had the effect of lessening the social consideration enjoyed by US diplomats and consuls in foreign cities (Illchman 1961, 42). With the reporting, in the 1870s notably, of cases of misconduct on the part of consuls or diplomatic officers, many lamented that such behavior was a dishonor to the US government and was detrimental to US foreign commercial interests (Illchman 1961, 42-55; Department of State 2014b). Some drew comparisons with the American military and judiciary and concluded that the merit-based recruitment and promotion that applied in these occupations also had to apply in the foreign services (Illchman 1961, 43). The practices of European governments, which had started to put in place examination and training procedures as well as promotion by merit in their foreign services[14], were also invoked as standards to follow (Illchman 1961, 42-43).

Many advocates of reforms suggested that, for diplomatic officers in particular, specific cultural dispositions, acquired through "education and good breeding", were required to be a diplomat (Illchman 1961, 42); economic and political capital were not sufficient. For Eugene Schuyler, a writer and journalist who had served as diplomatic officer, a diplomat needed to be

[14] France and Great Britain started to adopt such measures mostly in the 1860s (Hamilton and Langhhorne 2011, 112).

"a gentleman, that is, acquainted with the ways of the world and the usages and manners of the... governing classes" in the capital where he would serve (Illchman 1961, 44). Likewise, in 1884, a congressman who was also a former secretary of legation argued, "what we want in such a post is not mere wealth but ability... judgment, experience, information, character..." (Illchman 1961, 45). Increasingly at the end of the nineteenth century and in the 1900s, reformers argued that diplomacy was a profession that, like any other, needed to be "learned and nurtured to be effective and productive" (Plischke 1999, 222). But increasingly also, diplomats needed to be not only clever and well-educated, but also "thoroughly acquainted with the technical details of the business of diplomacy" (Illchman 1961, 60). For some, the latter was even akin to a science (Illchman 1961 60; Plischke 1999, 222). Advocates of such views included first and foremost the few diplomatic officers who had managed to have more than one appointment as minister or secretary (Illchman 1961, 63).

Between 1895 and 1915, amid pressures from businessmen and other members of civil society, the US government started to reform the foreign services[15]. Salaries of consular officers were increased and the latter were prohibited from engaging in private business (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 12). In 1905 and 1909, the White House issued executive orders introducing competitive entrance examinations, promotions based on merit and security of tenure for consular officers and diplomatic officers below the rank of minister (Plischke 1999, 210, 224; Illchman 1961, 130). Consideration of the political affiliation of candidates to the service was prohibited. In 1915, a bill was passed introducing a classification system, which

[15] In 1883, the US government passed the Pendleton civil service reform act, which introduced a merit system in the general domestic civil service, but the diplomatic and consular services were exempted from this reform (Plischke 1999, 208).

facilitated the transfer of personnel from one post to another (Illchman 1961, 130). While the reforms excluded ambassadors and ministers, presidents Roosevelt and Taft appointed several chiefs of mission among secretaries (Department of State 2014b).

Prior to the reforms adopted in the early twentieth century, some men had began to enter the service (as secretaries) by wanting to make a career of it and some of them did maintain their position for more ten years (Illchman 1961, 50). These men were among those voicing their disapproval of the spoils system and some, who had reached senior positions, had an influence on the reforms passed between 1905 and 1915 (Illchman 1961, 130). An esprit de corps was developing among these diplomatic officers, who shared, not only a common interest in securing job tenure and promotions by merit, but also a common social background; all came from wealthy families since the pay was still inadequate and all had university education, half of them from Yale, Harvard or Princeton (Illchman 1961, 95, 167). The introduction of competitive recruitment, personnel mobility and provisions for limited assignments in the department also allowed officers to come more often in contact with each other and to develop a feeling of group belonging (Illchman 1961, 137). Further, as the US was playing a more important international role during and after the First World War, these early US career diplomats developed a "sense of participating in a vital occupation" (Illchman 1961, 137).

After the First World War, Secretary of State Robert Lansing set about further professionalizing and democratizing the foreign services (Department of State 2014b). He enlisted congressman John Jacob Rogers, a supporter of reforms, and Wilbur Carr, a State Department civil servant, to work on enacting a comprehensive reorganization (Lamont and

Cohen 2014). Carr and Rogers soon came up with the idea of amalgamating the diplomatic and consular services, which was not to the liking of diplomatic officers (Illchman 1961, 148). Like their European counterparts, members of the diplomatic service had developed a feeling of superiority over consular officers (Schluzinger 1975, 5). They regarded their functions as much more prestigious and consuls' education and general dispositions as unsuitable for diplomacy. "It would take a very exceptional consul to make a proper diplomatic representative", argued publicly a minister, for instance (Illchman 1961, 151). Others strategized among themselves about the arguments to make in the public press against the integration of the two services (Illchman 1961, 152). Attempting to defend the independence of the diplomatic service, one of these officers explained in the press that questions of trade and commerce were far from being handled only by consuls; in fact, the latter, he claimed, depended on diplomats in the performance of their functions (Illchman 1961, 152).

The reform finally ran counter to the diplomatic service's preference for remaining institutionally separate from their consular counterpart. In 1924, the Rogers Act created the "Foreign Service of the United States" as a permanent career organization integrating the diplomatic and consular services (Plischke 1999, 312). Members of both services were now "Foreign Service officers". Under the act, merit principles and regulations applied to all appointments and promotions in the Foreign Service and pay was comparable to other government jobs[16]. Various features of the current Foreign Service personnel system were put in place, such as a grade system with corresponding pay scales, travel allowances and five

[16] Other pieces of legislation, passed both before and after the Rogers Act, enabled the government to buy and operate facilities overseas as missions and consulates, which made it further possible for citizens without private fortunes to serve as chiefs of mission (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 14).

years of probation for new officers who successfully passed an entrance examination (Lamont and Cohen 2014). Despite the institutional amalgamation of the two foreign services, diplomatic officers continued to reproduce the symbolic boundaries through which they had defined their identity relative to consular officers; as Illchman (1961, 201) remarks, "there continued to exist the assumption that a diplomatic assignment, no matter how low in grade, is more important than a consular assignment and that political reporting leads more rapidly to promotion".

In 1925, a Foreign Service school, which was later named the Foreign Service Institute, was created to provide training in languages and other relevant skills for service abroad (Department of State 2014b). Another development was the creation, in 1924, of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) "for the purpose of fostering an esprit de corps" among members of the Foreign Service (AFSA 2016a). The association launched the publication of *The Foreign Service Journal* and became involved in organizing various social events and monitoring Foreign Service issues and future prospects (AFSA 2016a). In addition to its role as a professional association, AFSA became, in 1972, the labor union of the Foreign Service.

In the decades following the Rogers Act, the number of US diplomatic posts increased steadily while consular posts progressively became less numerous, as table 3.2 indicates. The number of overseas personnel, for its part, exploded following the Second World War as the country became more involved than ever in foreign affairs (see table 3.2).

Table 3.2 State Department overseas missions and personnel, 1920-2010

	Diplomatic posts*	Consular posts	Overseas personnel
1920	45	368	514
1930	57	299	633
1940	58	264	840
1950	74	179	7710
1960	99	166	6178
1970	117	122	5865
1980	133	100	5861
1990	143	100	6783
1999	160	83	7158
2010	177	94	8199

Source: Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 13.

*Diplomatic posts are embassies and other overseas posts headed by a chief of mission.

A new Foreign Service Act was passed in 1980 and has remained in force to this day. It defines the functions of the Service as follows:

> (1) [to] represent the interest of the United States in relation to foreign countries and international organizations...; (2) [to] provide guidance for the formulation and conduct of programs and activities of the Department and other agencies which relate to the foreign relations of the United States; and (3) [to] perform functions on behalf of any agency or other Government establishment (including any establishment in the legislative or judicial branch) requiring their services. (United States 1980)

One of the novelties introduced by the Act of 1980 was its provision that "the members of the Foreign Service should be representative of the American people" (US Congress 1980). Like its equivalents in other countries, the US Foreign Service was essentially comprised of white males until the 1970s (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 24). In 1970, only 1,6% of the FSO corps was female and 1% was African American (Hovanec 2008, 12). Female Foreign Service officers (FSOs) had to resign when they married and spouses of FSOs were treated as adjuncts to their husband abroad (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 24). Pressured by lawsuits and complaints, the State Department was forced to change its practices toward women in the 1970s and

1980s. In the late 1970s, women began to enter the Foreign Service in "record numbers" and the gender balance improved progressively since then; women represented 26% of FSOs in 1994, 36,5% in 2005 and 40% in 2016 (Hovanec 2008, 12; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 25; Strano 2016, 24). The representation of African Americans, for its part, increased to about 5% in the 2000s (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 25).

The 1980 Foreign Service Act incorporated some demands of AFSA, notably by stipulating that the President should "normally" appoint Foreign Service officers as chiefs of missions and that "contributions to political campaigns should not be a factor in the appointment of an individual as a chief of mission" (Kopp 2015; US Congress 1980). Despite these provisions and those of the earlier Rogers Act, which had applied the merit system to all foreign service personnel, the White House did not cease completely to appoint non-career individuals as chiefs of mission. After a gradual increase throughout the twentieth century, the proportion of career ambassadors reached about two-thirds of the total number of ambassadorial appointments in the 1950s and this ratio has tended to remain the same ever since, regardless of the party in power, as shown in table 3.3 (Jett 2014, 26).

Table 3.3 Career vs. political ambassadorial appointments, 1953-2008

Administration	Career	Political
Eisenhower	146 (68%)	68 (32%)
Kennedy	73 (61%)	47 (39%)
Johnson	89 (60%)	59 (40%)
Nixon	159 (68%)	74 (32%)
Ford	60 (62%)	37 (38%)
Carter	148 (73%)	54 (27%)
Reagan	261 (62%)	159 (38%)
George H. W. Bush	147 (69%)	67 (31%)
Clinton	301 (72%)	116 (28%)
George W. Bush	317 (70%)	136 (30%)
Total	1701 (68%)	817 (32%)

Source: Jett 2014, 27.

In sum, the genesis and evolution of the FSO corps is bound up with social and symbolic struggles over the boundaries of legitimate diplomathood. The creation of the group in 1924 involved the redefinition of these boundaries mostly in terms of cultural capital - mainly competence and experience - rather than political and economic capital. However, the brief review of the FSO corps' history following the Rogers Act suggests that its institutionalization did not put an end to struggles over what counts as symbolic capital to speak on behalf of the United States abroad.

2. The FSO Corps Today: recruitment, composition and career system

The Foreign Service has its own recruitment, assignment and promotion system, all of which are under the responsibility of the director general of the service, who is traditionally a career FSO (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 174). The selection process to become a State Department FSO has long had a reputation of being difficult and very competitive (Dorman 2008; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011; own interviews). It is a multistep process that starts with a written exam, called the Foreign Service Office Test (FSOT). Registration to the FSOT is open to a large portion of American citizens: candidates must be between 20 and 59 years old and do not need any specific educational training or level of education (Department of State 2016c). However, as indicated in the Department's recruitment documentation, "most successful FSO candidates have at least a bachelor’s degree" (Department of State 2016c, 15). Since 2000, more than two-thirds of recruits have a master's degree or higher (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 38; AAD 2015, 36).

The FSOT has multiple choice and essay questions and measures job-relevant knowledge - notably on US government, society and culture; world history and geography; mathematics and statistics; economics; management; and communication - as well as English expression and usage (Department of State 2016c). Since 2008, candidates have also been asked to provide biographic information so as to take into account their job-relevant experiences in terms of education, work, travel or else (Guimond 2016). About 40% of candidates pass the FSOT (Guimond 2016; int. 25). The next step involves the submission, within three weeks of having passed the written exam, of six short essays about "the skills, knowledge and abilities that they would bring to the Foreign Service" (Department of State 2016c, 23). Examining these essays, a qualifications evaluation panel (QEP), composed of career FSOs, evaluates whether a candidate understands and possesses the set of skills, aptitudes and knowledge that are required for the job (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 176). The qualities and qualifications sought in FSOs, publicized as the "thirteen dimensions", are enumerated in the table below (Department of State 2016d).

Table 3.4 Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 Dimensions (see appendix B for the complete description of each dimension)

1. Composure
2. Cultural Adaptability
3. Experience and Motivation
4. Information Integration and Analysis
5. Initiative and Leadership
6. Judgment
7. Objectivity and Integrity
8. Oral Communication
9. Planning and Organizing
10. Resourcefulness
11. Working with Others
12. Written Communication
13. Quantitative analysis

Source: Department of State 2016d.

Candidates selected by the QEP are invited to the oral assessment, which has three components: a group negotiation exercise, a structured interview and a case management writing exercise (Department of State 2016c). The "thirteen dimensions" are also evaluated at this stage. Those who succeed at the oral assessment then have to go through a background security investigation, a medical clearance test, and a final suitability review (Department of State 2016c). Successful candidates are then placed on the rank-ordered register of their chosen career track (the latter has to be chosen as soon as they register for the FSOT) and are hired when positions become available. Candidates with demonstrated speaking proficiency in a foreign language or who are military veterans can earn bonus points on the rank-ordered register (Department of State 2016c). The whole selection process from the written exam to the register can take 10 to 12 months, but it can take up to 18 months to be hired (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 183). In recent years, 17,000 people have taken the FSOT annually and of this number, about two to three percent were offered a position (Guimond 2016; Dorman 2008, 15; Jett 2014, 37).

Cohorts of newly hired officers receive training in a six-week orientation course at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 184). Members of the same cohort (basic training at FSI) tend to maintain contact in the long-term (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 185; own interviews). Once their orientation training is finished, new officers go through additional weeks or months of training at the FSI, depending on whether they need to receive foreign language instruction for their first two-year assignment. The latter is normally overseas for all

recruits and in consular affairs for the vast majority of them, regardless of their chosen career track (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 187).

Following September 11, 2001 and after several years of very little hiring in the 1990s, there was a surge in recruitment of FSOs, so as to respond to personnel needs related to US missions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Dorman 2012, 23-25). Another hiring-surge came in 2008. As a result of these two waves of hiring, in 2011, about 55% of FSOs had been in the Service for less than 10 years (AAD 2015, 33). While close to half of new officers are now women (Jett 2014, 43; Hovanec 2008, 12), managers of the Service have emphasized, over the last decade, the need to increase ethnic diversity within the FSO corps (Dorman 2008, 25; Kralev 2012, 27). In 2012, 83,4% of officers were white, 5% African-Americans (while they represented 12,6% of the American population), 7% Asian-Americans, and 3,8% Hispanic (Kralev 2012, 27). Guimond (2016) points out that the representation of African-Americans and Hispanics has increased among new hires of the last 10 years; the former rose from 5,5% in 2006 to 12,1% in 2015 and Hispanics, who constituted 4,7% of new FSOs in 2003, represented 9,7% in 2015.

Data was released in January 2015 about the thirteen universities with the most alumni serving as FSOs for the State Department. According to this data, among current active-duty FSOs, the largest number of alumni came from Georgetown University and George Washington University (AFSA 2015g). As shown in table 3.5, ten out of the thirteen universities listed are located on the East coast and six institutions, representing about 64% of the 7665 FSO alumni, are in the broad Washington, DC metropolitan area.

Table 3.5 Universities with the largest number of alumni in the FSO corps, January 2015

University	Number of alumni
Georgetown University	1190
George Washington University	1116
University of Maryland	941
American University	829
Columbia University	599
Harvard University	554
George Mason University	522
University of Virginia	432
University of California, Los Angeles	308
John Hopkins University	300
University of California, Berkeley	299
Brigham Young University	289
Yale University	286
Total	7665

Source: AFSA 2015g.

The Career Path and System

New FSOs have up to five years to be awarded tenure, which 95% of them manage to obtain on average (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011,166). Once tenured, officers are governed by "up-or-out" rules that limit the amount of time that they can spend in any grade without promotion (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 172). The FSO grade system goes from FS-06 up to FS-01 and from FS-01 to the senior grades of counselor, minister counselor and career minister (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 164). Entry-level officers normally start at grade FS-06 or FS-05 (and more rarely, FS-04), depending on their educational and professional background, and generally spend about 20 years in mid-level grades (FS-04 to FS-01) (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 166).

About 90% of tenured officers reach the FS-01 grade and among them, about half are promoted to the senior ranks, in which they spend an average of nine years (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 167). Retirement is mandatory at the age of 65. According to promotion statistics from January 2008, women represented only about 27% of senior FSOs (Hovanec 2008, 12). In 2016, it remains the case that female representation decreases as rank increases; one third of chiefs of mission are women (including political appointees), for instance (Strano 2016, 24-26).

The Service devotes much effort to its whole performance evaluation and promotion process. The performance and potential of each officer is comprehensively evaluated in written reports each year (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 216). The evaluation is made notably with reference to the so-called "core precepts" of the Foreign Service, which cover, in line with the "thirteen dimensions" mentioned above, six areas of "competencies determined to be essential to successful performance in the Foreign Service" (AFSA 2013a). Table 3.6 illustrates the precepts and their general components as defined since 2013 (the specific expectations for each precept are reviewed periodically).

Table 3.6 Foreign Service Core Precepts

Leadership: Innovation, decision-making and judgement, team building, openness to dissent and differing views, community service and institution building.
Interpersonal skills: Professional standards, persuasion and negotiation, workplace perceptiveness, adaptability, relationship building and representational skills.
Communication skills: Written communication, oral communication, active listening, public outreach and foreign language skills.

Management skills: Operational effectiveness, directing and developing performance, management of resources, customer service, support for equal employment opportunities and merit principles, security and safety, including management of sensitive and classified material, crisis management skills.
Intellectual skills: Information-gathering and analysis, critical thinking, active learning, professional development, leadership and management training.
Substantive knowledge: Job-related processes and practices, institutional knowledge, technical skills, professional expertise, knowledge of foreign cultures.

Source: AFSA 2013a; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 240.

FSOs spend on average two-thirds of their career in assignments in US missions abroad, each assignment lasting in general two or three years (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 4). They cannot spend more than five consecutive years in Washington (Jett 2014, 38). The assignment system relies in part on a formal process whereby the Bureau of human resources advertises available positions and officers due for new assignments bid for the positions in order of preference (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 207-209). However, for officers beyond the entry-level, informal processes play a key role in assignment decisions. Officers mobilize their network of acquaintances to get informed of coming vacancies, to promote their candidacy for a specific position or be recommended for it by their current supervisor (own interviews; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 208). In parallel with officers' individual lobby to obtain a position, offices of the department and overseas missions also go out on their own to solicit candidates for the positions that they oversee. Hence, in this system, an officer's "corridor reputation" and overall social capital is important for his or her ability to obtain desired positions (interviews 3, 18, 30; Jett 2014, 53).

Throughout their career, FSOs undergo periodic training at the FSI for their onward assignment. This includes language instruction if required, but also thematic training about the

functions involved in their onward assignment and instruction on the region or country where they are headed. Leadership and management training is also required for officers in mid-career and in senior ranks. In the 2000s, the department's human resources bureau established career development principles specifying the set of experiences and skills that mid-level officers should acquire to be considered for the senior ranks. These include six years of experience dealing with one region or international organization and three years in a second region; professional development training; a year of cross-functional or out-of-cone work; experience in crisis response; speaking and reading ability in two foreign languages; leadership and management experience; and experience in a "hardship" post (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 172-174).

The career system of the FSO corps fosters common dispositions among its members and an esprit de corps, as the next chapters will testify. However, the FSO corps also has a number of internal social and symbolic hierarchies. The latter are the focus of the next section.

3. Symbolic and Social Hierarchies in the FSO Corps

"State has an internal caste system based on functional cones".
(Grossman 2011, 84: a retired FSO)

As mentioned in section one, when the Foreign Service was created in 1924, members of the old diplomatic service did not consider their consular colleagues on an equal footing; in their eyes, the latter could not be "genuine" diplomats. Similar representations are found in the contemporary FSO corps, but the latter has become more diversified in terms of formal functional specializations (also called "career tracks" or "cones"). FSOs enter the Service, and

are expected to do most of their career, in one of five tracks, which have roughly the same number of officers: political affairs, economic affairs, public diplomacy, consular affairs or management (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 187). Political and economic FSOs are charged with the reporting and analysis of political and economic developments, the delivery of demarches to host governments, negotiation, and providing input into the formulation of policy. Consular officers are of course responsible for American citizen services abroad and visa services for foreign nationals, while management FSOs take care of all the logistics of embassy operations (human resources, finances, facilities, etc.). The public diplomacy track, which was created following the dismantlement of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and the integration of its foreign service officers in the State Department, involves public relations work as well as the management of cultural and educational programs[17].

The dominant conception of the diplomat within the FSO corps has long been that it is first and foremost someone charged with managing the essentially political aspects of intergovernmental relations (Battle 1971; Asencio 1986; McDonald 1997; Moskin 2013; interviews 6, 7). This is in line with the overall institutional bias of the State Department, "who has a tradition of placing more importance on political work than on any of its other functions", as Jett underlines (2014. 48). In continuity with tradition, political officers "are generally seen as the diplomatic elite" in the department and remain nowadays the ones "who rise the most to the top", that is, in the most senior positions, whether as ambassadors or as

[17] The USIA was created in 1953 and had a corps of officers serving in embassies abroad alongside State Department FSOs. As pointed out by a former civil servant of the USIA, the latter's officers abroad were called Foreign Service *information* officers, "as a way of distinguishing them from the 'real' foreign service officers" (int. 4).

managers in the Department of State (Stevenson 2013, 154; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 201). In the words of Grossman, a retired career ambassador, "The assignment and promotion system still favors political officers who remain at the top of the caste system at State" (Grossman 2011, 84-85). About half of the career ambassadors are drawn from the ranks of political officers, while a little less than 20% come from the economic track, and about 10% each come from the other three tracks (Jett 2014, 47). The fact that career ambassadors are drawn primarily from the political officer cone partakes in the reproduction of their status as the diplomatic elite among FSOs and fosters the self-conception of political officers as "the leaders of diplomacy" (int. 7). While a few interviewees were slightly critical of the overrepresentation of the latter in ambassadorial positions, a retired economic officer characterized the situation as normal since "political work is the heart of diplomacy... political arrangements within countries and between countries, that is the central core of diplomacy" (Interview 6; also int. 7, 17, 25).

While political officers are in a dominant position within the Service, FSOs in the economic track have improved their standing over the last 50 years. In the 1940s and 1950s, when economic aspects of international relations started to have increasing importance in US foreign affairs, the dominant mentality within the Foreign Service was that "economics was not a gentleman's profession" (Battle, 1971; also McDonald 1997). Such thinking progressively gave way to the informal inclusion of economic FSOs as part of the so-called "substantive officers" of the Foreign Service, together with political officers. A senior consular FSO recalled that the traditional mindset for a long time was that "there were 'substantive' jobs, which meant political and economic, and then there were consular and management" (Int. 25).

Likewise, for a former political FSO who has remained closely involved with the Foreign Service, "The old generation sees it as the diplomats are the 'substantive officers': the political officers, the economic officers" (Int. 5) (also int. 6 and Asencio 1986). A senior public diplomacy officer, who was transferred from the USIA to the State Department in 1999, explained how his colleagues have typically defined "substantive work":

> Here's the answer that your very stereotypical State department officer would give: 'Oh well, substantive work my dear, you know, it's work in the political and economic fields working with the foreign ministry, writing, doing reporting, negotiating and representing and demarches and that sort of things, that's substantive work'. What the administrative people do, and what the consular people do, and what the public affairs people do, that's not substantive. And that is very very clearly part of our culture! That, 'oh well, you know, he's a good officer but he's never really done any substantive work'. (Int. 16)

As the previous quotes suggest, public diplomacy has traditionally not been considered a "substantive" area of diplomacy (int. 16). During the existence of the USIA (1953-1999), the work done by the officers of this agency abroad - cultural affairs and engagement with foreign publics - was largely regarded "as a sundry activity at the periphery of diplomacy" as Melissen remarks (2013, 194; also int. 4; Moskin 2013). However, with the integration of USIA officers in the State Department in 1999 and the recruitment of several new cohorts of FSOs since then, public diplomacy has gradually become a more valued functional domain among the latter, being increasingly regarded as an important "tool in the service of policy" (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 205; also int. 0, 7, 16, 24). This evolution has been stimulated by developments in global communications and by the new emphasis put by the State Department's political leadership, over the last decade, on using social media and engaging with foreign publics (Hanson 2011, 212; Henrikson 2013; Mellisen 2013). For a senior public diplomacy FSO and former USIA officer, "There has grown up to be a kind of more natural

affinity between public diplomacy, political and economic officers" (int. 7), as mid-level political and economic FSOs are now interested in taking up an assignment in public diplomacy in order to acquire the management skills necessary to go up the career ladder:

> ...political and economic officers want to do a public diplomacy (PD) tour because PD officers manage staff and manage more resources than they do and that looks good [for career advancement]. And political and economic officers would much rather get that management experience through PD where at least the subject matter is policy-oriented rather than going over to the management cone, to just kind of keep the motor-pool running and managing human resources. (int. 7)

Another upper mid-level interviewee, who switched several years ago from the political cone to public diplomacy, expressed the view that the political, economic and public diplomacy functions are closely related in a more fundamental way, since all diplomatic activities have become more public in the twenty-first century, as some diplomacy scholars argue (e.g. Gregory 2014; Melissen 2013): "there's nothing that happens just between a ministry and a ministry behind closed doors. Everything becomes public... At some point... any kind of [diplomatic] agreement is gonna require building a public constituency to support it" (Int. 16). Therefore, he said,

> we need diplomats who... [have] not just an understanding of how it plays out socially, politically or economically in a country, but an understanding of where are the pressure points, who are the key influencers, how can the US use its diplomatic tools like speaker programs, like exchange programs, like English language programs, like being able to be the power convener to pull together conferences. And how can we use those tools then to influence issues, specific issues in countries, to advance US interests, and that is public diplomacy. ...And so we need officers who can manage programs, who can manage budgets, you know, who can understand issues, who can speak to the media, who can speak publicly. (int. 16)

The political, economic and public diplomacy career tracks should actually be combined into one, argued this officer, given the importance of public diplomacy in serving policy goals and

given the need for senior political and economic officers to master the media-related aspects of diplomacy (int. 16). The same interviewee deplored that some officers, especially older ones, continue to see public diplomacy work as something that should stay somewhat removed from policy: "there are still people who came over from USIA who have this whole mindset who think [public diplomacy] is just, you know, culture for culture's sake, mutual understanding, we shouldn't be involved in policy, and that's completely wrong" (Int. 16).

For their part, two of the older public diplomacy officers interviewed, who served in the USIA earlier in their career, were critical of the way public diplomacy has come to be understood and practiced within the department (int. 7, 24). One of them suggested that it is mostly the public relations aspect of public diplomacy, and not cultural affairs, that has moved higher in the Service's informal hierarchy of tasks:

> ...the kind of PD job that is most attractive to POL and ECON officers is press officer, because that person really just articulates the policy... the POL and ECON officers are going over and talking to their ministry counterparts all the time about policy. So to do it publicly is not that different. And it keeps them focused on the nuances of policy between the US and that country. They're not signing up to do cultural affairs officer jobs, which they still think of as being very very different from what they do. ... more and more they think that that's what PD is, it's public affairs really. The rest, they don't really wanna know about. (Int. 7)

Overall, while it may be mostly public affairs, rather than cultural affairs, that has driven the shift in attitudes, public diplomacy seems nonetheless to have gained in symbolic capital, over the last 15 years, among Foreign Service officers.

By contrast, consular affairs and management have remained in the "non-substantive" category of Foreign Service jobs. They also tend to be the more easily accessible career tracks for aspirants to the Service, the most subscribed functional specialization being political

affairs, followed by economic affairs and public diplomacy (Dorman 2008; int. 16, 21, 25, 29). In line with the history of the Service - and like other national foreign services (Okano-Heijmans 2013; Leira and Neumann 2013), US consular officers still tend to be regarded as handling a peripheral area of diplomacy (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 192; Jett 2014, 16; Moskin 2013). As mentioned in the previous section, all entry-level officers normally have to do consular work in their first assignment abroad, but this does not really result in enhancing the standing of these functions; while it makes them realize how difficult visa adjudication can be, many hate the experience and feel like "it's a waste of time" to have to do that kind of work at the start of their foreign service career (int. 30). Despite the fact that the US government has come to see visa work as a national security issue since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a mid-level political officer suggested that consular work still tend to lie outside the conception that many FSOs have of diplomacy:

> I think many people join thinking that they're going to be doing…negotiating treaties or… you know, helping close a deal of thousands of dollars in sales in Boeing jets or.. you know, helping the ambassador talk down hysterical parliamentarians who are going to blow up the United States' reputation in the newspaper... so you're gonna try diffuse that situation and manage the image of the United States overseas. Those are things that you might think of when you join the Foreign Service, you think this is what you're gonna do. And so, consular work sometimes the people don't fit in that image. (Int. 29)

Both consular and management work "are considered to be sort of outside the core of what the diplomatic mission is" (Int. 29), said the same FSO, while underlining at the same time that these functions are crucially important for the overall mission of the US government abroad and the functioning of an embassy: "without those people, we wouldn't have a mission. There's no reason, really, to be over there if we're not protecting our citizens and not providing the ability for people to come to the United States. ... [and] without the

management, we're not gonna run" (Int. 29). On a side note, this comment suggests, with respect to consular work more particularly, that while these functions do not rank high in the symbolic hierarchy of the FSO corps, they can be symbolically useful for the justification of the group's *raison d'être* vis-à-vis the American public, and thereby for the reproduction of its social position.

Notwithstanding the views reported so far, a senior consular officer asserted, "anybody who is a consular officer will insist that they're a diplomat" (Int. 25). In many circumstances, he pointed out, consular tasks involve negotiations and "very politically charged matters", two hallmarks of "old-fashioned traditional diplomacy" according to him:

> When I was in Laos, we were negotiating an agreement with the Lao government on the return of deportees. We had formal negotiating authority from the State Department, we had authority to negotiate a document, we had a delegation... it was a negotiation! ...that was diplomacy. You know, one of the things consular officers tend to do is extraditions: depending on the particular case, an extradition can be a very politically charged matter, well that's diplomacy. Visas, a core element of consular work: trying to get foreign countries to give longer visa validity to American citizens, well that's a negotiation. So that's diplomacy.... You know anybody who thinks visas are not a substantive issue only needs to go to Brazil or China or Russia or India... when I was in Chennai, as the chief of the consular operation... I always went to the Chamber of commerce meetings [and] I was the one they always wanted to talk to. ...visas were the big issue, you know. (Int. 25)

Consular, management and public diplomacy officers often emphasize their greater management experience (budget management, human resources management) as an asset in terms of their ability to rise in the more senior positions in the Service, in comparison with the political and economic officers "who don't know how to run anything" (Int. 17, 18, 21, 25; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011). In particular, the position of deputy chief of mission (DCM), the "number 2" official at any embassy, is in essence a management job after all:

> What's the job of the DCM? To manage the embassy... Well if you look at the career of the traditional consular officer, I mean, when I was a FS-2 I was running a section with 24 American officers and 72 foreign nationals. I knew how to manage an organization. My colleagues in the political section managed themselves and maybe one local staff. So, which of us is gonna be more competitive for the job of managing an embassy? (Int. 25)

Management experience and skills are indeed valued for promotion in the Service and the political and economic officers are of course conscious of this fact. But while they recognize the importance of management *skills*, the latter still tend to exclude management work from their conception of diplomacy because they see it as being too removed from policy work.

Distinct habitus and practical lifeworlds among FSOs

> *"There's a division, there's a difference in culture I think between the people who run the consular affairs and the people who do the political-oriented work and the economic work; there is this sort of distinct culture and distinct sort of frameworks within which people operate". (Interview 29: political officer)*

If management experience is an asset to go up the ranks in the Service, why is there a bigger proportion of political and economic officers than management, consular and public diplomacy officers who get into senior level positions such as deputy chief of mission (DCM) and chief of mission? Part of the answer, according to my interviewees, is that members of these three groups are less numerous to actually seek these positions and apply for them:

> ...the people who tend to try hardest to become ambassador or deputy chief of mission tend to be the political and economic types. ...State has been... actively pushing more management track and consular officers to go for those upper level jobs. ... I think a lot of management officers are happy to get to that management, cheap management counselor-type position, than try to go higher, or maybe a DCM spot, but they just don't put their name in the rank for an ambassador position. (Int. 18: management FSO)

> ...there was information statistics that was released not too long ago... many more in the political and economic cones got some of these senior level jobs. The head

> Undersecretary for Press and Public Diplomacy recently sent out a cable [saying] that he's gonna support public diplomacy officers if they put their name forward for these positions, we wanna encourage more to move into leadership positions. ... there is a concern and effort now to encourage... more diverse cones to be represented at those levels. (Int. 23: public diplomacy FSO)

> ...you have an awful lot of consular officers... who are attracted to the core elements of [consular] work... but they really are not interested in sort of the bigger diplomacy sort of issues, they just wanna stay where they are... And so... consular officers are under-represented in the ranks of people who *apply* for those positions [of DCM and ambassador]. They're actually over-represented in the ranks of those who are selected for them. ...the ones who do apply are selected at a higher rate than political officers. (Int. 25, senior consular FSO)

These comments suggest differences in habitus among FSOs: political and economic officers have a greater disposition to seek the highest positions, while the consular, management and public diplomacy officers are more numerous to think that these positions are "not for the likes of them". This is akin to the social reproduction dynamics that Bourdieu and Passeron (1970) theorized, whereby the habitus of lower class members, being shaped by their lower social position, leads them to self-exclude from the higher reaches of the education system. The young mid-level management officer I met provided another illustration along these lines when he reflected on the opportunity to seek, in the near future, a job as special assistant to a high-level official in the State Department, a prestigious and strategic position to hold for a young officer; he expressed uncertainty as to whether he was the right type of person because "you have to have a certain personality type and I'm not really sure I have something like that" (int. 18).

On a different tack, the symbolic boundary distinguishing political and economic officers from their fellow FSO colleagues in the other cones (especially consular and management) is also likely to be fostered by the actual physical arrangement of embassies. Political and economic

officers, who in small or medium-size missions will often work side by side, work in conditions that are likely to give prestige to their functions. They generally have their offices close to the so-called "front office" of the ambassador and deputy chief of mission. They are also isolated from their local staff: "they are never sitting with their local staff and that is because political and 'econ', the front office, it's usually all a controlled area too where you need to have a top-secret clearance or you need to be escorted" (Int. 18). In contrast, management officers are typically mixed with local staff in their embassy section, which is more often than not the biggest part of the embassy (Int. 18). Consular officers, for their part, are often quite isolated from the rest of the diplomatic corps:

> A lot of times the consular section is not even located with the rest of the embassy. In a bigger consular operation, it may be separate just because of logistics and security, all these people coming and going... But even if it's located in the same place... it's like a controlled access area where the average political officer can't just go... (Int. 18)

According to the interviewee who shared these remarks, this physical arrangement of the consular section "kind of creates their own community... the consular unit is always very kind of a tight-knit group" (Int. 18).

In sum, the social and symbolic stratification of the FSO corps favors first and foremost political officers, as they occupy half of the ambassadorial positions and tend to be seen as the diplomatic elite of the group. Economic officers come second, their functions having secured the status of "substantive" work over the last half-century and their representation in the ranks of ambassadors being the second largest among the five cones. The three other career tracks have the same level of representation among ambassadors but public diplomacy appears to

have become a more valued area of diplomacy among FSOs than consular affairs and management.

4. Fostering a Common Professional Identity

Against the symbolic boundaries within the FSO corps, two organizations play an important role in fostering its esprit de corps: AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD). As mentioned above, AFSA is the professional association and labor union of the Foreign Service. While it does not represent only Foreign Service employees of the State Department[18], the latter constitute its biggest constituency and the president of the organization has always been a State Department FSO (AFSA 2016a). AFSA's governing board, whose members are elected for a two-year term, has 29 members including a vice president and eleven representatives of the State Department (AFSA 2016a). The activities of AFSA include the monthly publication of the *Foreign Service Journal*, the presentation of annual awards, advocacy in the Congress and outreach to the public through conferences of senior FSOs across the country (AFSA 2016a). In recent years, AFSA has often joined forces with the AAD to defend and promote the interests of the Foreign Service.

The American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD) is an independent organization devoted to the strengthening of US diplomacy and composed of over 250 former ambassadors and other senior government officials elected by their peers "based on criteria of professionalism and

[18] AFSA represents overall 32,000 active and retired Foreign Service employees of six foreign affairs agencies and of this number, 16,600 are dues-paying AFSA members and 14,000 are active-duty employees of the State Department (AFSA 2016a). The other foreign affairs agencies represented are: the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), the Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) (AFSA 2016a).

achievement" (AAD 2016a). Its activities include outreach programs, lectures, awards and publications and its president since 2008 is a former career ambassador, Ronald E. Neumann. Under the latter's presidency, AAD's publications and advocacy have focused particularly "on issues of resources, personnel strength, and professional education and training for today's diplomats" (AAD 2016a). As suggested by this orientation, the organization is largely focused on defending the interests of the Foreign Service although its membership has included, since its creation in 1983, career as well as non-career officials.

As part of their effort to secure the jurisdictional link between FSOs and diplomatic tasks, AFSA and the Academy are engaged in the symbolic construction of diplomacy as a profession, that is, as an occupation requiring "a set of skills to be mastered through apprenticeship and training, with restrictions on entry, advancement by merit, and codes of behavior" (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 63). However, while such symbolic construction has been enacted by earlier generations of US career diplomats[19], as suggested in section one, the definition of a common professional identity and the definition of diplomacy as a profession are not self-evident within the FSO corps. In my interview with the president of AFSA in 2013, the latter made explicit the doubts within the Service about whether diplomacy is a profession and if so, what are its requirements and who is entitled to define them:

> We haven't defined the profession. There's still an ongoing debate or there's a lack of consensus on whether diplomacy is or isn't a profession. ...we have a real challenge to try to get some sort of consensus on defining what its requirements are in terms of knowledge, substantive knowledge, in terms of experience, and

[19] For instance, shortly after the creation of the Foreign Service in 1924, Joseph Grew, a senior career diplomat, asserted in front of a class of recruits of the Service, that diplomacy is just as much a profession as law or medicine (Illchman 1961, 237). Speeches and writings of George Kennan, from the 1950s to the 1990s, also exemplify the portrayal of diplomacy as a profession (Kennan 2015[1961], 46-51; Kennan 1955; Kennan 1997).

> skills. And different people have written about this but we don't have a consensus and so the question is, the consensus has I guess to start within the profession, now… among whom, among master practitioners? That's part of problem: who are the stakeholders, who gets to participate in defining what the requirements are? (Interview 11)

In 2010, AFSA decided to conduct a "Professionalism Survey" among its members in order to see whether they had a collective sense of professional identity. The survey included a question on what FSOs consider their profession to be (AFSA 2010). Among the 557 mid-level officers who responded, the majority identified diplomacy as their profession but many others identified theirs "in several distinct ways": "Foreign Service", "Foreign Service generalist" or their functional specialization (AFSA 2010, 5). In their general comments on the survey, representatives of AFSA noted: "what immediately struck us is the diversity of views and understandings about what is even meant by 'profession', 'professionalism'... not to mention the distinction between diplomacy and the Foreign Service" (AFSA 2010, 1). The survey results also showed that the Foreign Service was "fragmented into cones and interest groups" (Ray 2016). Similarly, a senior management FSO contested the portrayal of all Foreign Service members as diplomats in the last report of the AAD and other advocacy of the Academy and AFSA, arguing that the Service actually comprises different groups of professionals - such as consular officers and commercial officers - and that the Service's diplomats only represent the "most elite and esoteric" members of the group (Hirsch 2015, 32)[20].

[20] The other professionals who this FSO referred to included the many Foreign Service specialists who perform support functions (see introduction).

Against the diversity of views among FSOs concerning their professional identity, AFSA has engaged over the last six years in activities aimed at inculcating in FSOs common schemes of perception in this regard. In 2012, AFSA established a "professionalism and ethics committee" to foster a "shared sense of foreign service professional identity" and "to enhance the professional nature and status of the Foreign Service" (AFSA 2015c; Ray 2016). Given the lack of common understanding of what is meant by "profession", as noted in the survey analysis, this committee has adopted and publicized (on its website) a definition of the concept, building in this regard on the advice and writings of others who have reflected on the question. The definition reads as follows:

> 'Profession' is the name given to a particular area of human endeavor where the people involved have specific education, experience, skills, language, and capabilities. Typically, 'professionals' perform functions and services that affect others' lives; think of doctors, lawyers, clergy, social workers, career military officers, or accountants. It seems obvious to us that everyone involved in our diplomatic service performs such functions and services, but the professional contours of members of the Foreign Service have not always been so clear to others. ...Additionally, professionals are distinguished from the rest of the population by the need to self-regulate their work... For the population to trust that the profession is capable of self-regulation, professionals must commit themselves to a higher standard of conduct than the general population. It is partly for this reason that professions commit to a code of professional standards or a code of ethics to guide their work according to high aspirational and practical principles. (AFSA 2015a)

Given the requirement for a profession, according to this definition, to have a code of ethics and given the absence of such code in the Foreign Service, AFSA's professionalism and ethics committee has been working on creating "a code of ethics and professional conduct" for Foreign Service members (AFSA 2015c; Ray 2016).

The Academy has also put forth recommendations in its latest report, *American Diplomacy at Risk* (AAD 2015)[21], to foster a common professional identity and to further professionalize the group. The report states that

> professional education for all FSOs, regardless of their 'specialization', should refocus on and instill pride in the core function of the profession—diplomacy. FSOs should define themselves in the first instance as 'diplomats' or 'in diplomatic service' rather than as specialists in a 'cone' or geographic area" (AAD 2015, 36).

Authors of the report claim that, as a profession, the Foreign Service should have stricter entry requirements and "self-policing mechanisms such as formal accreditation and certification, as do other professional bodies and the great majority of the world's diplomatic services" (AAD 2015, 33). The report notably recommends the modification of the Foreign Service officer test to include testing for "specific knowledge about the history and functions of diplomacy, foreign language ability, or an understanding of the... special knowledge and skills needed to perform successfully as an American diplomacy professional" (AAD 2015, 34). It also recommends the establishment of a requirement for entry-level officers to begin work on - and for mid-level officers seeking promotion to FS-01 to complete - "a Foreign Service Institute Certificate in Diplomatic Studies and Practice to inculcate the basics of diplomacy as a profession... to provide grounding in the structure of diplomatic practice for professional diplomats" (AAD 2015, 41). Hence, for the Academy, diplomacy defines the professional identity of FSOs.

[21] The 2015 report of the Academy was a project led by a group of four retired senior career officers and many other current or retired members of the Foreign Service. Members of the governing board of AFSA also participated as advisors in the project (AAD 2015, 6).

Conclusion

Created in 1924 by the merger of the diplomatic and consular services, the Foreign Service still bears the mark today of the symbolic boundaries that developed out of this earlier institutional separation. Indeed, like their predecessors of the old diplomatic service, FSOs in charge of political and economic affairs tend to look down on consular officers, considering their functions (and those of management officers) as peripheral to diplomacy and less prestigious. To some extent, this symbolic distinction is objectified in the physical space, insofar as political and economic officers often work close to the office of the ambassador, in the "top-secret" area of the embassy, in contrast with consular officers who work in a more isolated area of the embassy and in various cities of a host country. In line with tradition, political officers are those who tend most to reach the highest positions in the Service and are regarded as its diplomatic elite. An evolution has taken place, however, in the Service's hierarchy of diplomathood, economic and public diplomacy officers having gained in symbolic capital. Management and consular officers, for their part, remain at the bottom of this hierarchy.

While the hierarchies among its different functional sub-groups weaken the Service's esprit de corps, AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy work to encourage a common definition among FSOs of their professional identity. This definition associates the whole group of Foreign Service officers to the profession of diplomacy. The rationale for constructing diplomacy as a profession and assimilating it with FSOs is inextricably linked to the attempt of AFSA and the Academy to emphasize the jurisdictional boundaries of the FSO corps vis-à-vis other occupational groups in the State Department field and the broader US

foreign affairs field. In that perspective, the next three chapters examine the struggle of FSOs to maintain or improve their position relative to the other groups in these fields.

Chapter 4 - Who Owns the State Department? The Foreign Service's Status Group Claim vis-à-vis Civil Servants

Like any organization wishing to appear as a coherent collective, the Department of State's management and spokespersons sometimes refer to the whole organization as the diplomats of the United States. On the information board identifying the department on its 23rd Street Entrance in Washington, one can also read, "This building... houses America's diplomatic corps - the career Foreign and Civil Service" (fieldnotes, May 2014). Similarly, recent advertisement posters for State Department jobs display the slogan "We are diplomacy... We are Department of State employees" (Department of State, 2016e). Of course, in practice, reality is always more complex and disputed than such institutional discourse conveys.

The civil service represents a sizeable proportion of the Department of State's employees. About 11,000 civil servants work in non-rotational domestic positions of the department (Department of State 2016a). Contrary to the Foreign Service, which constitutes an agency-specific personnel system, they are part of the federal-wide traditional merit-based civil service system of the United States' government. Civil servants work in the whole range of areas covered by the department as well as in management, administrative, human resources and technical support jobs (Department of State 2015a). Approximately 700 positions are in the foreign affairs category per se, according to a recent study, but civil servants in other categories, especially public affairs and legal counsel, are necessarily concerned with foreign affairs as well (AAD 2015, 44). The same type of thematic areas that Foreign Service officers

(FSOs) in the five different career tracks cover are found in the department's civil service: political affairs, economic affairs, public diplomacy, consular affairs and management.

As mentioned in introduction, FSOs claim to constitute a status group of US diplomacy. As such, they collectively conceive of themselves as an elite of the public service (and arguably of society in general), a sense of honor based on the cultural characteristics of their Service. While this claim is associated to social and symbolic boundaries in relation to the government's civil service in general and other actors, it is vis-à-vis the State Department civil service that FSOs' status group claim appears most successful. In that perspective, this chapter shows how FSOs pursue their status group claim vis-à-vis the department's civil servants and how the latter respond to this claim.

In the main section (section 2), I demonstrate that FSOs' status group claim builds on four different sets of symbolic and social boundaries vis-à-vis the civil service. First is the symbolic boundary according to which of the Foreign Service's conditions of employment are more prestigious than those of civil servants and more characteristic of what being a diplomat is about. Second, Foreign Service officers portray their cultural capital of generalists as superior for diplomacy and foreign policy making than the specialized expertise of civil servants. Third, I show that FSOs have reproduced over time an informal division of jurisdiction within the department between themselves and civil servants. This jurisdictional boundary, which corresponds to the distinction between regional and functional bureaus, has contributed to their sense of possessing greater symbolic capital. Fourth, I address the boundary work and jurisdictional claims of Foreign Service organizations and veterans, which

have promoted the idea of their distinctive identity from the civil service and the preservation of Foreign Service's privileges relative to the latter.

Section three addresses civil servants' own boundary-drawing and jurisdictional claims, based on six interviews conducted with civil servants and a few other written sources (my interviews with FSOs also shed some light on civil servants' representations and practices). This empirical material suggests that civil servants contest to some extent the Foreign Service's status group claim, but seem to legitimate it in some regards and to normalize the boundary fostered by FSOs between regional and functional bureaus. Sections two and three are preceded in the following section by a presentation of all facts relevant to understanding the relation between the foreign and civil services of the State Department.

1. The Relation of the Foreign and Civil Services in Context

Until the 1950s, FSOs spent virtually all of their career overseas, so only domestic civil servants served in the Department of State offices in Washington (Department of State 2014b). Since the establishment of the agency at the end of the eighteenth century, civil servants had performed clerical tasks and managed communications with overseas posts, and over time had acquired other duties as the department institutionalized new areas of responsibilities (Plishke 1999). As shown in table 4.1, the State Department's domestic personnel increased dramatically throughout the twentieth century[22], as did the number of Foreign Service officers

[22] While the specific number of civil service personnel is not available for years before 1970, it should be roughly the same figures than the number of domestic personnel for years until 1940, given that FSOs and their predecessors almost never served in Washington before the 1950s.

sent abroad (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011). From 1970 until 2012, the number of civil servants more than tripled, going from 3476 to 10,811 (AFSA 2013b).

Table 4.1 State Department Domestic Staffing, 1900-2010

	Domestic personnel	Civil Service only
1900	91	*n.a.*
1910	234	*n.a.*
1920	708	*n.a.*
1930	714	*n.a.*
1940	1128	*n.a.*
1950	8609	*n.a.*
1960	7116	*n.a.*
1970	6983	3476
1980	8433	3438
1990	10 063	5197
1999	12 232	6958
2010	14 674	9914
2012	n.a.	10 811

Sources: Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 13; AFSA 2013b.

In the 1950s, the State Department proceeded, following the recommendations of two federal commissions to integrate its civil and foreign services, to the conversion of 1500 civil service employees to foreign service status and, in exchange, to the allocation of domestic civil service positions to FSOs (Kopp 2014). A controversial issue among the latter, these conversions did not lead to the complete integration of the two services. Although the issue of their integration was debated during the 1960s and 1970s, toward the end of the 1970s a consensus had emerged among the stakeholders in favor of separate services (Kopp 2015). The Foreign Service Act of 1980 endorsed that consensus.

The State Department Civil Service

The recruitment process into the State Department civil service relies on public job announcements and traditional competitive examining procedures (OPM 2016; Department of State 2016b). The department also recruits through several special programs targeted for groups with specific profiles, such as the prestigious *Presidential Management Fellows* program for highly educated individuals who enter the federal service at a mid-level grade. In contrast with the Foreign Service, civil servants hold non-rotational positions, have non time-limited tenures and have a rank attached to their position instead of in person, except for members of the Senior Executive Service (SES), which is the equivalent of the senior Foreign Service.

The Director General of the Foreign Service is also the director of human resources for the civil service employees of the State Department, but in that role he/she must follow the federal-wide regulations and policies of the federal government (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011). Further, while FSOs have as their union and professional association the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), civil servants are represented by the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), which is a federal-wide union.

State Department civil servants are professionals with various profiles and degrees of specializations. There are for instance lawyers (especially in the Legal office), chemists, biologists and mathematicians, as well as officers with educational backgrounds in the social sciences. The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) of the State Department portrayed civil servants as

> a core repository of expertise and specialized skill sets critical to our missions around the world today. ... A diverse group of economists, scientists, policy

> experts, attorneys, contract specialists, and others, these skilled personnel provide critical expertise, institutional memory, leadership, and administrative abilities (Department of State 2010, 166).

The Department signaled in the QDDR its intention of "better utilizing the expertise of civil servants through various measures, such as expanding overseas deployment opportunities for civil servants, creating new opportunities for conversion to the Foreign Service, and strengthen career pathways for civil servants" (Department of State 2010). Department officials have also indicated, more recently, a willingness to "break down institutional, cultural, and legal barriers between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service" (Department of State 2013b, cited in AAD 2015, 54). This seems in line with the emphasis of the department's leadership over the last decade on unity of purpose, likely as a way to counter impressions among civil servants of Foreign Service favoritism (Kopp 2015). In this regard, some former political appointees have remarked that the State Department has tended to have a "'caste-based system where FSOs are on top and the civil servants are down below'" (Kralev 2012, 46-47). A foreign policy expert and former mid-level appointee in the Department signaled, for his part, his recognition of the higher status of FSOs when he said that "civil service jobs in State are less prestigious jobs than the foreign service. Foreign service is the epitome of the State Department" (int. 15).

The Proportion of FSOs Versus Civil Servants in the State Department Bureaus

As in other foreign ministries, a distinction is made among State Department employees between regional and functional bureaus within the latter. Regional bureaus are the historic core of the department's diplomatic bureaus (Department of State 2014b). They are focused on specific regions and countries and are the focal points for communications with overseas missions. They are headed by the under secretary for political affairs (P) (see appendix C for

the department's organizational chart), which has been historically the third or fourth highest post in the department (Stevenson 2013). The international organization affairs bureau is the only functional bureau within the "P" family. Throughout the twentieth century, the department established a number of functional bureaus to deal with areas of foreign affairs becoming important in international relations, such as economic affairs (1924), international law (1924), international conferences (1929), international communications (1938) and human rights (1977) (Plischke 1999). The bulk of functional bureaus are organized in five clusters, each headed by an under secretary: Economic Growth, Energy and Environment (E); Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T); Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R); Management (M); Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (J) (see appendix C for the organizational chart).

According to a recent study, in March 2014, Foreign Service officers occupied an aggregate proportion of about 65% of the positions in five of the department's six regional bureaus, the remaining 35% being occupied by civil servants (American Academy of Diplomacy 2015). In nine functional bureaus - Consular Affairs (CA), Counterterrorism (CT), Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), Legislative Affairs (H), Human Resources (HR), International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), Intelligence and Research (INR), Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) - the aggregate proportion of Foreign Service officers was about 18% on average (American Academy of Diplomacy, 2015).

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below give more detailed data on the average proportion of FSOs and civil servants in functional bureaus and regional bureaus from 2012 to 2014. The data indicate that FSOs represented the majority of employees in all regional bureaus except one, while civil servants represented more than three quarters of employees in many functional bureaus.

Table 4.2 Proportion of Civil Service Employees in Functional Bureaus, 2012-2014

Bureau	Civil Service*
Economic Growth, Energy and Environment (E)	
Economic and business affairs	53%
Energy Resources	58%
Oceans and international environmental and scientific affairs	81%
Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights (J)	
Counterterrorism	83%
Democracy, human rights and labor	74%
Population, refugees and migration	78%
International narcotics and law enforcement	89%
Management (M)	
Administration	97%
Consular affairs (including Passport Agency)	94%
Human Resources	77%
Political Affairs (P)	
International organizations	71%
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (R)	
Education and cultural affairs	92%
International Information Programs	85%
Public Affairs	87%
Arms Control and International Security Affairs (T)	
Arms control, Verification and Compliance	92%
International security and non-proliferation	91%
Political-military affairs	71%
Others	
Intelligence and research	81%

Legislative affairs	83%
Office of the legal adviser	99%
Office of the Chief of protocol	97%

Sources: Data compiled based on DOS HR bureau (2012 and 2013a) and AAD 2015, 29.

*Mean proportions based on data from 2012, 2013 and 2014.

Table 4.3 Proportion of Civil and Foreign Service Employees in Regional bureaus, 2012-2014

Bureau	Civil Service	Foreign Service
African Affairs	42%	58%
East Asian and Pacific Affairs	26%	74%
European and Eurasian Affairs	39%	61%
Near Eastern Affairs	37%	63%
South and Central Asian Affairs**	72%	28%
Western Hemisphere Affairs	41%	59%

Sources: Data compiled based on DOS HR bureau (2012 and 2013a) and AAD 2015, 29.

* Mean proportions based on data from 2012, 2013 and 2014.

**According to the AAD (2015), the figures for this bureau likely include temporary employees.

2. A Claim to Symbolic and Social Domination Over the Civil Service

Many representations and practices on the part of Foreign Service officers sustain their subjective sense and explicit claim of possessing greater symbolic capital than the State Department's civil service and of being entitled to the maintenance of existing social boundaries vis-à-vis the latter. A long-retired officer and writer about the Foreign Service summed up some of the representations involved when he said, talking about relationships between FSOs and civil servants, "The foreign service people think...we're special, we pass this difficult set of tests, we're very good at what we do, we're proud of what we do, we're an elite service (int. 6). The first part of this section echoes that remark by addressing how the

formal conditions of employment in the Foreign Service are regarded by its members as signs of prestige and as symbolic distinctions defining what a diplomat is.

2.1 FSOs' Conditions of Employment as Markers of Symbolic Capital

> *'Elite' is an adjective describing organizations that have highly competitive requirements for entrance and advancement... maintain high professional standards and demand that members make the sacrifices necessary to gain objectives.* (Boyatt, Johnson, Neumann and Pickering 2013, 57; veteran FSOs)

Members of the Foreign Service tend to see their conditions of recruitment and employment as more rigorous and more prestigious than those of the civil service, which feeds their sense of constituting an elite and a special group of public servants. The recruitment process in the Service is considered more demanding, more meritocratic and more prestigious than the typical civil service recruitment (Int. 6, 11; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011; Blake 2012). According to Kopp and Gillepsie (2011, 174), it is "so famously strenuous that successful candidates look back on it as a rite of passage". Successfully going through this process tends to be seen by FSOs as acceptance into an elite group, as a former career ambassador indicates: "when you pass the Foreign Service examination you have joined an elite" (cited in Moskin 2013, 678). Likewise, for another former FSO, the Foreign Service's

> reputation as an elite and prestigious profession... has endured through the generations in part because of the mystique surrounding the difficult exams candidates must pass in order to join the diplomatic corps. ...passing the exams is seen as a badge of honor for those who make it through (Dorman 2008, 15-16).

Moreover, former or active-duty members emphasize "the profound differences in conditions of employment" between the foreign and civil services and the "rigors and sacrifice" of the former: while FSOs "commit to being available for worldwide service throughout their career"

through regular rotations and accept competitive annual evaluations, up-or-out provisions and a mandatory retirement age, "none of these disciplines apply to the civil service", as three former FSOs underline (Honley 2015; Harrop 2015; Kinney 2015). Members of the Service also have, in contrast with the civil service, to take the risks that come with some foreign postings (int. 29). The lobby of the State Department, which displays two memorial plaques in honor of those who died on duty abroad, offers a constant reminder in this regard (in addition to the annual memorial ceremony where the name of eventual new victims are added on the plaques) to those who work in its main building, adding to the Foreign Service's sense of honor and pride.

The fact that, as representatives of the United States government abroad, FSOs receive individual commissions issued in the name of and signed by the president also adds to their sense of prestige in relation to the civil service. An interviewee conveyed the perception of a lesser status for civil servants who do not have such commissions: "We have commissions that the president appoints us to... the civil servants do not, they are, theirs is just you know, contract positions and they come and they do the work" (int. 29). FSOs' conception of what a diplomat is builds on the fact that they are commissioned officers: diplomats are "those who go out and who present their commission" (int. 29). On a popular Foreign Service blog, a FSO criticized in January 2016 a media article for stating that "there are over 24,000 diplomats working for the Department of State" (a calculation seemingly including civil servants) by highlighting "the meaning of diplomat: commissioned FSOs nominated by the President and confirmed by Congress" (Diplopundit 2016).

However, more than their presidential commissioning, it is particularly the fact that they are mandated to serve primarily abroad that, in FSOs' view, makes the Foreign Service coterminous with diplomacy and thus, makes them the "real" practitioners of what the Department of State is intended to do. As a mid-level FSO asserted, a diplomat "goes out, lives in the field", while "civil servants are at home, they don't go out unless they do some of these excursion tours... they're not meant to be the diplomats who go out, negotiate with other governments and build trust and relationships" (interview 29; similar views in interviews 5, 11, 12, 33). Similarly, for a retired career ambassador, FSOs are "those recruited, employed and professionally focused on the main characteristic of international diplomacy", namely service abroad, while civil servants "largely remain in domestic locations, divorced in practice from the essential 'foreignness' of the department's responsibilities" (Marks 2016). As these quotations illustrate, because civil servants are based in Washington, FSOs tend to downplay or ignore the direct contacts that at least part of the civil servants get with the rest of the world either through occasional travels overseas for short-term missions or through contacts with foreign representatives in Washington.

On a different matter, even as their collective identity is more attached to overseas work, FSOs know that they have more prospect than civil servants of occupying senior domestic positions within the department. Several officers interviewed underlined that civil servants "hit a glass ceiling" earlier on in their career because "the majority of senior positions at the State Department are Foreign Service positions, and if they're not Foreign Service they're political appointee positions", as one FSO pointed out (int. 2). The latter mentioned that it is a challenge for civil servants "to continue to go past the office director level", while others

suggested that even office director positions are more difficult for civil servants to obtain (int. 2, 13, 18). Although the officers I met appeared sorry for the lesser opportunities for career advancement in the civil service, this nonetheless feeds FSOs' sense that the latter is in an inferior position within the department.

Being entitled to regular rotations in new positions and more frequent promotions, FSOs tend to have the impression that civil servants are lazy, lack ambition or are not so good, since they generally stay in one job for a longer period and have fewer opportunities for promotion. "You tend to get Foreign Service officers who think of the civil service as kind of lazy and they've been doing the same job for 20 or 30 years", said a junior officer (Int. 18). Two of my senior interviewees were clearly among those holding that representation: "we think the civil service, 'how can you agree to just sit in one job forever, and do the same thing over and over and never get promoted!'" (int. 17); "People (civil servants) don't retire: there were people who were mid-career office director types when I was a junior officer and they are still there! They are in their seventies! They're not going away, they're not going anywhere!" (laughs) (int. 8).

Moreover, there has long been a tendency among FSOs to look down on the civil service for its supposedly more "9 to 5" work routine and "mentality" (Int. 13, 17, Kinney 2010). Being used to overseas assignments conditions where there tends to be little boundaries between their work and the rest of their lives and where actual working hours are often longer, FSOs have been prone, when on domestic assignments, to have the impression that civil servants observing a regular work schedule from 9 to 5 are less dedicated to their work and are "not working very hard" (int. 17). A senior officer shared a candid illustration of that view: "you

(civil servants) leave at 5 o'clock and arrive at 8:30 and you take lunch... We look at you and we say, these people aren't committed... they're just doing their job and they're going home'" (Int. 17). Regular work routines and clear boundaries between work life and personal life are, in that perspective, the hallmarks of what "normal bureaucrats" do. FSOs, however, like other national diplomatic corps according to Neumann (2012), are "unwilling bureaucrats"; their sense of honor relies on the notion that they are not "just bureaucrats" like civil servants are in Washington, but that their identity is rather defined by the overseas work conditions described above[23].

In sum, the conditions of recruitment and employment in the Foreign Service tend to be regarded by its members as symbolic distinctions that establish a hierarchy between them and the civil service and that define what a diplomat is. In that context, FSOs are prone to think that it is much more desirable and honorable for a foreign affairs professional to be part of the Foreign Service than the civil service, as a senior FSO implied at the end of our meeting, which was also attended by her junior foreign affairs civil servant. She told him, "We will get you in the foreign service!", a friendly but unsolicited encouragement to which the civil service employee responded, "But I like the civil service!" (field notes, May 2014).

2.2 A Generalist Cultural Capital versus the "Narrow" Expertise of Civil Servants

Whereas FSOs identify themselves as diplomats and largely exclude civil servants from that identity, they identify civil servants as experts or specialists, in accordance with the language

[23] An interviewee acknowledged that when on domestic assignments, FSOs are bureaucrats: "Overseas... you're in a community... in Washington we're bureaucrats, so we go to work and we spend time working and then we go home to the rest of our lives" (laughs) (int. 2).

used in official documentation of the department[24] (e.g. Department of State 2010). The expression "technical expertise" is also frequently employed to refer to the civil service. FSOs readily recognize that civil servants provide invaluable expertise and institutional memory for the department as a whole. Some praise the "enormous amount of knowledge" or the "specialized knowledge and hard-won experience" of civil service colleagues and underline that they are "extremely capable and effective" or "dedicated and smart" (int. 10, 30; Banks 2016). However, the categorization of civil servants as experts is associated with a set of symbolic boundaries regarding the cultural capital of both groups, distinctions that again tend to feed FSOs' sense of greater symbolic capital.

First, from the perspective of FSOs, civil servants have less varied experience, and crucially, lack knowledge gained from working and living overseas, as suggested in the previous subsection. "Civil servants (...) have to have a body of technical expertise but are not always as well-rounded and have the combination of field experience overseas as well as Washington [experience]", said a mid-level officer (int. 12). Civil servants, implied another interviewee, lack opportunities for "cross-fertilization experiences" such as those enabled by regularly rotating into different jobs. Further, she explained that, like anthropologists, diplomats accumulate knowledge by living in the field, immersing themselves in another country's culture and interacting with local people (int. 29). Commenting on foreign affairs civil servants who specialize on some region or country, the then AFSA president argued that their knowledge is of lesser value because it does not build on actually living and working in that

[24] The department distinguishes between Foreign Service *generalists* and civil service *experts*.

region or country, and because they have less opportunities to broaden their expertise through varied experiences:

> They become knowledgeable about a region or a country, fine, but in today's world, if all your knowledge is based on domestic, you know what you learn here as opposed to actually living or working in the country, or expanding your expertise to add broader perspective to it, which they don't necessarily have the opportunity to do, I mean how valuable is it? (int. 11)

Because they stay in Washington, civil servants have more difficulty, according to some interviewees, to understand realities on the ground overseas as well as the realities faced by embassy personnel (int. 10, 13, 29). Of course, the FSO who compared her work to that of an anthropologist suggested that civil servants lack an understanding of overseas realities from the "inside": "Really, people who stay here long term, it's very hard for them to understand sort of what... their perspective is from the other side" (int. 29). Two other interviewees, for their part, claimed that "it is hard sometimes for folks back in Washington to understand... the demands that an embassy has on its time" and that "either the embassy or the host government doesn't have the capacity to attend to a particular issue right away" (int. 10, 13). One of the interviewees suggested that this is something that FSOs on domestic assignments can help with: "the FSO can help [civil service] colleagues understand that if they want to get their issue focused on, they have to be able to frame the issue and engage them in a way that best enables a response from the host country or from the embassy" (int. 10).

The previous point is related to FSOs' claim that civil servants are prone to be very much focused on the particular issue that they work on to the detriment of a reasonable assessment of how that issue fits into "the bigger context of things" (int. 13). "You may have folks who are so focused on their narrow piece of the spectrum of issues", said the officer quoted above

for emphasizing embassy knowledge, "that they think an embassy should be giving more priority to their issue, when in fact the reality may be that the embassy may be overwhelmed with other issues they have to confront" (int. 10).

As some previous quotations hinted or implied, FSOs tend to consider, as generalists, that while civil servants are really experts in some area, the breadth of their knowledge and skills is more limited, which limits their perspective on issues. In this regard, a public diplomacy FSO claimed that, despite their deep knowledge of the particular things that they work on, public affairs civil servants do not really know the broad range of programs and tools available, which "leaves a really big gap, unless you have experienced FSOs who know how it all fits together when we're actually out there talking to actual foreign people" (int.7-8). The president of AFSA emphasized that this is also how things should be: "the role of the civil service... is to provide narrow, technical advice on some one narrow subject. Which is kind of the reverse of the foreign service" (int. 11). Being critical of the division of the Foreign Service into different career tracks or specializations, "which is sort of like the civil service" she said, she portrayed the ideal-typical profile of FSOs in these terms: "generalists... dot connectors... synergists... people with breadth of experience, that's what a FSO, a diplomat, particularly at a senior level, needs" (int. 11; also Kinney 2010). Given the "narrow" expertise and experience of civil servants, they do not have, according to the same interviewee, the required or ideal profile for executive leadership and management positions within the department (int. 11).

For another senior interviewee, the generalist profile of FSOs comes with the belief that they can do anything as versatile and adaptable professionals oriented toward responding to the needs of the Service: "I'm what's called a generalist. You are expected if you are a generalist that tomorrow if they send me to be the head of our mission to Antarctica, I'd say 'sure I can do it'. ... We have a belief in the Foreign Service that... we can do anything, just about anything" (int. 17). By way of an example, he pointed out that he did not really have qualifications in the particular thematic area of the office he directed but had "a staff full of experts". The generalist conception described by this interviewee may however be somewhat different for the younger generations of FSOs, as he acknowledged, the latter being prone to call for more training.

Finally, some interviewees conveyed a representation of civil servants as less dynamic in their contribution to the work of the department as a consequence of their continuous work on the same issue or set of issues. "A foreign service officer brings experience from all over the place, a different kind of energy, different ideas", claimed one (int. 17). A mid-level officer also suggested that FSOs bring a different energy and different ideas, albeit with a hint of self-mockery about their sometimes grand ambitions:

> Sometimes [civil servants] are less dynamic about thinking outside of the box or coming up with new solutions, or things like that. Whereas foreign service officers, we're used to breezing into town, figuring things out like in 24 hours and then coming up with grand schemes that will change the world for the better or something like that. (int. 30)

Overall, from FSOs' point of view, while civil servants have invaluable expertise, their cultural capital tends to be too narrow for diplomatic and foreign policy purposes; they are narrowly-

focused on some specific issue and lack first-hand knowledge of overseas environments as well as a breadth of experiences and skills, in contrast with well-rounded generalists FSOs.

2.3 The Reproduction of a Regional-Functional Structure of Domination

Before seeing any data about the distribution of Foreign Service employees and civil servants in the State Department bureaus, as those presented in section one, I found out early in my interviews that FSOs had a clear representation of that distribution: FSOs are found in (great) majority in regional bureaus whereas civil servants are more or mostly present in functional bureaus (e.g. int. 2, 3, 5, 12, 13). This representation corresponds to a long-standing pattern within the State Department and at its root is FSOs' tendency to exclude functional bureaus from their conception of their jurisdiction, based notably on considerations of prestige and career progression. As Grossman remarks (2011, 83), the greater presence of civil servants in functional bureaus has contributed to their second-class status within the institution.

Historical background

As mentioned in section one, functional bureaus are more recent additions to the department's bureaucracy. The State Department, like many of its counterparts in other countries, introduced them to deal with various issues that started to be part of the international relations agenda throughout the twentieth century. There was resistance among FSOs to the introduction of these "new issues" and, in fact, the impetus for the change came in some cases (such as for the human rights bureau) from demands and decisions by the legislative branch

(Grossman 2011, 83)[25]. According to Grossman, himself a retired FSO, the creation of new functional bureaus in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s actually stemmed from the resistance within regional bureaus to the integration of these issues: "Regional bureaus have historically resisted incorporating the new parts of the diplomatic agenda, such as human rights or environmental protection, into their work. This has resulted in a proliferation of functional bureaus" (Grossman 2011, 83)[26]. Hence, FSOs tended to consider "functional issues" as less important and not genuine diplomatic issues.

In line with the traditional Foreign Service value system, regional bureaus had more policy-making authority and more prestige than functional bureaus (Grossman 2011, Stevenson 2013). Regional bureaus "were the prestige bureaus", as a long-retired FSO recalled from his career in the 1960s and 1970s (int. 20). The bureau of European affairs, in particular, was regarded as very prestigious during a good part of the 20th century, in the Cold War context. According to Weisbrode (2008), it was "one of the most powerful and influential foreign policy centers in the United States government, setting the course of American diplomacy, and fostering institutional loyalty, across four generations" of career diplomats.

[25] As an illustration of the resistance of the Foreign Service to the integration of human rights into foreign policy, an interviewee recounted that on a visit to Argentina, the first assistant secretary for the human rights bureau, Patricia Derian, a political appointee, was ignored by the leaders of the US embassy in Buenos Aires, while usually "they roll out the red carpet" for visiting high-ranking officials from Washington (int. 13).

[26] According to the AFSA president, civil servants "took domestic jobs in the functional bureaus in the 1970s because a lot of these issues were just appearing as new issues. So lots of people from EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) then sought to transfer over and take jobs in the bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science", for instance (int. 11).

From the beginning of their domestic assignments in the 1950s, FSOs have therefore tended to shun assignments in functional bureaus. In close interrelation with the factors already raised to shed light on that pattern (the low interest of FSOs for functional issues and the prestige of the regional bureaus) were career progression incentives created by the control of regional bureaus on overseas assignments and high-level domestic positions (int. 16, 20; Grossman 2011). Before the 1980s, regional bureaus were essentially the only decision-makers in the allocation of overseas positions, which also contributed to their prestige (int. 20). FSOs had consequently a clear incentive to work in a regional bureau so as to work alongside influential people for their follow-on assignments and, more generally, to enhance their future career prospects. For example, recounting his atypical decision in the second half of the 1960s to accept an upper mid-level position in the bureau for International Organizations affairs (IO), a retired officer explained that this was not considered a wise career move at the time: "The word of wisdom was that [the IO bureau] was the last place in the world you wanted to go. Because you would never get to be an ambassador out of the country in that fashion and it was sort of looked down upon by everybody" (McDonald 1997, 54).

The Contemporary Regional-Functional Boundary

Today regional bureaus remain perceived as the most important and prestigious bureaus within the department (int. 5, Stevenson 2013). This greater symbolic capital can be in itself an incentive for ambitious FSOs, as an interviewee suggested: "people who are ambitious might gravitate towards assignments in the regional bureaus because they sort of see that that's where the policy-making happens" (Int. 16). The greater influence of the regional bureaus may have been attenuated as some functional issues have become more high profile on the political

agenda and as some functional bureaus have access to more resources as a result (int. 16), but it is not clear that their overall greater influence has been superseded already.

Moreover, regional bureaus still oversee the bulk of overseas jobs and act as key players in assignment decisions (int. 3, 16, 33; Grossman 2011). Further, despite the role played today by the Human Resources bureau in the assignment process, the informal component of that process (based on each officer's own initiatives, contacts and lobby) remains paramount for tenured officers (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011; int. 3, 16, 20). Consequently, it is still the case that "FSOs tend to wanna go working – those who are ambitious at least – in the regional bureaus" and that positions in them "tend to be more competitive than other jobs" (int. 3, 16). The latter are seen as offering better prospects for onward assignments abroad, given the important role played by these bureaus in managing overseas jobs (int. 3, 11, 16, 33). The IO bureau also manages jobs abroad in US missions to international organizations, but much fewer than regional bureaus, so it is likely regarded as offering fewer job opportunities according a former political appointee assistant secretary for that bureau (int. 33).

While FSOs who are particularly interested in issues like climate change, refugee affairs or human rights, for example, can in principle tailor their career path accordingly by taking jobs in these areas, specializing too much in these areas could harm one's promotion prospects, as a senior officer admitted (int. 21). According to the former AFSA president, there is a "widespread perception" among FSOs, "and it is probably a correct one, that if you spend too much time in or if you work in a functional bureau, you’re less likely to be promoted" (int.

11). One or two assignments in a functional bureau can be fine, but "you have to be careful when you do it or how long you do it" (Int. 11, 23, 30).

Conversely, regional specialization is identified by FSOs as a required practice for promotion to the senior levels (int. 10, 21, 29; Jett 2014). "If you wanna be an ambassador... you really do have to focus more on one region, so that you have the credibility and the context, and the profile in that region", said one interviewee (Int. 21). According to Jett (2014), a lack of regional experience is detrimental to a FSO being considered for an ambassadorial appointment, because "a regional bureau will always ask what a candidate has done for it before it agrees to accept someone for consideration" (Jett 2014, 53). The support or acceptance by a regional bureau and its assistant secretary is essential to be selected for an ambassadorship.

The reproduction of the regional-functional boundary by FSOs also involves the reproduction of symbolic boundaries with respect to the nature of functional issues. FSOs interviewed tended to make sense of the presence of civil servants in functional bureaus by characterizing the issues dealt with in them as technical issues, too technical for them at least. For instance, in the perspective of one FSO, "particularly in technical areas like trade or arms control or defense, there tends to be more civil servants, and I think that's a good thing" (int. 2). Similarly, for another one, civil servants "tend to be concentrated in bureaus that require the most technical expertise: non-proliferation, nuclear issues, weapons, missiles, intelligence and research..." (Int. 12). Yet others portrayed some functional issues "like the environmental issues, the science and technology issues, international health issues" as "very specialized,

very technical", and therefore argued that it made sense to have more civil servants dealing with these issues given their capacity to deploy expertise (int. 10, 13). The former assistant secretary for the IO bureau (although not a FSO) also partly explained the fairly high proportion of civil servants over there by the technical nature of many international organizations:

> It has a relatively high percentage of civil service because of the large number of technical international organizations, so everything from the telecommunications union or civil aviation or nuclear weapons, international health, all sorts of things... so you have people who are specialists in that area (int. 33).

Reproduction of a "bilateral corporate culture"

The reproduction of a regional-functional boundary also contributes, to some extent, to making Foreign Service officers even more focused on bilateral diplomacy than they already are collectively when posted abroad, given the objective reality that there is a disproportionately much higher number jobs that need to be filled in bilateral missions (which amount to over 250 when including consular missions) than in multilateral missions (numbering about 10) (DoS 2016a). At the domestic level, the lesser presence of FSOs in functional bureaus implies that they have less involvement, not only in the directly IO-related work of the IO bureau, but also in various issue-areas handled elsewhere that have an important multilateral and IO component, such as climate change, economic affairs and nuclear non-proliferation. That being said, multilateral affairs and processes are not, and cannot possibly be, absent from the regional bureaus since they form an integral part of all regions' political and economic landscape. But, "for the most part", as an interviewee said, "most officers [in regional bureaus] are dealing with bilateral [affairs]" (int. 10; also int. 7-8).

Furthermore, there has been, according to some, a tendency within the Foreign Service to attach less value to multilateral work than to bilateral diplomacy: "for a long time we did not really value multilateral... generally speaking, bilateral work has been the route to the top, the route to ambassadorships and the route to assistant secretary or above", said the AFSA president, while disapproving that tendency (Int. 11). A former senior FSO also described the Foreign Service as having a "bilateral corporate culture" (Kinney 2010). Two interviewees made clear that they had little interest in serving at the mission to the UN or other multilaterally-focused positions: "To be honest, I'm a little embarrassed to say, but I really don't have any interest to serve at the UN... just from an intellectual perspective and my personality I prefer bilateral relationships" (int. 12); the other said he was among those who avoid multilateral assignments "like the plague", adding that "it's (multilateral diplomacy) a specialized area of diplomacy" (int. 16). A senior public diplomacy officer also suggested that political officers are particularly oriented toward bilateral diplomacy: "when it comes to the bilateral relationship between the US and some other country... that really is political officers, that's what they do. And their sense, I think, is that that is the core of diplomacy" (int. 7-8). Of course, this is certainly not unrelated to the great power status of the United States, whose bilateral relationships are, in comparison with many smaller powers, more developed with more countries of the world and for which multilateral forums have arguably, overall, a less crucial importance for its foreign policy than they do for many other nations.

Despite indications of a more bilateral culture among FSOs, some interviewees were not willing to say that there is "a genuine bias" against multilaterally-focused work, at least for overseas assignments: "there are a number of people in the State department who particularly

seek out assignments for NATO or the UN" (int. 16); "I do know positions in NATO are highly coveted by people... OSCE also I think is pretty highly coveted; UNESCO, I mean, for cultural diplomacy, to be based with them in Paris, that's a very good job to have. So... I think some people really do seek them out" (int. 23).

While the FSO corps may not have a bias against multilateral work, this section has shown that practices of its members have resulted over time in informally distinguishing their jurisdiction from that of the civil servants. Focused on regional bureaus, this implicit jurisdictional claim has long been associated with those bureaus of the department with greater policy-making authority and prestige. Therefore, the regional-functional boundary contributes to putting FSOs in a dominant social and symbolic position vis-à-vis civil servants.

2.4 Foreign Service Advocacy Relative to the Civil Service

As previous sections have suggested, FSOs claim a key role in policy-making in the State Department and a higher status than civil servants. As one of my interviewees said, "The Foreign Service is supposed to drive the thing" in the offices of the department (int. 29). In this regard, Foreign Service members, AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy claim jurisdiction, on behalf of all FSOs, of the bulk of leadership positions relative to the civil service (Int. 11; American Academy of Diplomacy 2015; Boyatt et al. 2013). This claim has been successful so far (AFSA 2015d, 2015e, 2015f). However, FSO veterans, AFSA and the Academy identify as a threat to this dominant position the expansion of the civil service over the last decades and some management practices like lateral entries. In this context, they put forth jurisdictional claims and emphasize symbolic boundaries between the two services as a

way to preserve FSOs' privileged access to leadership positions and their general access to policy-making positions.

Jurisdictional Claims Against the Growth of the Civil Service

In recent years, veterans of the Foreign Service, AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy have denounced the growth, over the last decades, of the civil service in the State Department (Johnson et al. 2013; AAD 2015; Marks 2016). They have portrayed that growth as illegitimate and detrimental not only to the Foreign Service, but for the Unites States in general, as this excerpt from a 2013 op-ed published in the *Washington Post* illustrates: "The civil service has grown significantly the past few decades, at the expense of the Foreign Service... If this trend is not reversed, the United States will lose the invaluable contribution of people with overseas experience" (Johnson et al. 2013). Sharing that point of view, a retired career ambassador denounced in the *Foreign Service Journal* that the expansion of the civil service was done "without formal congressional authority or mandate... [thereby] undermining the congressional (and national) decision to create and operate a distinct professional diplomatic team" (Marks 2016).

To support their jurisdictional claim against the expansion of the civil service, Foreign Service advocates argue that, given the different structures, conditions and rules of the two personnel systems, "The department has struggled to manage these distinctly different systems, and the result has been an increasingly fractious and dysfunctional corporate environment, draining energy and focus" (Johnson et al. 2013). Given that situation, Johnson, Pickering and Neumann (2013) argued, "The State Department's civil service personnel system must be

adapted to conform more closely to the requirements of professional diplomacy", likely referring here to key Foreign Service principles such as requirements for regular rotations and service abroad. While the co-drafters of the op-ed did not go so far as to suggest that the foreign and civil services should be merged (a position that is rather controversial among FSOs, e.g. Banks 2016), Marks (2016) advocated such a move, although what he suggested would not be so much a merger as an absorption of the civil service by the Foreign Service, the latter being regarded as better suited for diplomacy.

Jurisdictional claims against the civil service have also led Foreign Service stakeholders to complain that there has been "a lot of stretching" of the technical expertise rationale for civil service employment, notably for civil servants who are Foreign Affairs Officers (FAOs) (int. 11; also Kinney 2010). Talking about civil servants working on environmental issues, the then AFSA president denied the technical nature of their expertise:

> the nature of their expertise is that it's not that technical, it's policy work. It's not that these people are biologists or chemists, etc. We're talking about people who develop expertise in a set of policy issues related to some technical subject. Which we can also do and which we could say today diplomats need to be more literate about. (int. 11)

In a more circumspect way, a recent report of the American Academy of Diplomacy also called for a rethinking of "the traditional rationale [where] the Civil Service role is to provide technical expertise and continuity": "This rationale needs to be reviewed and probed in light of developments over the past 30 years and the current need for technical expertise. What specific detailed, operational technical expertise do Civil Service Foreign Affairs officers bring?" (AAD 2015)

The civil service having expanded especially in functional bureaus, AFSA, the AAD and other Foreign Service veterans have come to the conclusion that the Foreign Service presence in these bureaus needs to increase. The recent report of the AAD states that "The Department should address the relative allocation of Foreign Service and Civil Service positions in functional bureaus... The objective is to redress the significant loss of the Foreign Service perspective in virtually all of State's functional bureaus" (American Academy of Diplomacy 2015). For Boyatt et al. (2013), this should be done by notably "encouraging FSOs to understand the importance of this work; changing promotion precepts to make clear such assignments are not a drag on promotion prospects... and if necessary by imposing a measure of service discipline". Hence, veterans of the Foreign Service likely consider that for the latter to remain in a dominant position within the State Department and in US diplomacy in general, FSOs have to claim jurisdiction of those transnational policy issues that have become increasingly important in today's world. Their recommendations were echoed in the most recent State Department quadrennial review, the latter indicating an intent to "strengthen incentives for Foreign Service officers to serve in functional bureaus" and to "encourage greater specialization in key transnational issues" (Department of State and USAID 2015, 75).

Countering Attempts to "Homogenize" the Foreign and Civil Services

Recent Foreign Service advocacy has also focused on denouncing perceived attempts by the political leadership of the department to homogenize the civil and foreign services (AAD 2015, Boyatt 2016). The homogenizing practices that are denounced include notably the alleged removal, over the last decade, of the phrases "Foreign Service Officer" and "FSO" from the State Department lexicon and their replacement with "'State Department Official' for

public use and 'Generalist' in internal documentation" (AAD 2015). Various changes initiated by Secretary Colin Powell have been particularly controversial for seemingly attempting "to blur the difference between Foreign Service officers and the Civil Service" (Harrop 2015). For instance, the traditional "Foreign Service day" was changed for "Foreign Affairs day" and the so-called Foreign Service lounge, inside the State Department building, was turned into the "Employee Service Center" (Kopp 2015). For William Harrop, a retired senior officer, such policies have served "to weaken the Foreign Service and cloud its separate identity (Harrop 2015). While these policies have stemmed, according to AFSA's president, from "the desire to sort of equate everything... with the intent of creating more harmony and creating a better sense of, you know, we're all part of one team", it has contributed to create "a lot of confusion of roles"; "one mission one team is fine, but one team has different players, so you got to understand what the roles are" (int. 11).

To counter any deliberate homogenization or unintended confusion between the two services, advocates of the Foreign Service make efforts to emphasize the formal distinctions between them, conveying in the process a representation of the latter as having more rigorous requirements. For instance, a former AFSA president told a journalist and author of a book on the Foreign Service, "The Foreign Service has a personnel system modeled on that of the military, with entry by examination, competitive annual evaluations, an up-or-out process and mandatory retirement at age 65, which do not exist in the civil service (Johnson quoted in Kralev 2012, 47). Similarly, two retired officers recently emphasized in the *Foreign Service Journal* the importance of recognizing and respecting the differences between the foreign and

civil services, in reaction to an article by a civil servant calling for "parity" between the two groups:

> Mr. Roeder seems either ignorant of or unwilling to acknowledge the profound differences and conditions of employment that distinguish the rank-in-job, domestic Civil Service personnel system from the rank-in-person, worldwide-available, up-or-out Foreign Service - or their very different evaluation systems. (Kinney 2015)

> We need to preserve the fundamental distinction between FSOs and FAOs, which is this: Foreign Service members commit to being available for worldwide service throughout their careers... In contrast, FAOs are not expected to serve overseas, and are never penalized for turning down an overseas assignment. ... I strongly support treating members of the Foreign Service and Civil Service equally... But that is not the same as parity, which would imply that the two personnel systems are functionally the same. They are not. (Honley 2015)

A table was also produced by AFSA (2013) and reproduced by the AAD (2015) which compares the Foreign Service's formal conditions of employment to those of the civil service (see appendix D). In its recent report, the AAD further underlined that "the Department must define clearly the respective and distinctive roles of the Foreign Service and Civil Service, in compliance with the legislative language of the [Foreign Service] Act" (AAD 2015, 24). While the department has no "policy articulating the respective roles of the Civil Service and Foreign Service in Washington", "such a policy is imperative", claimed the AAD (2015, 44).

Opposing Lateral Entries of Civil Servants in the Foreign Service

A further civil service-related issue in Foreign Service advocacy is the question of lateral entries, that is to say, the entrance of new officers in the service at mid-level or higher ranks, instead of at bottom level, as FSOs normally do. It should be noted that, although they may overlap to some extent in practice (that is actually a point of controversy for the Foreign Service), a distinction is made here between lateral entries, which concern the recruitment of

permanent employees, and political appointments, which are normally temporary and will be the focus of the next chapter.

AFSA and other Foreign Service leaders have expressed opposition to lateral entries coming from the department civil service. For them, "allowing lateral entry by civil servants and others to take good Foreign Service jobs without accepting the concomitant sacrifices demoralizes and undermines the career service" (Johnson and Harrop quoted by Kralev 2012, 47). There are also "no legal basis for allowing [civil servants] the opportunity to convert directly to the Foreign Service at equal rank" (Honley 2015). In addition, "having worked in Washington for years does not necessarily makes a civil servant qualified for an overseas assignment", claimed Harrop (cited in Kralev 2012, 48-49).

AFSA, AAD and 12 former AFSA presidents recently mobilized against a provision inserted in the last State Department authorization bill establishing a pilot program for Foreign Service lateral entry at a grade higher than FS-4 (which is a mid-level grade) (Spero 2016). The program would be open not only to mid-career individuals from the civil service, but also from the private sector, which has likely increased the intensity of the opposition from the Foreign Service establishment. The latter fears that the program "will subject the Foreign Service to unprecedented politicization", as former lateral entries "all have been vehicles for abuse through the hiring of personal and political cronies" (AAD 2016b). The legal provision introducing the contested program was apparently not included in the authorization bill passed by the Senate in June 2016 (Spero 2016).

In sum, advocates of the Foreign Service seek to preserve, in relation to the civil service, the jurisdiction of FSOs over most diplomatic, policy-making positions and leadership positions in the State Department. They aim to maintain strict social boundaries relative to civil servants as well as symbolic markers of the distinct identity of the Foreign Service. Overall, Foreign Service advocacy aims at preserving the social and symbolic domination of FSOs over the civil service within the State Department.

This section as a whole has made clear that the FSO corps claims an elite status within the State Department, a distinct jurisdictional domain from the civil service, and the preservation of its privileges vis-à-vis the latter. The next section shifts the focus on the civil servants' perspective and looks at the extent of their contestation and acceptance of the social and symbolic boundaries produced, promoted and defended by the Foreign Service.

3. Civil Servants: Between Contestation and Normalization of FSOs' Status Group Claim

Civil servants deplore the "major division", "divide" or "longstanding disharmony" between the civil and foreign services of the State Department (int. 35; Lowengart 2010; Roeder 2015). They contest the discrimination in institutional rules applying to the civil service, the elitism in Foreign Service attitudes and advocacy, as well as some of their attitudes and practices on the workplace. However, they also reinforce in some respects the boundary work and jurisdictional claims of the Foreign Service. This is the case regarding the regional-functional boundary, their representation as experts and FSO's exclusive representation as diplomats.

3.1 The Ambiguous Contestation of the Foreign Service's Symbolic Capital

Many civil servants have expressed in recent years the feeling that they tend to be seen and treated as second-class employees within the department (Interview 19, 32, 35; Roeder 2015; Lowengart 2010; Kopp 2015; Washington Post 2013; Diplopundit 2011). When I asked a public affairs civil servant what are the differences between public affairs domestic work in the department as a civil servant and as a FSO, she immediately pointed to the informal hierarchy between the two: "I would say that they are comparable in terms of the required skills. But in this department... there is a certain sense that the foreign service officer outranks or is in some way better than the person who chooses not to go that road. I don't think that it's valid at all... But there is that culture (int. 32). The expressions "*there is a certain sense"* and *"there is that culture"*, by leaving unspecified the subjects reproducing that culture, are reflective of a certain ambiguity in the civil service's stance vis-à-vis the Foreign Service's social and symbolic domination within the department: on the one hand civil servants contest it, but in some respects, they also seem to participate in reproducing it. Before addressing how they may reproduce that culture, this subsection will first look at the extent of their contestation regarding employment conditions and their general treatment within the State Department.

The public expression of civil servants' complaints is a relatively rare occurrence, but as suggested above, an article entitled "Seeking Parity between the Civil and Foreign Services" (Roeder 2015) by a former foreign affairs civil servant recently found its way in the *Foreign Service Journal*. The author denounced that civil servants are not seen and treated as "equal partners" in the pursuit of the department's mission. More specifically, he portrayed as unfair

the fact that civil servants at mid-level ranks and above who wish to convert to the Foreign Service cannot do so at equal rank (lateral entry), whereas "FSOs can convert to Civil Service without sacrificing rank if they meet certain conditions" (Roeder 2015). He also made the case for easier access to overseas assignments for civil servants and for the possibility that the senior members of the civil service be considered for an ambassadorship, a position that has virtually never been accessible to them (Roeder 2015; int. 35 also makes a similar point about ambassadorships).

Other civil servants have expressed discontent about their more limited possibilities to reach positions of leadership in the department's bureaus, many of these positions being formally reserved for FSOs (Interviews 32, 35; Lowengart 2010). As section two suggested, this situation is frustrating for mid-level to senior civil servants who are in positions just below the regularly changing FSOs who act as their boss but are, from their point of view, actually less knowledgeable about the job than they are. For one of my interviewees, the very unsatisfactory consequence for a civil servant in such a position is that he "is in training mode all the time", having to teach the landing FSO manager the particular aspects of the office, "knowing that that position is never going to be his" (Int. 32).

Civil servants decried the claim of Foreign Service leaders, in their 2013 *Washington Post* op-ed, that the civil service has grown "at the expense of the Foreign Service", (Johnson et al. 2013; Kopp 2015). Individual responses of civil servants to that claim denounced the lack of recognition of the value of their work (their cultural capital, which will be addressed in the next subsection) and that representatives of the Foreign Service were being divisive and elitist

instead of recognizing that "every job in the department has value" and that all employees "work towards the same goals" (anonymous civil servants in Washington Post 2013).

In some instances, members of the civil service seek to enhance their own symbolic capital by pointing out publicly that they are also involved in diplomacy. To support his denunciation that the State Department's two groups of career employees are not seen and treated equally and that the image of diplomacy that tends to be conveyed within the department is focused on FSOs and chiefs of mission, Roeder (2015) argues that "today's diplomacy is nearly always developed by a team of Foreign Service and Civil Service professionals". He draws on his own professional experience to show that civil servants too participate in sensitive diplomatic negotiations and missions abroad and work with foreigners to notably improve security and provide humanitarian relief, all things normally falling within the Foreign Service's conception of diplomacy:

> Like many FAOs and FSOs, I led or participated in sensitive negotiations to control technology that could have been converted into weapons against the United States. I was also the first economic officer to visit Albania, served with the Multinational Force of Observers in Egypt and worked on counter-smuggling operations with the European Commission in Brussels. And I helped negotiate the Tampere Convention... a treaty designed to save lives in disasters. ... the Tampere delegation was entirely Civil Service, as were my several missions to Sudan to talk to rebels and relief workers. (Roeder 2015)

In addition, civil servants "take courses at the Foreign Service Institute, in academia and other venues", just like FSOs (Roeder 2015).

Given their role in US diplomacy, Roeder (2015) argues that civil servants should have the right to be honored too in the new diplomacy museum (called the Diplomacy Center) that the

State Department will open shortly in its vicinity for the general public. In line with this position, a civil servant having participated in the development of the diplomacy center explained that herself and others made the case for the inclusion of civil servants in an exhibit called "I am a diplomat": "we had lengthy discussions... some people thought that we should adhere to the strict understanding of diplomat and some of us felt that everybody who works in the department, in one way or another, is involved in diplomacy" (int. 32). Both FSOs and civil servants (as well as locally employed staff) have finally been included, in contrast with the position of AFSA who "did not want [museum designers] to call somebody a diplomat who is not a Foreign Service officer" (int. 19).

However, while civil servants claim recognition as being "involved in diplomacy", they actually seem to share the representation of FSOs as the "real" diplomats. For the civil servant involved in the diplomacy center project, the decision of including civil servants in the aforementioned exhibit "really stretches the definition of diplomat with respect to how we perceive it, for the purpose of this museum", the "strict understanding" of the term being coterminous with the Foreign Service (int. 32). Civil servants are "involved in diplomacy... supporting the work abroad", while FSOs "are upfront in some other countries as a diplomat" (int. 32). Later in the interview, this civil servant also conveyed a certain recognition on her part of the specialness and superior status of FSOs when she said, "there's that cachet to being a Foreign Service officer" (int. 32).

Another civil servant, a junior FAO in a geographic bureau, indicated his acceptance of FSOs' claim to superior symbolic capital as diplomats when I asked him whether he felt tensions between the foreign and civil services:

> Certainly, Foreign Service officers think of themselves as being, you know, this is a diplomatic agency and they are the diplomats, so they think of themselves as being maybe a class above. I don't really have a problem with that. ... in the functional bureaus, civil servants tend to be in charge... So it is a give and take and I think it's a good balance. (Int. 27)

When questioned as to his professional identity, this interviewee acknowledged that he had "some of the functions of the diplomats" - "I meet with Canadian diplomats... I talk to people about sensitive issues" - but emphasized instead his identify as a foreign policy professional (int. 27). So did a senior civil servant with extensive experience leading bilateral and multilateral negotiations when I asked him whether he considered himself a diplomat:

> It's complicated because I'm not Foreign Service, I'm civil service, and I'm not based overseas. One narrow definition of diplomat is an official accredited to a country or an embassy. I think that, I probably have a more expansive definition... that definition says that anybody who is working to advance, working with other countries to advance US foreign policy goals is a diplomat. But I'm not sure, you know, I call myself a foreign policy professional. (Int. 28)

"Foreign policy professional" seems to be the most common title that foreign affairs civil servants give to themselves. Even Roeder (2015), who highlights that FAOs practice diplomacy too, calls the latter "foreign policy professionals".

In sum, whereas civil servants express discontent about some of their employment conditions as well as their general treatment by the Foreign Service and others as "second-class citizens", they also seem (at least based on the material, arguably limited for drawing solid conclusions, that was available to me) to reproduce FSOs' representation as the real diplomats.

3.2 Jurisdictional Claims Based on Invoking Expertise and Continuity

In accordance with FSOs' representation, the self-worth of civil servants is based on the view that they have expertise that FSOs, as generalists, do not have. They see themselves as professionals who have technical expertise and/or "build depth of expertise" through their long experience in some area of the department (int. 9, 19, 27, 28, 35). Underlying this expertise is often, some civil servants point out, more in-depth education: "GS[27] staff typically have more in-depth education in the specialized areas they address... than their Foreign Service counterparts who are typically generalists with less expertise in their given area" (anonymous civil servant, Washington Post 2013). Some interviewees mentioned to me that many in the civil service have PhDs, which, one said, is not the norm among FSOs (int. 32, 35). That was indeed the case for four out of six of my civil service interviewees.

Also in line with the Foreign Service's portrayal of them, civil servants frequently point out that they constitute the institutional memory of the department given their greater longevity in a given position and the continuity that they provide amid frequent turnovers among Foreign Service members (int. 9, 28; Kralev 2012, 46; Washington Post 2013). Given their continuity and expertise, civil servants contend that they constitute an indispensable complement to the Foreign Service within the department, as this interviewee suggested in reaction to the Foreign Service's claim that the juxtaposition of the two personnel systems is problematic:

> I don't know how you do it otherwise, because the advantage of the civil service is that you have longevity, you've got experience, you've got institutional memory, you've got substantive expertise; you cannot have that in the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service, I mean, you have different cones, but they rotate out and every

[27] "General Schedule" (GS) designates the category of the federal-wide civil service of which State Department civil servants are a part.

> country is different, you're gonna deal with different types of thematic issues. I think it complements each other nicely. (Int. 9)

Similarly, from the point of view of a senior civil servant, the combination of the foreign and civil services in the department's headquarters forms a "really healthy mix", the advantages (continuity and expertise for the civil service and the "multiplicity of perspectives" for FSOs) and disadvantages (lack of continuity for FSOs) of each system counterbalancing each other (int. 28). "The offices and bureaus that I've seen that do a great job are the ones that actually have that mix", he added.

Notwithstanding the acknowledgement of their complementary role to the Foreign Service, civil servants' claimed cultural capital leads them to be critical of some of the latter's attitudes and practices on the workplace. For instance, a civil service interviewee criticized what she identified as a belief on the part of her Foreign Service colleagues that they can do anything: "the belief is, 'I can do anything, I'm a generalist. [And for my annual evaluation] ...I have to be seen as being very proactive and able to take things over'" (int. 19). While portraying FSOs as smart, "it does bother me", she said, "when people who are not maybe as knowledgeable about something command and take over like they know it all... doing stuff that potentially could very seriously have an impact on the future" (int. 19). Hence, tending to see expertise or solid experience as necessary credentials to perform certain tasks within her office, this civil servant felt irritated to see her generalist Foreign Service's colleagues act as if they had the required competence when they did not. She was also critical of her regularly changing Foreign Service bosses (in the position of office director), for their lack of commitment to the overarching project being developed by the office's staff, a commitment that, in her view,

would have been demonstrated by efforts on their part to become more knowledgeable about the operational aspects and the specific content of the project (int. 17, 19). In sum, for this civil service employee, the generalist profile of FSOs resulted in dilettantism in the performance of their job.

Similar criticisms are visible in the claims of other civil servants, for whom FSOs sometimes act as if they know as much or more on a given issue despite their much shorter experience or lack of background dealing with that particular issue (int. 13, 30, 32; Spero 2011). As a FSO himself confessed, "A civil servant may often say, 'you have no real background on this, how can you make a judgment on it?'" (int. 13). Given the shorter time spent by FSOs in a given office, civil servants are also prone to be annoyed by Foreign Service colleagues who seem to think that their ideas and solutions are new when in fact these ideas and solutions have already been considered or put to use in the past (int. 29, 30). On a related but different aspect, a public affairs civil servant argued that it is unfair that FSOs sometimes disregard the opinions and knowledge claims of their civil service colleagues because of their lack of overseas experience: "civil servants they don't bring the experience of living abroad to the table and I think that sometimes it discounts their experience totally... it discounts everything that that person says or brings" (int. 32). Yet, "you may know a lot about a particular issue because you follow it in the news, you read extensively about it..." (int. 32).

Civil servants suggest that their specific cultural capital of expertise and continuity gives them more legitimacy to control certain types of tasks or subject-areas within the department. While some may go so far as to claim that their continuity makes them more suitable for domestic

policy jobs in general (e.g. anonymous civil servant in Washington Post 2013), civil servants' jurisdictional claims are mostly focused on functional bureaus, in symmetry with the Foreign Service's focus on the regional bureaus. My civil service interviewees suggested, like FSOs, that work in their current or former functional bureau requires "subject-matter expertise" or "technical expertise" and/or long-term involvement and consequently, it is normal or desirable for FSOs to stay away from these functional bureaus (int. 9, 13, 27, 32, 35). "It is in the functional bureaus, the "E" bureaus for example, where you're gonna have the need for technical experts", said one (Int. 9). Another interviewee argued that in the public liaison office, "it was wise" that there was no FSOs because "there's a certain institutional memory, continuity that is required, so you really can't have people parachuting every two years and hightailing it off and then making sure that that works" (int. 32).

Likewise, a senior civil servant manager within the OES bureau - which is in charge of climate change negotiations - invoked the need for longevity and consistency to explain why there was not more FSOs on his staff (one or two FSOs out of 30 people):

> We find that our work, especially negotiations, it takes a fair amount of time to understand the dynamics and the rhythms of the negotiations, as well as the substantive matter. And so, that's why we probably don't have more FSOs; because they're normally in for 2 or 3 years, and it normally takes at least a year to really understand the context. And if it keeps cycling in and out, we don't have the consistency that is required for a negotiation process that is going on decades, right? So that's why we generally restrict ourselves to one or two. (int. 9)

Underlining the need for specific knowledge and experience to work in his office, the same interviewee later on added, "we're very careful in screening applications from FSOs... we can be pretty picky on who we pick" (int. 9). Moreover, he normalized the regional-functional segmentation between FSOs and civil servants by arguing that it is natural that FSOs be found

more in regional bureaus given their regional specialization and given that "they join the Foreign Service to live in foreign lands";

> That's kind of a natural thing because a lot of them specialize in a region. So if you serve in a couple of embassies in Europe, it makes sense for you to come back to a European regional bureau, because that's what you know. So you're able to build up that expertise and you're not in totally new ground. ... So in a way that makes perfect sense. (Int. 9)

To sum up, civil servants defend their worth and their role based on claiming to possess a distinct cultural capital, namely expertise and continuity, that is essential as a complement to the Foreign Service within the State Department, especially in functional bureaus. This leads them to be critical of some of FSOs' attitudes and practices on the workplace, thereby asserting and protecting their own conception of relevant knowledge and competence within the department. While such stance amounts to a contestation of Foreign Service's claimed cultural capital, their jurisdictional claim over functional bureaus legitimizes the regional-functional boundary and hierarchy fostered in the first place by FSOs. This is in addition to the reproduction by civil servants of their representation, by FSOs, as experts and of their exclusion as diplomats, as seen in the previous subsection.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the FSO corps' status group claim in relation to the State Department's civil service builds on a set of symbolic boundaries and jurisdictional claims which together amount to a claim to symbolic and social domination over civil servants. FSOs cultivate a sense of honor as an elite based notably on construing their employment conditions as more prestigious and more rigorous than those of the civil service. They also claim more

symbolic capital, for diplomacy and foreign policy-making purposes, based on their lifestyle and their cultural capital as generalists with overseas experience.

Within the State Department, FSOs have tended to reproduce an informal division of jurisdictions by privileging assignments in regional bureaus and leaving functional ones to civil servants. This has contributed to the reproduction of a pattern of domination over the latter given the greater prestige and policy-making authority of the regional bureaus. While FSOs' jurisdictional claim over the regional bureaus has been enacted in a relatively implicit manner, Foreign Service organizations and veterans publicly pursue jurisdictional claims to ensure FSOs' privileged access to leadership positions in the State Department and other diplomatic and policy positions. Foreign Service advocacy also emphasizes the need to preserve symbolic markers of the distinct identity of the Service relative to civil servants.

For their part, a number of civil servants have denounced their perceived unequal treatment and their representation by FSOs as having an inferior status. However, some of them also seem to participate in the reproduction of that status, notably by legitimizing their exclusion as bearers of the identity of diplomat. Importantly also, by claiming jurisdiction of functional bureaus, civil servants normalize the traditional regional-functional jurisdictional boundary and, with it, its underlying structure of domination in favor of FSOs. Overall, while more data would be required on civil servants' representations vis-à-vis FSOs, the facts that the latter occupy virtually all career ambassadorships and senior positions of the department, fill most of the overseas positions and have reproduced their jurisdiction over the prestigious regional bureaus, put FSOs in a dominant position over civil servants.

The findings suggest that, by continuing to privilege work in regional bureaus and to attach greater value to its generalist cultural capital, the Foreign Service defines as its jurisdiction what corresponds to a more traditional diplomatic culture. By contrast, with their greater involvement in functional bureaus and the value that they attach to specialized expertise, civil servants are associated with a more modern set of diplomatic tasks (i.e. dealing with transnational issues) and processes (i.e. multilateral negotiations). In this regard, it is striking that civil servants tend to be excluded from dominant conceptions of diplomathood since they are in many cases actively involved in highly topical processes of multilateral negotiations, such as climate change negotiations or disarmament negotiations.

Beyond civil servants, another important group of diplomatic actors with whom FSOs interact within the State Department, both domestically and abroad, are political appointees. The next chapter will address this important relationship.

Chapter 5 - Diplomats Against Politics: Contesting and Legitimizing Political Appointments

Appointments of private citizens in diplomatic positions have long generated debate in the United States. A recent incarnation of this debate took place during the winter of 2014, following the Senate confirmation hearing of three ambassadorial nominees who came from the private sector and had been fundraisers for Obama's two presidential campaigns. The nominees (respectively for Norway, Hungary and Argentina) committed gaffes in their responses to some of the Senators' questions, which generated a great deal of news stories and editorials[28]. These news reports and comments pointed up the nominees' lack of knowledge of their designated host country and, as on other occasions in the past, called into question ambassadorial nominations of financial and political allies of the president with no diplomatic experience.

As already mentioned in chapter three, since the 1950s, successive White Houses have allocated about 30% of ambassadorships to political appointees and 70% to career members of the Foreign Service. As of May 2016, 55 political appointees (29,4%) and 132 career Foreign Service officers (70,6%) were serving as United States ambassadors abroad (AFSA 2016c)[29]. Within the State Department also, a significant portion of senior domestic positions, such as

[28] e.g. Eilperin 2014, "Obama ambassador nominees prompt an uproar with bungled answers, lack of ties", *Washington Post*, February 14; PBS 2014, "Recent Confirmation Hearings Raise Eyebrows at Ambassador Nomination Criteria" February 17.

[29] A very small number of ambassadorships are also given from time to time to career civil servants from the State Department and/or career officers from other federal agencies using the Foreign Service personnel system (Commerce Department, Agriculture Department and USAID) (Jett 2012, 47).

undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, traditionally go to non-career appointees. Of course, by definition all these political appointees, whether ambassadors or senior officials in the State Department, serve at the pleasure of the president and are therefore replaced when there is a change of presidential party.[30]

This chapter examines how members of the Foreign Service and political appointees negotiate their respective jurisdiction in relation to one another. In section two, I show that members and representative organizations of the Foreign Service, claiming jurisdiction of a greater share of ambassadorships and high-level positions in the State department, engage in boundary work to circumscribe non-career appointments. The symbolic boundaries that they draw define the competences required to be an ambassador or another high-level diplomatic official. This cultural capital includes substantive knowledge of international affairs and experience of high level government policy and operations.

In section 3, I turn to political appointees' own boundary work and jurisdictional claims aimed at legitimizing their access to diplomatic positions. Non-career appointees notably invoke the presidential prerogative in their defense, but they also take up the dominant conception, according to which a cultural capital of competence is required in these positions, by reframing it. Downplaying the formal boundary between career and non-career diplomats with respect to diplomatic competence, they claim to bring with their appointment various skills and assets that career diplomats do not necessarily have, thereby enhancing US diplomacy.

[30] Of course, political appointments are not a feature unique to diplomacy in the US. Within the whole US government, there are over 3000 high level positions that go to political appointees, while countries such as France, Great Britain and Germany have between 100 and 200 such political appointments (Lewis 2008, 3).

While section three is focused on political appointees' jurisdictional claims and boundary work in the public arena, section 4 moves the focus to the workplace and addresses the way political appointees handle their claim to legitimate diplomathood during their appointment. I show that they are concerned about being perceived as legitimate and competent participants in US diplomacy alongside FSOs, and therefore seek to accumulate resources that can be converted into symbolic capital in the State Department field.

Methodologically, this chapter uses empirical material drawn from a combination of sources: my own interviews with 24 current or former Foreign Service Officers and three former diplomatic political appointees; documents produced by the organizations representing respectively career and non-career US diplomats; articles, books and opinion pieces by former FSOs and political appointees; and a set of publicly-available interviews with political appointees conducted by third parties.

To set the background to the presentation of the findings, the chapter first gives more details on diplomatic political appointees using the existing literature and available data on their professional backgrounds, the determinants of their selection by the White House, where they serve as ambassadors, and the proportions of career and non-career appointments in senior positions within the State Department.

1. Political Appointees: Who They Are and What They Do

Political Ambassadors

Non-career ambassadors have various professional backgrounds. By way of illustration, the following professional profiles were found among Obama's second-term ambassadors (Beckel and Zubak-Skees 2014):

- Private sector: business executives and entrepreneurs, lawyers, consultants, directors of NGOs
- Presidential campaign staff
- Government: officials from non-foreign service agencies, officials from the legislative or judicial branch, members of the armed forces, White House staff, former aides for high-level State department officials
- University professors.

While the precise criteria according to which the White House makes the final selection of non-career ambassadors may vary somewhat from one presidency to the other, the available evidence indicates that primary and key determinants across presidencies have been the political and/or personal connections of non-career ambassadors to the president, notably their role as fundraisers or donors for the presidential campaign or inauguration (e.g. Confessore and Stolberg 2013; Eilperin 2014; Fedderke and Jett 2012; Hollibaugh 2015)[31]. According to a

[31] A White House tape recording made public in 1997 revealed that in 1971, Nixon told his chief of staff that "anybody who wants to be an ambassador must at least give $250,000" (Lardner and Pincus 1997). In line with this evidence, an interviewee from the Council of American ambassadors gave the example of the selection process used by the White House personnel office for ambassadorships in 2000, after George W. Bush's election: the selection process started with the identification of the more than 1000 people "who were deserving" because "they had done enough; they had close enough connections or whatever". Then, this list of over 1000 people was

review of the Center for Public Integrity, 29 out of the 64 political appointee ambassadors[32] in Obama's second term raised for him between $50,000 and $1,2 million between 2007 and 2013 (Beckel and Zubak-Skees 2014). These so-called campaign "bundlers" virtually all come from the private sector. The other 35 Obama appointees are mostly former government officials or staff for Democratic politicians, former presidential campaign staff and scholars (Beckel and Zubak-Skees 2014).

Some non-career ambassadorial appointees who were not financial allies of the president are nonetheless perceived (in the media) as providing a clear payoff for the White House in domestic politics (Hollibaugh 2015). For instance, the nomination in 2009 of an openly gay individual (David Huebner) to be ambassador to New Zealand was perceived as a gesture by Obama to consolidate support within the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender community in the US. Furthermore, host countries' preferences can also play a role in the type of ambassador selected; some countries, like Saudi Arabia, want an envoy who is personally close to the president while others, like Japan, prefer a US envoy who is a high-profile personality (Jett 2014).

Who Goes Where As an Ambassador

As suggested in the press, ambassadorships in certain parts of the world tend to routinely go to non-career individuals. Since 1960, 72,5% of the chiefs of mission in Western Europe and

narrowed according to a set of criteria, starting with people's interest and availability to take on an appointment and then, for the about 150 people who were left, according to a "matrix of qualifications" (Interview 31, 2014).

[32] These nominations at the ambassadorial rank include nominations such as special representatives or coordinators for some particular issue, Department of State Chief of Protocol and deputy US Trade Representative.

71,7% of the ambassadors to the Caribbean region have been political appointees (AFSA 2015d, see table 5.1). By contrast, and as shown in table 5.1, there has been significantly fewer political ambassadors than career ones in South Asia, East Asia, South America, Eastern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Other types of diplomatic posts that have been filled mostly with political appointees since 1960 are ambassadorships to multilateral organizations, as table 5.2 makes clear (AFSA 2015c). Overall, political appointee ambassadors are more likely to serve in high-income (in terms of GDP per capita) countries and highly touristic venues, while career diplomats are more likely to serve as ambassadors in poorer countries and more difficult environments (Fedderke and Jett 2012). Recent academic research adds that economic partners of the US, democracies and states that share foreign policy interests with the US are also more likely to receive non-career ambassadors (Hollibaugh 2015).

Table 5.1 Ambassadorial Appointments by Region of the World, 1960-2015

Region	Career Appointments	Political Appointments	% Political Since 1960
Western Europe	106	280	**72.5%**
Caribbean	45	114	**71.7%**
Oceania	81	73	47.4%
North & Central America	90	66	42.3%
South Asia	93	33	26.2%
East Asia	157	52	24.9%
South America	171	48	21.9%
Eastern Europe	172	45	20.7%
Africa	669	112	14.3%
Middle East	243	39	13.8%
Central Asia	56	0	0%

Source: AFSA 2015d.

Table 5.2 Ambassadorial Appointments to International Organizations, 1960-2015

International Organization	Career Ambassador	Political Ambassador	% Political since 1960
African Union	0	3	**100%**
ICAO	0	12	**100%**
UN/Rome	0	3	**100%**
OAS	2	15	**88,2%**
UN	3	23	**88,5%**
NATO	4	15	**78,9%**
UNESCO	3	7	**72,7%**
UN/Vienna - IAEA	4	9	**69,2%**
UN/Geneva	6	13	**68,4%**
OECD	7	10	**58,8%**
EU	8	10	**55,6%**
ASEAN	1	1	**50%**

Source: AFSA 2015c.

Political Appointees in Domestic Positions of the State Department

As in other federal agencies, there are three categories of political appointments within the State Department (Lewis 2008, 22-25):

- Positions requiring Senate confirmation: secretary, deputy secretary, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, special representatives/coordinators;
- Non-career positions within the Senior Executive Service (senior management level of the federal civil service);
- Mid-level positions of a confidential or policy-determining nature, such as special assistants for senior officials and directors of communications or press.

In comparison with other federal agencies, the number of positions requiring Senate confirmation is particularly high in the Department of State (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 43).

The latter has about 60 officials in that category (excluding ambassadors), while the average department has 15 to 30 such officials (Lewis 2008, 23)[33].

According to data gathered by AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), in 2014, non-career appointees occupied 51% of the Department's senior leadership positions (i.e. positions requiring Senate confirmation), while in 1975 they represented 37% of the high-ranking officials (AAD 2015). 64% of the so-called special envoys, special representatives, coordinators and special advisors were also political appointees in 2014 (AAD 2015). Taking into account deputy secretaries, assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries (thus leaving aside undersecretaries), the State Department's human resources bureau, for its part, underlined in 2013 that career FSOs and civil servants occupied then 69% of these positions and political appointees 31% (Department of State 2013b).

In general, very few big campaign contributors serve as political appointees in domestic positions of the department. According to Jett (2014), an examination of the background of the 101 political appointees who required Senate confirmation between 2001 and 2013 indicates that more than half came from political or government backgrounds, 15 had business backgrounds, and the remainder came from academia, think tanks, the media, NGOs, law and the military (Jett 2014, 151).

[33] Below the Secretary of State, the Department's chain of command is the following: Deputy secretary; Undersecretary; Assistant secretary (who heads a bureau); Deputy assistant secretary; Office director; Deputy office director; Division chief. For the organizational chart of the Department, see appendix C.

2. Circumscribing the Room for Political Appointees

> *That's what happens when we have political ambassadors or other political [appointments]: we're essentially saying it's not a profession, it's not that important, anybody can do it, and you don't need to have gone through an apprenticeship journeyman... to really acquire the skills to do it well.* (Interview 11: AFSA president)

Members of the Foreign Service are skeptical about the diplomatic competence of political appointees and, as suggested by the above quote, feel that political appointments are both a devaluation of diplomacy and an encroachment on their jurisdiction. They do recognize that bad and good performances are found among both career and non-career people and, in fact, that many political appointees have been excellent diplomatic practitioners (own interviews; AAD 2015; Neumann 2015; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, Jett 2014; Wood 2014). However, the space that they are willing to concede to non-career individuals is definitely more tightly defined than what the current practice allows. Therefore, they advocate for a more restricted access to ambassadorships and other political appointments by outsiders, mostly by drawing symbolic boundaries pertaining to competence.

Two organizations play important roles in publicly pursuing the Foreign Service's jurisdictional claims vis-à-vis political appointees: the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), which monitors closely the ratio of career and non-career appointments in senior positions, and the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD). Considering that the current proportions of political appointees both in ambassadorships and in policy positions in Washington are unacceptable, the leaders of AFSA and the Academy have been working closely together on that issue in recent years (Neumann 2010).

2.1 Jurisdictional Claims Against Political Ambassadorships

The Foreign Service association and the AAD have made clear that strict parameters should be upheld for political ambassadorships. For the two organizations, this practice "should be exceptional and circumscribed", in line with the provision of the Foreign Service Act (1980) that "positions as chiefs of mission should normally be accorded to career members of the Service" (AFSA 2015b). They advocate for a ratio of no more than 10 percent of political appointments among all ambassadorial appointments instead of the traditional ratio of one third (AAD 2015; AFSA 2015b). This recommended limit is meant to "accommodat[e] the occasional appointment of unusually talented and public service-minded private citizens with relevant experience" (AAD 2015, 20). Further, they remind all interested parties that, once again according to the Foreign Service Act, “contributions to political campaigns should not be a factor in the appointment of an individual as a chief of mission" and that ambassadorial nominees

> should possess clearly demonstrated competence to perform the duties of a chief of mission, including… useful knowledge of the language... of the country in which the individual is to serve... and understanding of the history, the culture, the economic and political institutions, and the interests of that country. (Foreign Service Act, quoted in AFSA 2015b)

In 2014, AFSA adopted more detailed guidelines defining the qualifications that the White House and the Congress should require for candidates to ambassadorships (AFSA 2014). The recommended guidelines were established by a working group composed of ten "distinguished former chiefs of mission", including three who were non-career appointees. According to these guidelines, the qualifications that each ambassadorial nominee should possess are the following (AFSA 2014):

- Leadership, character and proven interpersonal skills;

- Understanding of high level policy and operations, and of key U.S. interests and values in the country or organization of prospective assignment;
- Management experience;
- Understanding of host country and International Affairs.

While the complete description of each of these guidelines (see appendix E) indicates that a demanding package of competences is seen as necessary, the guidelines do not clearly convey the careerists' dislike of non-career ambassadors coming from the private sector and, conversely, their more favorable attitude toward those who have a "distinguished record in *public service* or in *academia*" (my emphasis) (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 63; Smith 1980; Bruno 2014). As illustrated by the then president of AFSA, the appointment of outsiders with distinguished public service backgrounds can be welcome for the prestige that it brings to the Foreign Service:

> We could probably accept… if a certain percentage of ambassadorships were given to highly qualified people that really brought a stature to the profession – and those are like very senior members of Congress, like the Mike Mansfields or people like that. I think that would be fine because that would be almost saying this is a really worthy profession and people who have spent a lifetime successfully, you know, are interested in doing this, it's important work. (Interview 11)

Similarly, in an opinion piece about the controversy surrounding non-career ambassadorial nominations in February 2014, a former FSO approved the appointment of a congressman, but expressed concern for those nominees from the private sector:

> Of course, we have little reason to worry about longtime Montana Senator Max Baucus, whose appointment to serve in China the Senate passed unanimously... But some wealthy campaign donors with backgrounds a bit further afield from public service should give us concern. They've already embarrassed themselves (Bruno 2014).

Obviously, the Foreign Service's negative opinion of private sector ambassadorial appointees is bound up with their perception that the latter do not get their position based on their skills and experience, but as a reward for their political contributions to the president's election. The Foreign Service's criticisms of political ambassadorships focus on that perceived pattern, which career diplomats consider an insult to their competence and a devaluation of diplomacy: "when a vacuum cleaner salesman or the wife of somebody who contributed 500,000$ gets named ambassador, that's kind of saying, it doesn't matter, it's not important, or at least you don't need any skills for it other than what, I don't know, personal wealth" (Interview 11). Denouncing "the sale" of ambassadorships, career officers argue that political contributors turned ambassadors often lack the required qualifications to serve in that role, which is detrimental to the quality and prestige of US diplomacy, is susceptible to public embarrassment, and "deprives the American people of the full value of their investment in some embassies" (e.g. AAD 2015; Johnson et al. 2013; Bruno 2014; Jett 2014; Kennan 1997). In the words of the 2015 report from the AAD, "The practice of calling on private citizens does not justify sending overseas ambassadors so deficient in evident qualifications as to make them laughing stocks at home and abroad" (AAD 2015, 11). For his part, a Foreign Service interviewee lamented that his former boss, a political ambassador who had been an important political supporter for George W. Bush's presidential campaign, lacked the substantive knowledge required for the important position he held:

> He didn't have a clue about anything! I mean, it was kind of embarrassing... He inherited his father's steel company, they made nuts and bolts... that's great but he knows nothing about like, foreign policy or policy development, or anything. The conversations that he would have with high-level personalities were really just low level. He just didn't know anything. And he never really learned it, his three and a

> half years there, he never really learned it. Probably not the best choice for a critical country like [this European country]. (Interview 30)

Like AFSA and the AAD, individual career officers emphasize that there has to be, in the process of ambassadorial nominations, a greater consideration for the qualifications of the candidates. In particular, they underline the importance of understanding and experience of international affairs, foreign policy and government operations, as well as experience in the host country and knowledge of its language, culture and history (Burns in PBS 2014; Jett 2014; Wood 2014; Smith 1980). As a corollary to their claims, they make the point, against the questioning by some of the importance of ambassadors, that the latter still play very important roles; globalization and changes in the conduct of diplomacy actually "reinforce the central role of the ambassador", according to Wood (2014) and Jett (2014). In today's world, "It takes an experienced international manager and a skilled international bureaucrat, as well as a political operator" to perform in the job of ambassador (Wood 2014).

Adding some nuance to the dominant career discourse presented so far, one of my interviewees, a career FSO who herself served as ambassador in recent years, displayed a more permissive attitude toward non-career ambassadors, even those coming from the private sector. She suggested that the latter may have a habitus that is better fitted with the representational demands of some ambassadorial positions:

> The reason why I don't think it's so horrible or heinous as you might have seen in the media over the past few months, is because they bring something to the embassy that Foreign Service officers just lack. I mean, most of us spend most of our careers out of the country and so we haven't worked in America, with Americans in the way that these political appointees have, and so they bring a certain genuineness about American attitudes. I'm not saying we're not genuine Americans but, you know, they've spent a lot more time on the ground in the United States than we have and so... I think there's an authenticity to what they tell

> the host country officials. And in London, for example, I saw our ambassador there, I didn't envy him at all... he ended up having to go to lots of events with very stuffy people and, you know, I didn't find that very interesting. He moved in social circles like that back in Beverly Hills and he could talk about modern art and he had his own collection. If I'd been put in that position, I would never have made it because, you know, I like to talk about foreign policy issues or politics, and he was able to operate on that level. So I don't think it's entirely a bad thing... But you know, you should have reasonably qualified professionals that come into it. (Interview 34)

Hence, this interviewee acknowledged the relevance, in terms of competence for the role of ambassador, of non-career envoys' general attitude, sociability and general knowledge about various subjects. Overall, however, the competences that career diplomats tend to consider most relevant and important for political ambassadors are competences more specifically characteristic of the Foreign Service, notably proficiency in international affairs, understanding of US foreign policy and government operations, as well as knowledge of the host country and its language.

2.2 Jurisdictional Claims Against Domestic Appointees

FSOs tend to have higher regard for the competence of political appointees serving in positions within the department than they do for political ambassadors in general. A mid-level officer remarked, "They're usually better, the political appointees who come over to work in the department are usually, not always, but usually experts in their areas. Plus, it's really hard work" (Interview 30). Similarly, a former career ambassador points out that the non-career people working in the department are much more likely to be "policy wonks who have an interest in and the qualifications for work that is heavy on substance and short on glamour" (Jett 2014, 151).

However, the Foreign Service decries that the presence of political appointees (in senior, but also mid-level positions) within the department has become too overwhelming. Career officers lament that the department "has become a lot more politicized than it was 40 years ago", with "a growing number of the policy and senior positions in the department going to non-career people" (own interviews; Johnson et al. 2013). They bemoan a greater tendency to put political appointees into positions below the assistant secretary level: "the degree to which political appointees have penetrated the bureaucracy is really far greater now than ever before and so, you've got political appointees down to the deputy assistant secretary and sometimes at the office director level" (Interview 34, 2014; AAD 2015). AFSA and the American Academy of Diplomacy also denounce the increase of non-career appointees occupying regular senior positions (assistant secretary and above), from 37% in 1975 to 51% in 2014, and the "recent explosion" of special envoys, special representatives, or coordinators, 64% of which were political appointees in 2014, and who often "are not integrated into the specific bureaus that are already responsible for these issues" (AAD 2015, 15-16).

As they do for political ambassadorships, members of the career service resent the presence of political appointees in domestic positions for reducing their opportunities for career advancement based on merit, a fortiori given the rule of "up-or-out" that governs the Service (Interviews 11, 29). FSOs underscore the injustice of seeing non-career appointees "climbing rungs above them on the career ladder" (AAD 2015, 16) when they are the ones most competent for the job, as this mid-level officer illustrated when taking about her Foreign Service boss:

> [My office director], she's been in for 27 years... she's an experienced diplomat, knows her stuff... Here comes a deputy assistant secretary to be above her, who is

> much younger and is from the legislative branch. [So] now she can't be a deputy assistant secretary. ... a lot of the deputy assistant secretaries are... political appointees who have done other things which are fabulous... and interesting and substantive, but they don't know diplomacy. And they don't know policy in the same way, the way that we make it. [With] all these political appointees in those positions, where are the career diplomats gonna go? ... What happens to those professional diplomats who are the ones who practiced it all their lives and have learned it, lived it? (Interview 29, 2014)

More to the point, by limiting the opportunities for FSOs to reach senior positions, the current presence of political appointees within the department undermines the quality of the latter's policy output, according to career officers. First, with less career officers in senior positions in Washington, their results a loss of FSOs' field perspective in the policy process, while this is "knowledge essential for melding the desirable with the possible" (AAD 2015, 15). Second, political appointees are there for a short time and therefore lack a longer-term perspective and institutional memory (Johnson et al. 2013; AAD 2015; interview 6). Further, "their ascension creates a system inherently incapable of providing expert, nonpartisan foreign policy advice", according to a group of veteran FSOs (Johnson et al. 2013; also AAD 2015, 16). Echoing that opinion, a senior officer explained that the inflated presence of political appointees interferes with FSOs' role of ensuring that, through comprehensive debate and analysis of policy choices, the best advice is given to decision-makers (interview 34). This, in turn, jeopardizes sound policy decisions:

> [...] it tends to stifle debate in a way, because many of these people view themselves as sort of 'policy enforcement officers'. In order words, whatever that administration's policy is, they feel that they're there to defend it. And among Foreign Service officers we fully understand that we are there to follow the instructions of the elected officials, but we feel it's our obligation to debate the pros and cons. And so when you have somebody who comes in, who's sort of lagging their finger, it tends to lead to some bad decisions, like perhaps the Iraq war. So it is very important I think that a bureaucracy be allowed to debate things so that they can provide the best possible advice to the political leaders: the leaders make the decisions but the quality of the advice is our responsibility. And so I

> think that that balance [between career and non-career officials in Washington] is one that has to be very carefully watched. (Interview 34).

While the Academy and AFSA do not propose specific targets in terms of what would be an overall acceptable proportion of political appointees within the department (although, of course, they imply that it should be at least closer to what it was in the 1970s, that is, about 37%), the recent report of the AAD includes a series of specific recommendations about the standards that should be followed for filling various senior or mid-level positions. Notably, the AAD recommends that "the president and the Secretary of State should systematically include career diplomats in the most senior of State's leadership positions because they provide a perspective gained through years of experience in diplomacy" (AAD 2015, 17). In particular, a career officer should occupy at least one of the two Deputy Secretary positions and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs position, the latter being traditionally filled by a career officer (AFSA 2015e). Other recommendations of the Academy include ensuring that the department's committee responsible for senior appointments be composed of a majority of active duty or recently retired FSOs, and limiting the number of mid-level non-career appointees serving as special assistants in the offices of assistant secretaries and officials of equivalent rank.

In short, considering as an encroachment on its turf the current ratio of political appointees in senior and mid-level domestic positions, the Foreign Service claims jurisdiction of a greater proportion of the latter based on the argument that too many political appointees is detrimental to sensible foreign policy while, conversely, "a strong foundation of career service is essential to sound foreign policy thinking and execution" (AAD 2015, 16).

Overall, through its boundary work vis-à-vis political appointees, the Foreign Service claims social recognition of a certain conception of the cultural capital required for these positions. This conception emphasizes the following elements: knowledge about the substantive matters of diplomacy and foreign policy; regional and host-country knowledge; long-term experience and understanding of the bureaucratic aspects of diplomacy and government work; and ability to provide a non-partisan, field-based and long-term perspective in the policy-making process. For career diplomats, the set of competences required would justify the expansion of the Foreign Service's jurisdiction over diplomatic positions at the expense of political appointees.

3. Defending the Jurisdiction of Political Appointees

Having to cope with the exclusionary claims of the Foreign Service as well as occasional negative coverage by the media, political appointees find themselves in a defensive posture. They seek to defend the status quo in terms of their access to diplomatic positions through a set of practices enacted in the public arena and intended to legitimize political appointments. While they invoke some arguments not directly related to competence, a key claim of political appointees is that, despite not having obtained their position through the career path, they bring in their diplomatic position knowledge and experience that do make them competent participants in US diplomacy alongside the career service.

The defense and promotion of the role of political appointees relies in part on the Council of American Ambassadors, the association of non-career ambassadors created, like the American Academy of Diplomacy, in 1983. A non-partisan organization, the Council has over 200

members who are former or incumbent non-career US ambassadors having served under different administrations from the 1970s until today (Council of American Ambassadors 2016)[34]. This section first examines the practices of the Council of American Ambassadors and then turns to the boundary work of individual political appointees (incumbent or former ones), be they members of the Council or not.

3.1 The Council of American Ambassadors: Standing-Up for Non-Career Ambassadors

To describe its mission, the Council broadly states on its website that it "supports the Department of State and its Chiefs of Mission" and pursues objectives such as "advanc[ing] public understanding and support for the key role of the American Ambassador" (Council of American Ambassadors 2016). However, a more fundamental purpose underlies the association, as the senior vice president of the Council, himself a former political appointee, made clear in my interview with him: "the Council's mission is to stand up for the contribution of the non-career appointees... and to uphold the president's prerogative to continue to appoint those who he chooses" (Interview 31).

The Council emphasizes the president's constitutional prerogative to appoint those who he/she chooses as the "cardinal principle that is of greatest importance" (Interview 31). Accordingly, the statement co-drafted by the Council vice president in response to AFSA's guidelines

[34] The Council's membership criteria are not stated publicly, but contrary to the American Academy of Diplomacy, one can deduce that they are not based on criteria of achievement given that its members include former ambassadors who were strongly criticized for their bad performance in State Department inspection reports and in media reports (e.g. Cynthia Stroum, ambassador to Luxembourg, 2009-2011; Nicole Avant, ambassador to the Bahamas, 2009-2011).

portrayed the latter as a useful contribution to "provide guidance to the president as he carries out *his constitutional prerogative to select the ambassadors of his choice*" (Interview 31; my emphasis)[35]. On a more personal note by my Council interlocutor, "as a practical matter, the president may have people he knows, people to whom he's politically indebted... the president needs to have the latitude to be able to send such people... there will always be some non-career appointees that the president wants to reward as his supporters". Clearly, by emphasizing the president's prerogative to appoint ambassadors, the Council is also upholding the possibility for political, economic and social connections with the White House to give access to ambassadorships.

While criticizing the general attitude of career officers as unreasonable for implying, including in day to day interactions[36], that the Foreign Service has a special right over ambassadorial positions, the vice-president of the Council explained that the "best practical accommodation" is that the State Department and the White House informally agree on and respect their respective jurisdictions:

> [...] these are the places in the world where we imagine that we will mostly be appointing political ambassadors and these are the places where we don't normally expect to be appointing a non-career appointee. So, in plain language, State Department, this is your sandbox to play in. This is our sandbox. Let's stay out of each other's sandboxes except on those occasions when there's something exceptional. (Interview 31)

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[35] This statement is not publicly available.

[36] He recounted the following anecdote as an illustration:

> I was back in the State Department preparing for my assignment and this FSO who had worked for me as a deputy [in the department] came filtering through and said: 'what are you doing back here?' I explained I was getting ready to go to Barbados [as an ambassador]. He said: 'Oh, that could have been one of ours!'. There it is. That's the actual summary of the whole attitude right there. The jobs are ours and we'll let the president have some to play with. Wrong! The constitution says the jobs are the president's. (Interview 31)

This suggests a practical arrangement similar to the one that has prevailed for many decades.

Notwithstanding the importance of the presidential prerogative for the Council, in its public discourse, the latter focuses its jurisdictional claims in favor of non-career ambassadors on representations of civic engagement and competence. The Council portrays non-career appointments as a practice in the "American tradition of citizen diplomacy [which] began in the 18th century when the Second Continental Congress appointed Benjamin Franklin as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of France" (Council of American Ambassadors 2016). Like Franklin, other non-career ambassadors have "left the private sector or other... responsibilities at the President's call to serve in a diplomatic capacity on behalf of the United States" (CAA 2016; also Valdez 2013[37]). Additionally, the Council underlines that "These citizen diplomats bring to their ambassadorial assignments important knowledge and experience accumulated from successful careers in academia, business, the law, the arts, the military, and political and public life" (CAA 2016). In support of that claim, the Council showcases the profile of six former non-career ambassadors with distinguished records in government service prior to their diplomatic appointment (e.g. Howard Baker, ambassador to Japan, 2001-2005; James Blanchard, ambassador to Canada, 1993-1996; Michael Mansfield, ambassador to Japan, 1977-1988).

In order to defend the role of non-career ambassadors, the Council seeks to foster recognition for the latter within the foreign affairs field; in other words, the organization seeks symbolic

[37] In Valdez's words, on the occasion of the Council's 30th anniversary, non-career ambassadors are "Americans, who like Benjamin Franklin, left their professions and businesses to serve our country as its highest-ranking diplomatic representatives" (Valdez 2013).

capital. Given the mostly negative attitude of the career establishment (and maybe also given negative media coverage) toward political ambassadors - especially those from the private sector - the latter have tended to feel unfairly disrespected and unrecognized for their role in American diplomacy, as the vice president of the Council of American Ambassadors pointed out to me:

> They feel, as non career ambassadors - I mean, maybe while they're in office, they feel they get respect, but once it's all over, they look back on it and they feel like, especially if you're sitting in the Council of American Ambassadors, there is this sub-currant of we don't get no respect. And on the Foreign Service side, there is a sort of reciprocate attitude: you don't deserve it. (Interview 31)

On the 30th anniversary of the Council, its president emeritus, Abelardo Valdez, pronounced a speech also underlining the quest for recognition of the association's members:

> Prior to the Council's founding... non-career ambassadors were almost never invited back to the Department [after completing their appointment] to share their opinions on policy or to participate in any capacity, and there was scant recognition of their contributions to American diplomacy. The Council has changed most of that for the better, especially during the last decade. In the process, it has gained the respect of the Department of State, the career Foreign Service, and the foreign affairs community. Much good will has been established by the Council with the Department of State through several of its programs... (Valdez 2013)

As the last quote suggests, it is through its various programs that the Council has sought to increase the volume of political ambassadors' symbolic capital in the foreign affairs field. "We're bending over backwards to make substantive contributions to the conduct of American diplomacy abroad", said to me the Council vice president in reference to the association's programs (Interview 31). These programs include the following: fellowships "to develop young leaders in international affairs and public diplomacy"; a series of public lectures on foreign policy issues in various cities of the country; an orientation program for newly

appointed non-career ambassadors; an online forum for commentaries by Council members on world issues; and a bi-annual foreign affairs journal (circulated notably to important policy stakeholders of the foreign affairs community). The Council also organizes a number of club-like activities - international missions, roundtable discussions, semiannual conferences, award ceremonies - in which members gather with high level officials of the US foreign affairs community and/or from other countries and former dignitaries.

To gain more recognition as part of the foreign affairs community, members of the Council can apparently rely, thanks to the contributions it receives from some of its wealthy members and other private sources[38], on economic capital to an extent that organizations of career officers cannot match. They are involved in fundraising efforts and/or direct financial contributions for the preservation of the State Department's properties of cultural and architectural significance, and for the upcoming establishment by the Department of a diplomacy museum (Interview 31; Council of American Ambassadors 2016). For the vice president of the Council, "it provides an additional dimension of leverage for the whole State Department, the whole diplomatic enterprise, to have some of these people involved", he said talking about wealthy individuals named ambassadors.

According to its vice-president, the Council tries "very actively to break down [the] tension that has historically existed between the career and the non-career" camps and "build a rapprochement" with AFSA, (int. 31). The programs of the organization are part of that

[38] The Council of American Ambassadors is financed through member dues contributions and donations as well as "financial and in-kind assistance from corporate and private foundation sources" (Council of American Ambassadors 2016).

endeavor, but the Council has also sought to show goodwill in the more specific context of AFSA's efforts to circumscribe the criteria for the selection of chiefs of mission with its 2014 recommended guidelines. The organization, expressing its thanks to AFSA for sharing with the Council its qualification statement in advance and for tiptoeing around the question of the ratio of non-career ambassadors, has sought to underline that it shares with AFSA the position that 100% of ambassadors should be the most qualified people for the job (Interview 31).

In sum, the Council of American Ambassadors' first-order defense of non-career ambassadorships relies on the argument of the presidential prerogative, according to the Constitution, to make these appointments. However, aware that this is not sufficient to foster the social recognition of political ambassadors' legitimacy in the foreign affairs field, the organization's defense of non-career appointments also indirectly relies on practices aimed at demonstrating the positive contribution of the non-career community to US diplomacy and its concern for diplomatic competence. In this regard, the Council portrays political ambassadors as citizen diplomats who, like early US diplomatic envoys, responded at the call of duty to serve their nation, bringing with them valuable knowledge and experience.

3.2 Arguments of Individual Political Appointees

Like the Council of American Ambassadors, active-duty political appointee ambassadors invoke, as an implicit justification of their occupation of an ambassadorial position, values of civic duty as well as historical references to early diplomatic American envoys (e.g. Kounalakis 2013; Mandell 2015). According to Kounalakis (2013), then ambassador to Hungary, the system of non-career ambassadorial appointments is, alongside the career

service, "a formula that has served us well ever since Benjamin Franklin found himself in Paris as our first diplomat". Mandell (2015), then ambassador to Luxembourg, also refers to Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and other early envoys "who were all political appointees, not professional diplomats" when US diplomacy started.

More importantly, while some former non-career appointees underline that political appointments are a matter of democratic or presidential control over the bureaucracy (Silberman 1983, McCormack 2002), active-duty and retired non-career diplomats mostly emphasize their competence to defend their jurisdiction vis-à-vis career officers. They are obviously critical of the public discourse, conveyed in the media and by representatives of the Foreign Service, in which political appointees tend to be portrayed as unqualified or less qualified than career officers. To counter this image, they stress that both career and non-career diplomats are mixed bags in terms of competence (e.g. Attwood 1980; Miller 2003; Benjamin 2014; Rivkin 2013; interview 33). The US ambassador to France, for instance, was quick to underline, in response to an interview question addressing the fact that he was not a career diplomat, that "there are extraordinary career ambassadors and extraordinary non-career ambassadors, or political appointees. It isn't that one is one way and one is the other. I think there are a variety on both sides" (Rivkin 2013, ambassador to France, 2009-2013). Similarly, in the context of the controversy that erupted in 2014 following the gaffes committed by three ambassadorial political nominees in their Senate hearing (see introduction), a former State Department appointee, while expressing his disapproval of the nominees' selection for the position, warned against making generalizations about the quality of non-career ambassadors:

> The conclusion many draw - that political appointees are almost by definition inferior to Foreign Service ambassadors - is flat wrong. In recent years, we've had

> a batch of unusually talented political appointees - ones who added skills and insights that few, if any, career diplomats could match. (Benjamin 2014)

For a scholar who served three times as a State Department political appointee over the last 25 years, the usual framing of the debate about non-career diplomatic appointments unjustly ignores the many political appointees who are experts in foreign policy matters and are therefore not appointed merely for political reasons:

> I personally think it's an artificial debate. ...because the debate tends to be unfairly framed as in political: friend of the presidential political party, knows nothing about foreign policy. Or, career Foreign Service officer: knows a lot about foreign policy. That is artificial. It ignores people who are foreign policy experts who come in as political appointees. There are a lot of those. ... What you don't want to have is people sent to posts who don't know anything that's relevant for the job. The tendency is to use 'political/non-' as shorthand for that; I am very critical of that analysis, cause I think that it's unfair to smart political appointees. (Interview 33)

She pursued by suggesting that FSOs do not necessarily always have the required expertise for some positions and that, career or non-career, the legitimacy of a senior officer depends on the relevance of this person's skills and expertise for the specific position he or she is appointed in:

> ...the tendency to say, 'oh, we shouldn't have so many political appointees', overlooks the fact, it's the quality of the political appointees and the quality of the Foreign Service officers. Just because they're Foreign Service officers, they may be excellent but that doesn't necessarily assume that they will have the expertise needed for the job today. ... The question is, what's your expertise and is it relevant for that job. Which means that job might go to a political, might go to a career Foreign Service officer. People in personnel management... they're having to think about what's the right person for this, who has the right mix of skills; they might not come with the label you're used to. (Interview 33)

While this scholar-diplomat tended to emphasize foreign policy expertise (or regional or issue-specific expertise) as a capital legitimizing non-career appointees, others with different professional backgrounds underline, for their part, other kinds of skills and experience that make them very suitable for senior diplomatic positions, ambassadorships in particular. These

include management and leadership experience as business leaders, familiarity with issues faced by US companies abroad, as well as experience of dealing with legislators and negotiating with various stakeholders (e.g. Rivkin 2013; Kounalakis 2013; Eacho 2013; Benjamin 2014; Chorba quoted in DePillis 2013). Even when not specifically questioned about their credentials, some non-career ambassadors suggest that their background in business or another domain endowed them with key competences for their ambassadorial role (e.g. Mandell 2015; Eacho 2013; Bondurant 2005). For instance, when asked to describe his job as an ambassador, the non-career envoy to Austria, who was previously a business chief executive officer (CEO), pointed out that "this job is very similar to being CEO of any enterprise... because you are the leader. You are Mr. Outside; you do the public speaking on behalf of the enterprise" (Eacho 2013). Similarly, for the then ambassador to Luxembourg:

> I have found that my business background has been very helpful here in Luxembourg — this is a business country. There are three trillion dollars under asset management here in Luxembourg, from which arise all kinds of issues. I am familiar with many of them because I've seen them before and have a background assisting U.S. companies with them. (Mandell 2015)

Apart from specific skills and knowledge, political appointees draw attention to other characteristics of non-career people that contribute, according to them, to the quality of US foreign policy and diplomacy. First is the claim that non-career people infuse dynamism into the bureaucracy by bringing new ideas, new perspectives on issues, and a greater propensity to take risks and challenge existing practices since their professional future does not depend on not upsetting defenders of the status quo (Benjamin 2014; Rivkin 2013; Kounalakis 2013; Oreck 2013; Hunter 2004; Attwood 1980). According to Rivkin (2013), "it's sometimes the case where a career ambassador would not necessarily want to anger someone in Washington over a decision because he's going to be looking for his next appointment". By contrast, the

short tenure of a political appointee implies that "you cannot be afraid of challenging policy and even shaking a few trees and getting some people upset", which is "healthy for American diplomacy" in Rivkin's view (2013). For some, the policy dynamism brought by political appointees is a particular necessity given the central role played by the United States in the world, as these two excerpts suggest:

> I'm firmly of the view that political appointees are central to US foreign policy and America's role in the world: you need the dynamism that comes with people who are there for a short time but have an agenda. The US role in the world includes setting the political agenda, you need people who want to do that, and so it's absolutely central. (Interview 33)

> The in-and-out system is unique in America... partly because we're challenged by things all over the world. If you're sent someplace, say, Paraguay, the circumstances you face are going to be the same year in and year out, even if you're Britain. But if you're the United States, because of our role and centrality, circumstances are constantly changing, and you have to have this kind of renewal. (Hunter 2004, 49)

Finally, another common argument that political appointees make in their favor is the claim that they have greater proximity and access to the White House and that this social and political capital can make them more effective as ambassadors (e.g. Rivkin 2013; Kounalakis 2013; interviewee quoted by Haglund 2015). In addition, some host countries particularly value having envoys who have close connections to the president (Chorba, quoted in Pillis 2013).

In sum, in addition to the practices of the Council of American Ambassadors, individual political appointees seek social recognition of their legitimacy as US diplomats by downplaying the formal boundary between career and non-career practitioners with respect to competence. Some of them do so by claiming to possess the same kind of skills than the ones

valued by the Foreign Service, such as foreign policy expertise, but many others invoke different abilities or assets that contribute to their competence, such as a greater access to the White House and a greater propensity to take risks. While this section has focused on how political appointees pursue their jurisdictional claims in the public arena (with a broad audience comprising the American public, stakeholders within the US foreign affairs field and myself as a researcher), the next section moves the focus to the workplace and the relationships therein between themselves and career officers.

4. Political Appointees' Practices to Gain Symbolic Capital on the Workplace

Different political appointees have different amounts and types of capital when they come in the job. Some had previous experience in the foreign affairs field, have connections with the White House, and/or are academics specialized in the area or issues for which they are appointed. Notwithstanding the variety of individual situations, many political appointees suggest, when talking about their experience during their appointment, that they sought recognition as legitimate practitioners vis-à-vis career officers. In other words, they sought to accumulate symbolic capital in the State Department field. As mentioned in chapter one, symbolic capital is "the form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate" (Bourdieu 1989a, 17). In that perspective, various political appointees suggest that they sought to acquire cultural or social resources that could amount to symbolic capital in the eyes of career officers, or that they attempted to convert their preexisting resources into symbolic capital, in order to be perceived as legitimate and competent by career officers.

One obvious way in which political appointees seek to gain symbolic capital on the workplace is simply through dedication to their diplomatic job, which can enable them to demonstrate competence and thereby earn them the respect of career officers. The vice-president of the Council of American Ambassadors suggested so, for instance, when he slipped into his criticism of the attitude of FSOs toward political appointees the remark that, "As a political appointee [in the State Department], I worked my butt off to be just like the career guys. ...I left that job, I think I had earned a lot of respect from this particular Foreign Service officer" (Interview 31). Another former political appointee interviewee, when responding to my questions on how she prepared for her appointment, pointed to her dedication to "study and learn things" in order to forge a good reputation for herself within the State Department, a reputation of competence despite the fact that her professional background as a professor of art history was afar from many of the subject areas involved by her appointment:

> For the practice [Senate hearings] it was much harder questions than you'll ever get from the Senate. I still remember very complicated trade questions... energy, biotechnology; it was very complicated. But I did fine, you know, I'm an academic, I know how to study and learn things. And I remember so well the person who was supervising me afterwards came up to me and said, 'oh my god you did so well!' He was clearly so surprised because here I was an art historian, so they had no idea how I would know anything. So they were pleasantly surprised. Then you have a public 'murder board' in front of other people from the State Department. And you're told - and this is really terrifying - that this is really important for your reputation inside the State Department. So if you do a bad job it's really difficult to recover because the word is on the street, within the Department - and you know, political, you always try to impress the professionals - will be that you're not very good, you didn't learn...you didn't do very well. So that was terrifying. But that went fine also. ...both of these experiences were much more nerve-racking than the actual Senate hearing. (Interview 22)

While it may not necessarily be all political appointees who put the same energy at trying "to impress the professionals", at least some of them, as suggested by the last quote, may feel that

they have to prove their competence to the State Department establishment in order to be endowed with sufficient symbolic capital as diplomats.

The strategies mobilized by political appointees to increase, within the State Department field, their symbolic capital often involve converting (or at least trying to convert) the capital they have accumulated from past experiences in other fields. In the case of that professor of art history turned ambassador, her comments on her experience in that position suggest that she tried to convert her cultural capital as an academic specialized on the art works from her host country into symbolic capital in the State Department field. She reported having sought to demonstrate to career officers on her staff, who apparently had little interest in cultural diplomacy[39], how valuable her cultural expertise and initiatives could be for the management of relations with the host country:

> I quickly picked up the fact that they didn't think culture was important, that area that I came from. ...therefore to me it seemed all the more important to demonstrate to them how important it could be in the context of a diplomatic relationship. And how their very narrow view, that all we're gonna do were political affairs... I mean... one of the best ways to [accomplish your diplomatic goals] is to demonstrate interest in the other party and their culture. I knew more about Dutch history and culture than most of the people in the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. And they liked that, they were flattered. They thought it was fantastic to have someone who spoke their language and knew all about their greatest artists. I would take the minister of Foreign Affairs around the Mauritshuis and show him the Rembrandt exhibition. They loved that. Similarly, visiting American dignitaries - I can remember one time we had a visitor coming to do something in the Department of Defense and I said... on the way back we'll stop at the Mauritshuis... And the political officer said, well how do you know he wants to do that? And I said, I can tell you anyone from Washington, who has the opportunity to see Vermeer's *View of Delft*... they're gonna be thrilled to do that. And of course the person was. And I continued to do things like that... So, you know, I felt it was important and I had in a way two audiences, I had the Dutch

[39] She reported having been told by a career officer, for instance, "we don't do culture, we do policy".

> and I had also the embassy and I wanted to show them that there were other ways of doing diplomacy than the very narrow ways they thought. (Interview 22)

While this political appointee challenged the symbolic boundaries drawn by career officers, namely their low regard for cultural affairs in diplomacy, her comments display nonetheless a search for recognition from the latter that culture could be a useful diplomatic tool.

For returning political appointees (i.e. individuals who are appointed in a State Department position for a second or more appointment), a type of resource that can be particularly useful for them is the social capital that they have previously acquired within the State Department or some other federal bureaucracy related to the position they come in. Richard McCormack, a man appointed in various White House and State Department positions over the years, explains in an oral history interview how he used his relation of mutual acquaintance and recognition with a career officer to compensate for his lack of cultural and symbolic capital in his role as ambassador to the Organization of American States:

> I didn't have the kind of detailed knowledge of Latin America that I needed. I also knew that, because I came from a political background, there were those in the Department who viewed me as an interloper. So I approached Bob Sayre, who had been the career Ambassador to four major Latin American countries and had just retired. He had just led the inspection of my Economics bureau as his last assignment... This inspection was totally constructive, and I developed a high respect for the man. So I called him one day... I said, 'Listen, Bob, why don't you became a consultant to me personally, sit in the office next to me, and you and I will work on this portfolio together.' I said... 'I know there will be times when I will come up with proposals that you will be able to market more successfully with your career colleagues than I will.' By the same token, I said, 'I need the detailed knowledge on people and countries that you have as a former ambassador in the region...' He agreed, and we spent valuable time together. (McCormack 2002, 71-72)[40]

[40] In response to a question on his dealings with the State Department bureaucracy when he was ambassador to the OAS.

While some non-career appointees who come in their positions already have, as McCormack did, a certain amount of social capital that they can readily mobilize, others engage in networking practices that, by increasing their social capital, can enhance their performance, their relationships with career people and the respect that the latter have for them. In this regard, when talking about her first appointment (out of three) in the State Department as a special assistant for a senior official, one of my non-career interviewees emphasized the importance for her then to develop her networks within the bureaucracy in order to be effective in her job:

> [T]here are many different communities within the department. And so one of the things to learn when you arrive is what are those different communities, what authorities people have and how do you get something done. ...ultimately organizations run on people and so, building your networks of people is important. (Interview 33)

She went on to explain that, while FSOs who also worked as special assistants in her office already had their connections in other bureaus, she had "to figure out how to do that" and who were the relevant persons in other parts of the bureaucracy to talk to beside those who were obviously involved in a given issue. These sorts of social connections were an important resource for her to develop in order to be able to informally seek out the perspectives and collaboration of a variety of people within the bureaucracy.

For his part, David C. Miller, a former non-career ambassador to Tanzania and Zimbabwe, provides an example of efforts on the part of a political appointee to accumulate social capital before his actual Senate confirmation hearing. As he described how he employed his time during the three to four months preceding his delayed hearing, Miller recounts how his efforts

to getting to know and be known by people within the relevant offices of the State Department enabled him, in his view, to earn the respect of career officers:

> I sort of went down to the Department every day. ...I got to know all the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, the office directors, and the culture of the building. And more importantly, they got to know me. ... those three or four months around the building in which people figured out that I was not a jerk and not a crazy ideologue and in fact really liked Africa and had done a lot of work in Africa turned out to be really important. It was one of the things I've counseled new political appointees to do… try and spend as much time in the building as you can. (Miller 2003, 46)

Hence, Miller suggested that he handled his reputational concerns as a new political appointee through efforts at accumulating social capital and symbolic capital. Moreover, it is not simply getting to know and be known by relevant people that gives one social capital, but the also the attitude, the social skills, that one displays in his/her relation to others. For Miller, part of the way in which political appointees can facilitate their acceptance by career people and their overall relationships with them is by demonstrating sensitivity to the latter's susceptibilities regarding non-career appointments:

> ...your political appointee ambassador has done a lot of things that offend the career FSO and he doesn't really know it. Most importantly, the political appointee has taken a job that could have gone to a career officer. ... So, you've got to understand that when you're coming into this system, it's better to try to come in and be friends and understand that they're just a little offended by how you got there. ... That first three or four months [of informal contacts with career officers] allowed me to make the point that I was less of a jerk than I might have been. (Miller 2003, 46)

In a similar vein, when I questioned her about the attitude of FSOs she worked with during her last appointment, one of the political appointees interviewed suggested that non-career personnel, even as they seek to act as change agents within the bureaucracy, need to

understand and show respect for the culture and expertise of career officers if they want to be accepted by the latter:

> [W]hat I think is frustrating to the career services is if they feel you don't understand and respect their culture. And that's why I started [earlier in the interview] with the point about the sense that it's a Service, just like the military. I think people arrive at a civilian agency and may not recognize that it also has its own standards and its own mores and you're just like, okay how do I learn those, respect those, and foster innovation, and that's the challenge there about how to do that. But I think if you give people a sense that you respect their expertise, that goes a long way. ... If you arrive and sort of say I have all the answers and nothing here works and I've got to change everything, that's not gonna win you a lot of friends. But if you figure out, okay a lot of things work very well, but here's some new ideas, new information, new issues, we have to think differently to deal with those, that's a different approach. (Interview 33)

Thus, part of the success of political appointees in being accepted and recognized by career people relies on their ability to understand and relate skillfully to the culture and subcultures of the State Department and the Foreign Service[41]. Political appointees who have that skill are better equipped to accumulate the social, cultural and symbolic capital that they need to be accepted and recognized by career officers. Hence the need, mentioned by some political appointees when talking about their first experience within the State Department, to learn the "culture of the building" (Miller 2003; Oreck 2013; Interview 33).

In sum, this section points to the symbolic power of career officers vis-à-vis political appointees. Indeed, while the latter sometimes challenge the former's categories of legitimate diplomathood, they also deploy efforts to be perceived and recognized as legitimate according to career officers' own habitus and valued resources.

[41] Maranto (2005, 50), a public administration scholar and former political appointee himself, tends to support this view by arguing that one of the causes of career-noncareer tensions within US government organizations is "not knowing the culture of the organization one enters".

Conclusion

This chapter has showed that, through its jurisdictional claims and boundary work, the Foreign Service seeks to enforce, vis-à-vis non-career individuals, more restrictive social boundaries for appointments as ambassadors and in domestic positions of the State Department. The Foreign Service voices criticisms over the ratio of career to non-career appointments and over the pattern of appointing as ambassadors private sector individuals who helped the president get elected through their financial contributions. Members and representatives of the career service claim social recognition of their own conception of a competent diplomatic corps, a conception characterized notably by long-term apprenticeship and field-based experience in diplomatic functions, substantive knowledge of foreign policy issues and non-partisan expertise.

Political appointees cope with the Foreign Service's exclusionary boundary work and jurisdictional claims by defending and promoting the contribution of political appointees to US diplomacy and foreign policy. Political appointees are concerned about countering the negative image or prejudice that tends to be conveyed about them and therefore seek to increase their symbolic capital as competent and dedicated diplomatic practitioners. The Council of American Ambassadors plays an important role in that regard, being involved in a number of programs and activities intended to showcase within the foreign affairs field the positive contribution of the community of non-career ambassadors to US diplomacy. Using as a symbolic resource rhetorical references to the US tradition of "citizen diplomacy" since its early history, political appointees claim social recognition for their competence by underlining

the value-added that they bring to American diplomacy through the skills and experiences that they acquired in other fields.

The findings suggest a different appreciation of the position of power of career diplomats than the one that the Foreign Service's advocacy conveys and that tends to be conveyed in existing accounts (news report and other literature on the subject), which mostly portray career officers as being marginalized by political appointments. The chapter adds nuance to this portrayal by pointing out that Foreign Service officers actually exert some symbolic power over political appointees. Indeed, political appointees seek recognition as legitimate diplomats in significant part in accordance to career officer's fundamental principle of classification for legitimate diplomathood, competence, although many of them interpret differently what diplomatic competence consists of exactly. On the workplace, at least part of the political appointees also display a certain adherence to career people's system of meaning by seeking recognition from them as competent and legitimate, be it by demonstrating that they have a substantive mastery of foreign affairs issues or a respect and understanding for their culture, for instance.

That being said, political appointees do challenge the Foreign Service's claim to jurisdictional control over diplomatic tasks. Another group of contenders are of course the other government agencies involved in America's external relations. The next chapter will turn to the relationship of career diplomats with this set of actors.

Chapter 6 - Who Drives US Foreign Policy? FSOs and the State Department vis-à-vis Other Government Actors

As discussed at the start of this dissertation, in the United States as in many other countries, the jurisdiction of most government departments has extended at least in part to the international aspects of their domestic functions. In the American context, this development has been fostered by globalization and interdependence, like elsewhere, but also by the development of a national security system in the Cold War context, the country's great power status and its related military and governance interventions in foreign countries. A more recent factor has been Washington's far-reaching fight against transnational terrorism. Overall, as a result of these various factors, a diversity of federal governmental actors are involved in the US foreign affairs field, the social space concerned with the shaping of US foreign policies and the implementation of these policies abroad.

Of course, in the foreign affairs field, the position of the FSO corps depends in significant part on the jurisdiction of the State Department. With that in mind, I first show in this chapter that the FSO corps seeks to improve its position vis-à-vis the White House and the Department of Defense by asserting its jurisdiction in national security policy-making and implementation. Second, in relation to other civilian agencies involved in US foreign affairs, I demonstrate that FSOs produce symbolic boundaries that tend to marginalize the diplomathood of these actors. They claim more cultural capital as diplomats and, on this basis, claim jurisdiction of such tasks as the balancing of the interests of different specialized agencies in international negotiations and the coordination and supervision of other agencies at missions abroad. Third,

I show that FSOs struggle for the recognition, by other agencies, of their jurisdictional claims as coordinators and leaders of other agencies at embassies, based on the State Department's and the chief of mission's formal responsibilities in this regard.

The chapter is divided in three parts. The first section sets the institutional context for the main empirical analysis that will follow in sections two and three by first laying out and contextualizing the geography of contemporary participants in the American foreign affairs field and their respective, albeit overlapping, jurisdiction. This is followed by a presentation of the State Department's institutional organization, main formal authorities and institutional orientation relative to other agencies. Section two and three present the findings regarding FSOs' boundary work and jurisdictional claims in the foreign affairs field, findings of section two being geared more toward the Washington setting, while section three is focused specifically on the embassy setting.

1. The Institutional Context

1.1 Participants in the US foreign affairs field

Until the Second World War, the State Department was the dominant institution engaged in US foreign affairs in times of peace. The department was sidelined during the war and, in its aftermath, the emergence of the Cold War and the adoption in 1947 of the National Security Act paved the way for a new configuration of power among foreign policy players, a configuration that has been detrimental to the State Department's official and traditional role of leader in foreign affairs (David 2004; Marks 2014). The 1947 Act defined national security as a central operating framework for US foreign policy, a framework that has persisted despite

the end of the Cold War and has empowered as key stakeholders of foreign affairs the Defense department, the so-called "intelligence community" (with the CIA as the main agency) and the executive office of the president.

The law of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC), a structure that has become central in the US foreign affairs field. In the strict sense, the NSC has been intended from the beginning as an interagency decision forum, with the president, the vice-president and the secretaries of state and defense as central members, and various other participants such as the director of national intelligence. While this formal mechanism has tended to have more of a symbolic function, as a mark of prestige for those being on the list of its participants[42], the supporting NSC staff, initially a small group of advisers, expanded over time and became the most influential organization for US foreign policy making (David 2004; Stevenson 2013). A component of the president's executive office, the NSC staff is led by the National Security Adviser and its deputy, who oversee about a hundred professional staff members (and another hundred support personnel) (Stevenson 2013, 69). Most of this staff are detailees from executive federal departments, among which the State Department. The NSC bureaucracy is organized into directorates covering specific regions or politico-strategic issues, such as counterterrorism or international arms control. Economic and homeland security issues were also added to the portfolio of the NSC staff in the 1990s and 2000s. Having access to all the most sensitive intelligence and field reports from departmental personnel, the NSC staff advise the president on policy options and, beforehand, are responsible for interagency coordination

[42] Most presidents have used only sparingly the NSC as a formal decision forum but, as Stevenson (2013, 67-69) notes, membership of the formal NSC (whether as statutory members, statutory advisers or in some other capacity) confers status and prestige.

on the issues they oversee, notably by convening and heading meetings of the interagency policy committees (Stevenson 2013, 70-71). In sum, the NSC bureaucracy has fostered the centralization of foreign policy formulation and management in the White House.

As suggested above, the Department of Defense assumed an increasingly prominent role in US foreign affairs over the last sixty years, even more so, many observers underlined, since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (e.g. Adams and Murray 2014). In Washington, the civilian and military branches are deeply involved in foreign policy planning and interagency coordination. The civilian office of the undersecretary of defense for policy has geographic responsibilities like regional bureaus of the State department, while on the military side, the office of the joint chiefs of staff is engaged in politico-military affairs, international negotiations and interagency coordination (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 153). Abroad, going way beyond the customary practice of having defense attachés with their support staff in embassies, the military has developed since the cold war years a network of regional and functional combatant commands, a network that some observers assimilate to a parallel foreign policy or diplomatic structure (Marks 2014; Krieger et al 2015; Priest 2000). The six regional combatant commands (COCOMs) are led by four-star officers and are in charge of military operations and activities in a specific world region (Murray and Quainton 2014, 166)[43]. They are not under ambassadorial authority, in contrast with all other federal government employees stationed or traveling abroad. Having at their disposal extensive resources and being considered by some countries as key US interlocutors, COCOMs have

[43] The six regional COCOMs, among which the Africa Command, the European Command and the Pacific Command, cover all regions of the world. There is also a Special Operations Command which has a global combatant mission (Stevenson 2013).

increasingly been engaged in tasks previously considered as the responsibilities of civilians. Overall, by gradually acquiring more responsibilities, authorities, and funding, the military, as Krieger et al. (2015) argue, "has acquired de facto and de jure jurisdiction over putatively diplomatic territory".

Another set of actors having populated the US foreign affairs field over the last six decades is the intelligence community, a large group including the relatively modest intelligence and research bureau within the State Department, but going way beyond it with sixteen other federal agencies or departmental units, among which the well-known Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) created in 1947. The State Department could potentially have had a more central role regarding the intelligence function, the White House having instructed the department shortly after the Second World war "to take the lead in developing a comprehensive foreign intelligence program", but senior State Department officials saw it as "a mere duplication of foreign service reporting" and therefore refused to take up that responsibility (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 156). Today, while intelligence officers posted abroad conduct covert operations in contrast with traditional diplomats, they also conduct diplomacy to some extent through their exchanges with host country officials and members of society, and of course their reporting to Washington constitutes one more source of information on developments in foreign countries in addition to Foreign Service reporting.

While the active presence in US foreign affairs of the defense department and the intelligence community is a long-standing reality, a more recent participant, also considered a key national security stakeholder, is the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Created in 2002 in

reaction to the attacks of September 11, 2001, and by federating many pre-existing agencies, DHS' mission of ensuring domestic security has implied its involvement in the realm of foreign affairs from the outset given transnational threats and globalized transportation and trade (Stevenson 2013). The department has been busy engaging foreign allies, notably through its officers posted in US diplomatic missions, to improve international cooperation and coordination for immigration policy, visa security, aviation security, border security and law enforcement, all aspects particularly important with respect to the primary mission of DHS of preventing terrorist attacks in the US (DHS 2014).

Beyond the main national security departments and agencies presented so far, a further important stakeholder of US foreign relations since the 1960s is of course the Agency for International Development (USAID), which is affiliated but not subordinate to the State Department. As the primary manager of American foreign aid programs, USAID has about 1700 foreign service officers in developing countries (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011; Kopp 2015). These officers are also covered by the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and share the same union (AFSA) as the State Department FSOs, but apart from these commonalities, the two groups are distinct organizations with their own rules and policies for recruitment, hiring, training, assignment and promotion (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 46-47).

In the economic domain, and among the federal departments with a primarily domestic function, the Treasury Department is one those whose role in foreign affairs has become very important since the 1960s. Treasury notably administers economic sanctions of foreigners, works to safeguard the financial system from foreign threats and transnational financial crime,

and represents the US in international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It has attachés in 16 major posts and technical advisories in about 40 countries, helping them to further develop their institutional capacities in the financial sector (Stevenson 2013, 179). The senior leadership of the Treasury department is also in regular contact with foreign counterparts, not just in multilateral forums like international finance ministers' meetings, but also on a bilateral basis, as illustrated by this description from the then Deputy Secretary of Treasury, Robert Kimmit:

> I have just recently come back from a trip through Europe. My boss... is in India right now. He comes back only to go off to South Africa. When he gets back, I head to he Persian Gulf and other places. When we travel, we meet not just with finance ministers and central bank governors, but also with foreign ministers. We get into the prime minister's office. (ISD 2007, 6)

Expressing himself on the occasion of a public roundtable on US diplomacy and foreign policy where he was the only non-FSO participant[44], Kimmit started his speech with the remark that "diplomacy, and the art and conduct of diplomacy" apply not only to traditional foreign policy but also to the conduct of international economic policies (ISD 2007, 6).

Just like foreign economic policy was historically part of the State Department's jurisdiction, the area of international trade policy and negotiations was transferred from that department when, in 1962, the Congress created the position of US Trade Representative (USTR), a post placed in the executive office of the president (Stevenson 2013). Since then, the USTR office has been responsible for advising on trade policy and negotiating trade agreements, which is

[44] The other four participants were former or active-duty top diplomats having made their career as State Department FSOs: Nicholas Burns, David Newsom, Marc Grossman, Thomas Pickering (Institute for the Study of Dipomacy at Georgetown University, 2007).

done notably through its employees posted at the US mission to the World Trade Organization in Geneva.

Another trade-related function moved partly outside of the State Department to the Department of Commerce, Congress and others having found that the former's diplomats were not particularly interested or efficient in promoting US businesses abroad (Stevenson 2013, 180). Since the end of the 1970s, the Commerce Department has been in charge of that mission through its Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) whose 260 officers or so are present in about 80 countries (Stevenson 2013, 180; AFSA 2016b). A similar mission is pursued by the Department of Agriculture, with its Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), a corps of about 100 officers who are deployed abroad to promote the export of American food and agricultural products and provide technical assistance to locals (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011; AFSA 2016b)[45]. In countries where the FCS and the FAS are absent, State Department FSOs in the economic track cover in principle their portfolios (interview 2).

Other international activities of departments with primarily domestic functions are, first, those of the Department of Justice and the affiliated Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). These law enforcement actors are present in various countries for liaison on legal issues and for counterterrorism and counternarcotics programs (Stevenson 2013). The Department of Labor, for its part, is active in international labor affairs

[45] Like USAID, the Foreign Commercial Service and the Foreign Agricultural Service are also covered by the provisions of the Foreign Service Act and are represented by AFSA, but constitute distinct organizations with their own rules and policies for recruitment, hiring, training, assignment and promotion (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 46-47).

through three of its offices: the office of child labor, forced labor and human trafficking; the office of trade and labor affairs; and the office of international relations, which pursues "bilateral and multilateral engagement" and "represents, coordinates, and facilitates US government participation in the labor components of all major international organizations that deal with labor and employment issues" (Department of Labor, 2016). The Department of health and human services, like the Labor department with respect to the International Labor Organization, plays a lead role at the World Health Assembly of the World Health Organization and sends some of its civil servants in certain US missions abroad for duties like disease surveillance and prevention (interviews 1, 25).

In a different set of areas, the departments of transportation and energy, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), all have of course their respective international component, with for instance: officials from the Transportation department serving on the staff of the US mission to the International Civil Aviation Organization in Montreal (int. 33); professionals from the Department of Energy being involved in interagency delegations for international negotiations on energy policies and serving at the US mission to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (int. 35); and EPA experts playing a role in "advancing the United States' international environmental priorities", notably in the context of climate change negotiations (EPA 2016).

In sum, this review of the internationally-focused activities of different government departments, offices and agencies makes clear, despite being non-exhaustive, that the US field of foreign affairs is considerably decentralized, although at the same time centralization in the

White House has affected foreign policy aspects considered as matters of national security. Decentralization has occurred in some cases, like the economic and trade areas, as a result of a transfer of responsibilities from the State Department to other agencies. An opposite process has also occurred following the end of the Cold War, this time in favor of the Department of State's jurisdiction: two formerly independent agencies, the US Information Agency (USIA), created in 1953 and devoted to public diplomacy, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), established in the 1960s, were incorporated into the State Department around 2000.

As a corollary of the broad reach of the executive branch's international activities, there are currently 32 agencies and subagencies represented overall within the US diplomatic network (DOS 2016a). In larger embassies, the proportion of State Department personnel relative to other agencies can be less than one-third (CSIS 2007). In 2006, while there were 27 agencies represented overseas, they occupied 22% of positions in embassies, of which 9% were from USAID and 6% from the Defense department, and the Agriculture, Commerce, Homeland Security and Justice departments each posted more than 500 employees abroad (Zeller 2007, 21). Beyond personnel stationed in embassies, the international portfolio of various agencies translates into visits of their officials in foreign countries. Congress also frequently sends delegations abroad for short-term missions. Embassies typically provide logistical support for these official visitors.

1.2 The State Department's Authorities, Organization and Institutional Orientation Relative to Other Agencies

As indicated in its repository of regulations and procedures (*Foreign Affairs Manual*), the Department of State, given its statutory authority to assist the President in conducting foreign relations, aims to "provide interdepartmental direction and leadership to other foreign affairs agencies of the US government" (DOS 2015b). The department pursues that goal notably in the context of the National Security Council system, with its several interagency groups at different hierarchical levels, although in practice direction and leadership in national security matters is likely to be more potently provided by the NSC staff[46], as suggested previously in this section. Moreover, country directors in regional bureaus of the State Department are supposed to "serve as the single focus of responsibility for leadership and coordination of... interdepartmental activities concerning [their] country or countries of assignment" (DOS 2015b).

The State Department's aim of providing interdepartmental leadership and coordination is also reflected in the breadth of issues that its functional bureaus cover. A functional office or some other bureaucratic unit exists for most of the areas of American foreign relations in which other federal departments have main responsibility (DOS 2016f). Hence, while over time State lost to other departments formal and main responsibility for some functional portfolios such as

[46] One indication of the extent to which the State Department can play a leadership or coordination role in the NSC system, is whether its representatives chair interagency meetings. In this respect, there can be variations from one administration to the other concerning who chairs which NSC interagency group; in the Clinton and Obama administrations, some interagency committees were headed by the State Department, while others were headed by the White House or others (int. 15). The current version of the Foreign Affairs Manual indicates that the State Department chairs the subcabinet level interagency group as well as the assistant secretary level interdepartmental group (DoS 2015b). It is less clear regarding who chairs lower level interagency groups.

foreign economic policy, its bureau of economic and business affairs, for instance, "conducts policy analysis that covers broad areas of [US] foreign economic policy: international finance and development; trade policy and programs; ...counter threat finance and sanctions; and transportation affairs" (DOS 2015b). For sure, the department does not necessarily claim a lead role on all of its functional portfolios that overlap with other departments (especially regarding foreign economic affairs), but it clearly seeks to monitor the majority of issues with an international scope.

With respect to the participation of various agencies in international conferences and other multilateral meetings, the department remains vested with a coordinating role through its bureau of International Organizations: the latter is in charge of managing US participation in multilateral conferences, which includes "the selection, accreditation, and instruction of US delegations" (DOS 2016f). A former principal for international organizations affairs (a "revolving-door" political appointee) emphasized the formal authority of the State Department to speak on behalf of the nation at international organizations (and beyond) and to instruct ambassadors on what they say:

> the agency that actually goes and delivers the message is still the State Department. Because it has the authority... to say the position of the US is x, y and z, even though six other agencies were part of forming it. ...you have a very clear procedure for who gets to instruct a US ambassador at an international organization on what they say, and that's the IO bureau. (int. 33)

While for some international organizations, like the International Labor Organization and the World Health Assembly, the statutory responsibilities are shared between the State Department and relevant specialized departments, the interviewee highlighted that "in the vast majority of situations, the conduct of diplomacy is a responsibility of the Department of State.

So the individuals sitting behind the signs (at international conferences) are mostly people from the Department of State" (Int. 33).

In embassies, consulates and other US diplomatic missions, the State Department's role vis-à-vis other agencies formally derives from the presidential mandate given to chiefs of mission (Peck 2007). In 1961 the White House started the practice of providing a letter of instructions to all chiefs of mission formally vesting them, as representatives of the president, with authority over all executive departments in their country of assignment (Oakley and Casey 2007). This authority was reaffirmed in the 1980 Foreign Service Act, which states that "under the direction of the President, the chief of mission has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees" in their country of assignment, except for those under the command of a US area military commander (US Congress 1980). While stating that the chief of mission (COM) works directly for the president (and hence, not for the Secretary of State), the Act and presidential letters of instruction also indicate that the COM must report through the Secretary of State, the latter being "responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of US government activities and operations abroad" (Peck 2007, quoting the presidential letter of instruction). Hence, notwithstanding the formal distinction between the authority vested in the COM and that of the Secretary of State, both authorities are bound to overlap in practice as the former must report through the Department of State and as the latter is responsible for the management of diplomatic missions and most aspects of ambassadorships (selection of most of them, preparations for newly appointed COM, etc.).

One implication of the chief of mission's formal authority is that he or she can veto agencies' requests to send additional staff at their post and can send back in the US anyone under their authority whose behavior he or she considers problematic (DOS 2015b; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 147). Also, all government personnel wishing to travel on official business in a foreign country are required, before entering the country, to obtain a "country clearance" by the US diplomatic mission in that country (DOS 2015b).

In terms of organization of diplomatic missions, the ideal-typical embassy is organized as showed in figure 6.1 below. The authority of the chief of mission is implemented through the organizing principle of the "country team", which implies that representatives of all agencies in a diplomatic mission constitute a team under the ambassador's leadership (Oakley and Casey 2007). More concretely, the country team is generally constituted by the senior managers of every major thematic or agency section of the embassy, such as the political section, the economic section, the USAID section, etc., in addition to the deputy chief of mission (DCM), who is normally a senior State Department FSO. The COM normally convenes weekly meetings of the country team.

Figure 6.1 Illustration of an ideal-typical US diplomatic mission



Source: Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 147.

Of course, ambassadors' *de jure* authority and the country team mechanism do not guarantee *de facto* chief of mission authority, especially when the goals and priorities pursued by the various agencies conflict with those established by the ambassador and the State Department (Stevenson 2013). In fact, *de facto* authority depends on social recognition, among members of a diplomatic mission, of the legitimacy of an ambassador's formal authority. With the apparent objective of increasing that social recognition, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (DOS 2010) re-affirmed ambassadorial authority by stating that "chiefs of mission must be empowered and accountable as CEOs of multiagency missions". This statement was part of the larger policy put forth in the 2010 QDDR which emphasized the leadership and coordinating role of the State Department vis-à-

vis other agencies, while at the same time calling for a “whole-of-government approach to foreign policy" (Marks 2014, 246; DOS and USAID 2015).

Entitled "Leading through civilian power", the 2010 QDDR also reflected the efforts of Secretary Clinton to strengthen the role of civilians relative to the military whose role, in years following the attacks of September 2001, became particularly prominent. In that perspective, Clinton emphasized a notion of foreign policy as relying on the three pillars of diplomacy, development and defense (Hanson 2011).

2. FSOs and Other Foreign Affairs Participants in Washington

Given the central role that the NSC structure and the military establishment have come to play in the US foreign affairs field, FSOs are bound to make, like most observers of American foreign policy, an overarching symbolic distinction between the traditional stakeholders of the NSC system - namely the State and Defense departments, the NSC staff and the intelligence community - and the other departments and agencies of the federal government involved in American foreign relations (e.g. int. 1, 12; David 2004). In that perspective, the first part of this section looks at FSOs' relations to the Defense department and the NSC staff, who they regard as more serious contenders for their jurisdiction, while the second part addresses FSOs' boundary work and jurisdictional claims relative to other civilian officials of the US government.

2.1 Struggles within the National Security Sub-field

Relations between the State Department, the Department of Defense and the NSC staff may be regarded as forming a social field of their own. Officials from these three organizations interact closely in the context of the NSC interagency system and it is customary for FSOs to serve temporarily on the NSC staff or in some part of the Defense Department (int. 0, 1, 12, 21). Detail assignments on the NSC staff are particularly valued and coveted among ambitious political and economic FSOs at junior and mid-levels (int. 0, 1, 21). As a senior public diplomacy officer explained, these assignments are considered as some of the most career-enhancing moves:

> If you want to rise to really influence policy, that's one of the things you do, you go to work at the National Security Council. When I was in European affairs, almost all of my bosses had come from the NSC with Condoleezza Rice: they were FSOs who went to work for Condee Rice at the NSC and when she became Secretary they came, they were deputy assistant secretaries. They were young, they went straight to mid-level officers to being kind of heads of policy, shall I say. (int. 21)

As this quote illustrates with respect to Condoleezza Rice, FSOs are given the opportunity to establish, while being detailed at the White House, social relations with influential people for the future of their career. In addition to this social capital, they gain a richer access to information, as suggested by an interviewee who served on the NSC staff: "At the White House you're drinking from a fire hose of incoming information from all the branches of the intelligence community that serve the president. ...you have at the NSC the greatest access to information that you'll probably ever have in your career" (int. 12).

Moreover, serving FSOs mix up with members of the armed forces in education institutions. For high-level training, senior FSOs value attending the National War College (NWC), an

institution funded by the Defense Department and which offers a master of national security strategy "to prepare future military and civilian leaders for high-level policy, command and staff responsibilities" (NWC 2016; McDonald 2008). Conversely, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, an institute founded by a group of career and non-career ambassadors and which maintains a close relation with the State Department, hosts each year as resident associates on detail both FSOs and militaries (ISD 2016).

The relative institutional permeability that has developed between the traditional stakeholders of the NSC system has been accompanied, as suggested in section one, by a challenge to the State department's jurisdiction on the part of the White House and the Pentagon. Several of my FSO interviewees admitted that the role and influence of their department in the formulation of foreign policy has declined over the last decades in favor of the latter (e.g. int. 1, 3, 5, 21, 29, 34)[47]. "More and more, and particularly with this [Administration] (the Obama Administration), the White House has become more of the center", said a mid-level political officer (int. 29). "Foreign ministries all over the world", noted for his part a former FSO, "but maybe especially in the US, have become less and less the central players in making foreign policy", with the White House seeking "to have more and more control over important foreign policy decisions, whether it be the Middle East or China..." (int. 3).

A senior political officer with a specialization on the Middle East region was particularly critical of the expansion of the White House's NSC over the years:

[47] One interviewee emphasized, however, that "through the interagency policy process in Washington, the State department is still extremely influential" (int. 16).

> The NSC is supposed to be a coordinating body, it's supposed to stop disputes among the various departments, and it has become itself its own sort of shadow State department, shadow Department of Defense... And they don't have the resources to do it properly… You would think that that would be a recipe for more creativity and interesting ideas and constructive debate, but it turns out mostly a bit chaotic. (int. 34)

She explained that with the NSC "operating as a sort of shadow decision-making operation", the result is unwieldy patterns of interactions between NSC country directors responsible for two or three countries and their regional counterparts at different hierarchical levels of the State Department (int. 34). The result of the overlapping jurisdictions of the two entities is also, she argued, that it opens the door to omissions of some aspects of their responsibilities because each organization can assume that the other one handles these aspects. Further, she suggested that one of the reasons for the diminished influence of the department in policy-making on foreign policy issues at the top of the White House's agenda, such as policy on Syria for instance, is "because of this sort of draining effect of constantly being second-guessed saying 'mother may I' with the NSC" (Int. 34). Against this tendency, the senior interviewee called for "greater independence of action on the part of the State department, to at least let the State department try to figure out what it can do independently of the NSC" and let it come up with policy options and submit them to the NSC thereafter (int. 34).

As a former officer admitted, even if the White House has more control over foreign policy making, "there still should be a sense for people in the embassies that you have a valuable mission, that you're implementing the President's foreign policy" (int. 3). However, as the State Department becomes less central to foreign policy making, explained the same interviewee, "the less there's a feeling for State Department diplomats of being part of the

action", of having a meaningful role (int. 3). Hence, members of the FSO corps (political and economic officers in particular) claim jurisdiction not merely of foreign policy implementation, but claim a role in the formulation of policy options (AAD 2015; int. 1, 3, 5, 12, 34). The recent report of the American Academy of Diplomacy provides an illustration of this jurisdictional claim for a policy-advising role, when it rhetorically asks, as part of its denunciation of the politicization of the State Department, "Who will speak truth to the powerful and state what policies ought to be rather than simply cheerleading? Who will be the future Foreign Service officer who proposes a strategic long-term policy framework as George Kennan did in the 'long telegram' of February 22, 1946, concerning the Soviet Union?" (AAD 2015, 16). For the AAD, "a strong foundation of career service is essential to sound *foreign policy thinking* and execution" (AAD 2015, 16; my emphasis).

Beyond the White House, members of the Foreign Service consider that their role has also been challenged, particularly in the last 15 years, by the so-called militarization of US foreign policy, that is, the expansion in the role assumed by the military in foreign affairs and in allocation of resources to the military and the intelligence community, to the detriment of civilian foreign affairs agencies (int. 1; AAD 2015; Marks 2014; Ray 2015; Freeman 2011). Senior or retired officers portrayed this militarization as having been fostered particularly by the George W. Bush Administration, but also more generally by the Congress' and the American public's "disregard for diplomacy and fascination with force" (McNamara 2013; Grossman 2011, 91; Freeman 2011).

Decrying the neglect of civilian institutions in US security policy, retired FSOs and the American Academy of Diplomacy denounced, over the last decade, the disproportionate allocation of resources to the Defense establishment and the fact that nondefense responsibilities of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization were mostly assumed by the military because civilian institutions lacked the proper resources to do so (Holmes 2009; AAD 2008; McNamara 2013). They called for significantly increasing State Department and USAID funding and Foreign Service personnel so that these institutions could handle these tasks (Holmes 2009; AAD 2008; McNamara 2013). More broadly, these advocates of the Foreign Service underlined that civilian institutions like the State Department are critical instruments of national security and power and that the US government was neglecting them at its peril (Holmes 2009; McNamara 2013; Mazzetti and Schmitt 2015). In the words of McNamara (2013), the "Shield [i.e. diplomacy] is the first and best defense and is almost always more efficient and effective than the Sword... which is used only the Shield is inadequate". Similarly, stakeholders of the Foreign Service often point out that the latter constitute the country's "first line of defense" or "the front line of our defenses" (Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 150; Grossman 2011, 94; Holmes 2009; AAD 2015; Keeley 2000; Steigman 1985; Oakley and Casey 2007).

Like Secretary Clinton and her 2010 QDDR, advocates of the Foreign Service (e.g. AAD 2008; McNamara 2013; Holmes 2009) called for a rebalancing of American security policy in favor of the civilian tools and institutions provided by the State Department and USAID. In its 2015 report, the AAD endorsed the past two administrations' concept of a foreign policy

integrating diplomacy, defense and development, and reminded readers that, "When force is used, diplomacy remains essential before, during and after combat" (AAD 2015, 9).

With the Obama Administration's greater focus on diplomacy, the "diplomatic voice" of the State Department has been strengthened "to some extent" according to a senior officer (int. 1). Nevertheless, the latter emphasized that the "institutional shifts that took place after 9/11", with an increased role for the military and other components of the national security establishment, have had an enduring impact on the bureaucratic weight of the State Department and FSOs (int. 1).

2.2 Diplomats Among "Peripheral" Actors of US Foreign Affairs

As suggested at the start of section two, FSOs draw a symbolic boundary between the traditional national security agencies and the other federal departments and agencies that are active in US foreign relations. My interviews suggest that they tend to regard the international activities of the latter as more peripheral to the business of diplomacy and foreign policy. For instance, when talking about the fact that many more government agencies have people assigned overseas nowadays - like "the Department of Justice and the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of health and human services", a senior officer said: "But most, some of these agencies are a little more technical. I wouldn't regard them as being directly linked to the formation of foreign policy" (Int. 1). For another interviewee, the importance in foreign affairs of specialized agencies like the Department of Agriculture is actually limited because most of such agencies "are not heavily involved overseas" outside of certain countries (int. 16). Concerning the Department of Treasury, a mid-

level officer pointed out its increased role in foreign policy formulation and its "considerable leverage if your country has a strong financial sector", but "they do not yet, I think, carry the most gravitas that the Defense Department, the CIA or State do", he said (int. 12).

Regarding USAID specifically, while FSOs' historically low regard for the development agency has certainly improved over the decades (McDonald 1997), a certain snobbishness seems to remain toward its professionals, as this quote illustrates: "AID people don't really do much if you ask me. Because their job is to basically subcontract out... And then they manage. They're project managers. They don't actually do stuff themselves" (Int 30). The snobbishness is actually reciprocal according to another officer: "they see themselves as much more high-minded and much more altruistic than we are... they feel like they're less tainted by policy and political sort of machinations, although I think that they are very much as tainted" (int. 29). Moreover, "their programs have to fit in our policies" and "they're under us", indicated respectively the two interviewees, suggesting thereby that USAID is subordinate to State, a point of view that is contested by development officers (int. 29, 30; Kopp and Gillepsie 2011, 49).

Those questioned directly on whether they consider as diplomats officials from other agencies who are stationed at embassies or take part in international negotiations did not necessarily have clear-cut views, but their answers nonetheless suggested that they were reluctant to consider them as diplomats. A former member of the Service, who has remained closely involved with the institution, told me, "I think the career diplomats in general would not, [although] it depends what they're doing and what their role is" (int. 5). As for an official from some federal department, like the Department of Treasury for instance, who would be abroad

temporarily to negotiate an agreement, "probably he's going to think of him or herself as a diplomat, they're representing the US government, but technically they're not diplomats, they're not on, there's the diplomatic list, they wouldn't be on that list" (Interview 5). Hence, for this interviewee, the "most technical definition of diplomat" really corresponds to State Department FSOs, even if officials from elsewhere in government, like USAID officers for instance, are sometimes called diplomats (Interview 5). Another interviewee, a senior FSO, when describing the identity of officials from the US Trade Representative's Office, was hesitant to exclude their classification as diplomats, because "they are performing very important diplomatic functions", but emphasized that their identity is primarily that of trade negotiators: "those at the US trade representative's office... they're negotiators, they're trade negotiators. Would I consider them as [diplomats]? ...probably not… there is sort of a history of how we define it, but I don't mean this as a lessening of them..." (int. 1).

A Sense of the Whole Picture of US Government Interests

As is the case in relation to the State Department civil service (chapter 4), FSOs characterize themselves as being focused on broader aspects of foreign relations than other agencies. While most other agencies attend to a single category of issues, "the State Department is focused on the entire foreign policy relationship... we're there to maintain the relationship in all aspects of it", said one interviewee (int. 2). Comparing country directors in the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense with State Department country directors, another interviewee underlined that the former's "vision of their country's relation with the US tends to be more narrowly-scoped to the defense equities alone, whereas the State Department people tend to have a broader vision of the political, economic, cultural as well as defense equities" (int. 12).

In a more critical manner, a senior officer suggested that other agencies lack an understanding of the broader context in which their international concerns are embedded and of the broader objectives of US foreign policy:

> in Washington, a lot of people [from other agencies] are very narrowly focused on their one little particular job, but they don't get there's overriding goals; in a particular country we have overriding objectives... Just because you're the expert on this issue, doesn't mean that you get to decide what the whole government should be doing in this country. And this country is just one country surrounded by a bunch of other countries where there are all these other interests. (int. 25)

FSOs "are really much better", this interviewee continued, "at understanding the global context, the regional context and the interagency context within which the work is being done" (int. 25). Accordingly, State Department officials "help other agencies understand how their issues fit in the big picture of US government relations with [a] country", said another senior officer (int. 28). In the words of the 2015 AAD report, "Professional diplomats... must constantly sketch the big policy picture that will emerge from piecing together the individual agency pieces of the policy puzzle" (AAD 2015, 30).

Similarly, a retired officer explained that in the context of international negotiations on environmental or economic issues, for instance, "the person from EPA is focused on the environmental issues, the Treasury person at negotiations on restructuring foreign debts is very sharply focused on that issue", but State Department officials have an important role to play by bringing a more holistic vision of all the US interests involved:

> It is also important to have someone at the table who looks across the range of issues and can balance... there are other interests beside this one and sometimes those other interests have to be balanced with the issue on the table in a particular negotiation. That's one of the things that the State Department should be able to bring to the table... It's the sense of the whole picture of US government interests, which other agencies by and large don't have and the State Department does have. And it resides especially in the Foreign Service. (Interview 6)

Another retired officer, who was the only FSO involved in the Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations in the 1990s, linked the ability of State Department officials to provide a holistic assessment of US interests to their freedom from "special domestic interests":

> With a complicated negotiation... the State Department has to be in charge, because it is the only agency without, if you will, a special domestic interest at stake unlike DOE or DOC or EPA or Agriculture. ... We are really the only ones who could look at the whole picture and say OK, out of this whole mess, where does the greatest U.S. interest lie and why? (Kinney 2010, 145).[48]

In short, the evidence assembled suggests that FSOs (and possibly other DOS officials as well) distinguish themselves from other agencies involved internationally based on claiming to have a more complete understanding of US relations with foreign countries and the ability to look holistically at the range of domestic and international concerns that weigh in in a given policy debate so as to assess how these concerns should be balanced. The symbolic boundary thus drawn delineates the jurisdiction of FSOs vis-à-vis other agencies and justify their involvement in international issue areas in which the latter are active.

Keeping Tabs of Other Agencies' Transnational Activities

On a different matter, despite the "leadership and coordination of interdepartmental activities" that country directors in the Department of State are supposed to provide (DOS 2015b), my interview with the FSO director of the Office of Canadian affairs suggested that, at least in the

[48] A different but related claim is that State Department officers are instrumental for the politics aspect of technical issues handled on the international scene, for instance: "the department of agriculture thought FAO was their agency, but we had to show them that the politics was also important..." (int. 14, about his experience as office director in the IO bureau in the 1970s).

case of US-Canada relations, the department does not necessarily lead and coordinate as much as it monitors the activities of other agencies (int. 26):

> a lot of our job now is sort of just... trying to keep on top, sort of dancing on the waves, the tips of the waves, to kind of make sure there aren't problems beneath the surface, like you know, there's no big iceberg sitting down below the water that's gonna sink us (small laugh). So we have to kind of just keep tabs... (int. 26)

Through this monitoring, officials of the Office of Canadian affairs seek to diffuse problematic issues ahead of time, although these issues can appear remote from the kind of work that they value, as suggested in this excerpt:

> Our customs and border protection guys put new lights at one of the border crossing points and... we had to negotiate with [them] to reduce the lights at night because it was blocking the Canadian astronomers from seeing the stars... These are things that are so... you wouldn't think of them as being international cross-border diplomatic issues but sometimes you have to pick up the phone and say 'hey guys, can you turn that light down a little bit?' (laughing) ...my colleagues who work on European affairs don't have to worry about polluted waters or polluted air or... noise pollution... or lights pollution. (int. 26)

Also attending the interview, a foreign affairs officer from the same office intervened in the conversation to say to his boss, about the cross-border issues she was talking about, "but those are all irritants you mentioned, what about the good stuff that we do?" (int. 26). The director then went on to talk about the work of the office related to the issues that the president and the Canadian prime minister talk about when they meet, namely policy issues about the situation in troubled parts of the world or any issue on the agenda of a G7 or G8 meeting.

Further, when addressing the formally-mandated coordinating role of the State Department in the interagency examination of TransCanada's international pipeline project Keystone XL, the head of the office suggested that the department's involvement in such cross-border issues does not fit with its institutional identity and, incidentally, with her identity as a diplomat: "It's

kind of weird in this circumstance, when you have a cross-border issue with diplomats... we become the regulators and State department, we're the diplomats, we're not used to being the regulators" (int. 26).

To recapitulate this section, the relations of Foreign Service officers, in Washington or in general, to other government actors engaged in international dealings appear more agonistic vis-à-vis the traditional national security stakeholders, namely the Defense Department and the NSC staff, than relative to other government actors engaged in international dealings. The jurisdictional claim of FSOs over policy-making tasks clashes with the domination of the NSC in the formulation of foreign policy (security policy more particularly). Further, the prominent role and resources that the military establishment has acquired are seen as challenging the role of FSOs and the State Department in general in the implementation of national security policy abroad. Against the militarization trend, advocates of the Foreign Service have asserted the latter's importance for national security and have called for rebalancing resource allocation in its favor.

Beyond the quasi-subfield formed by traditional national security actors, my interviews and other sources have suggested that FSOs tend to draw symbolic boundaries categorizing other internationally-active agencies as more peripheral to diplomacy and foreign policy, and as more narrowly-focused in their international activities. The corollary of this boundary-drawing is twofold: first, FSOs claim a higher status on the hierarchy of diplomathood; and second, they claim jurisdiction as those who handle foreign relations in a holistic manner and who are best positioned to balance different US domestic and international interests regarding various

international issues. On a different tack, the last part of this section has suggested that FSOs may be reluctant to construe transnational environmental and regulatory issues as issues that are part of a diplomat's jurisdiction.

3. Boundaries and Jurisdictional Claims in Multiagency Embassies

As seen in section one, US chiefs of missions have authority over the direction, coordination and supervision of all executive government personnel and the Department of State is formally responsible for the coordination and supervision of all US government activities abroad. When serving in embassies, Foreign Service officers (especially senior ones) work to enforce the jurisdictional boundaries defined by these formal prerogatives, which amount to an institutional capital. Before addressing these efforts, I first show that FSOs tend to draw a symbolic boundary between themselves and personnel from other agencies based on cultural capital.

3.1 Cultural Capital within the Embassy Community

Several interviewees used the expression "embassy community" when talking about their service overseas; "abroad, you're in a community", said a mid-level FSO when contrasting work and life in foreign countries versus in Washington (int. 2). This common representation reflects the reality that at many posts, especially in places where living conditions are difficult or where the local culture is very different from American culture, the embassy personnel do not just work together, but often live in the same area and see each other in various social activities (int. 17, 23, 24 25, 26). In small posts, as in Guyana for instance, where one of my interviewees served, "a very strong camaraderie" and a strong cohesion may develop and is

fostered by embassy staff spending a lot of time together outside of work (int. 25)[49]. Such cases suggest that, in certain conditions, some fading of agency identification may occur in favor of an interagency esprit de corps.

However, because they are overall more accustomed to working in embassies than many of the staff from other agencies, FSOs are of course likely to feel like they have more cultural capital tailored to that environment than the latter. In this regard, one senior interviewee mentioned that "sometimes you have to kind of teach agencies" at post about standard operating procedures "because quite often they have people who have never been to an embassy environment before, so they're kind of learning what it's all about even if they are the boss" (int. 21). Some also made remarks similar to the ones reported in section two about the lack of understanding by some civilian agencies' officials of the context and functioning of foreign policy and diplomacy, for instance: "you get people, particularly when they're not coming out of a foreign service context[50], who really don't understand the way the US foreign policy apparatus works" (int. 25). Adding some nuance, the interviewee said,

> Somebody who swat from being a legal attaché… who has been going from post to post, they get it, they understand the way the embassy works. But when you get somebody from an agency that just says, 'hey Bob, we'll gonna send you to Portugal for two years!', and he doesn't have the context, and if he's the only person from his agency out there, he doesn't really get the way the whole organization comes together (int. 25).

[49] The social life of the staff is not necessarily just among Americans, but can also involve the broader international community present in a given place (int. 18, 25). This is in line with what Severine Autesserre (2014) documented with respect to the practices of international humanitarian and peace-building professionals.
[50] The interviewee is referring here to the FCS, FAS and USAID.

For his part, another interviewee suggested that the most salient symbolic boundary at post between FSOs and officials from other agencies is the one relative to law enforcement officers. The military and foreign service officers from USAID, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce are, like State Department FSOs, "all used to this lifestyle", used to "living overseas in an embassy community [and] know what an embassy does and doesn't do" (int. 18). By contrast, officials from subagencies like the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) or the Custom and Border Protection agency (CBP), for instance, are often not so used to an embassy working environment and have a very different culture, from the point of view of this FSO who served alongside officers from these agencies in the Bahamas:

> …that was always challenging because the CBP officers, they're good at their job and they know what to do, but they're used to doing it in like a border town in Texas or somewhere between Montana and Canada, so sometimes it was tougher for them to fit in, I think. Or the CBP people stuck together, and the State people stuck together, and the DEA people stuck together, because the cultures were quite a bit different. Especially between the law enforcement agencies, like the DEA guys carry guns, they work with the police, and State Department people we're about talking… (Interview 18)

The same interviewee was also of the opinion that law enforcement agencies like the DEA are "a little more independent", that is, they tend to be less deferential to ambassadorial authority (int. 18). Retired officers suggest that this is because of the "the nature of law enforcement practice, which is to hold information tightly, not to share it" (int. 24; also Gillepsie quoted in Zeller 2007, 26). The career ambassador serving in Yemen from 1997 to 2001, Barbara Bodine, did experience a challenge to her chief-of-mission authority by the FBI, which was investigating (alongside the military) a terrorist attack on a US navy destroyer in 2000 in the Gulf of Aden (Zeller 2007). Reporting that the FBI was accusing her of prioritizing the safeguarding of the diplomatic relationship over the US investigation of the attack while, in

her view, “the investigation can’t go forward irrespective of the rest of the relationship”, Bodine asserted: “This is a point that some new players don’t understand. A good relationship is not the end; it’s the means. If we have a candid, honest relationship, then you can do a great deal” (Bodine quoted in Zeller 2007, 27-28). According to Bodine, “such overaggressive attitudes” as the one displayed by the FBI in Yemen “are typically not exhibited by longtime overseas personnel, such as members of the Foreign Commercial Service or the Foreign Agricultural Service” (Bodine in Zeller 2007, 28). This is in line with the aforementioned view that, compared to other agencies, a greater cultural distance separates law enforcement agents from State Department officers.

Like Bodine, other career FSOs suggest that conflicts with other agencies can arise from the latter's “ignorance of diplomatic methods and procedures” (Zeller 2007, 24). One of my senior interviewees observed that ensuring embassy cohesion is always a challenge because "a lot of these people from other agencies come to an embassy and they haven’t served in one before and they’re not accustomed to the hierarchical nature of an embassy" (int. 34). She implied that the lack of experience of these representatives from other agencies makes it more likely for them to cause "surprises" by taking some initiatives without informing the DCM and the ambassador (int. 34). Similarly, Oakley and Casey (2007) pointed out that other agencies' personnel often "do not receive adequate guidance from their agencies on relationships with the Ambassador and with other agencies, nor do they receive thorough briefings on the Presidential letter and its intent" (5-6). For his part, retired ambassador George Staples (quoted in Zeller 2007, 27) remarked that challenges to ambassadorial authority by other agencies at

post sometimes occur out of a certain misunderstanding of the “broader perspective” of bilateral cooperation with the host country.

In sum, active-duty and retired officers draw a symbolic boundary between them and personnel from several other agencies by claiming to display, thanks to their greater experience of the embassy and diplomatic environment, different attitudes and behaviors (i.e. a different habitus) within the embassy community and by claiming to possess greater knowledge and know-how about embassy operations and the handling of diplomatic relations with a host country. Hence, they claim to be endowed with more cultural capital than personnel from other agencies within the embassy community.

3.2 Enforcing the Department of State's and the Chief of Mission's Jurisdictional Boundaries

Commenting on the presence of numerous agencies in diplomatic missions, a senior officer said with humor, "We joke sometimes that the Department of State overseas has become the concierge for the rest of the government" (interview 26). The metaphor does seem adequate given that State Department staff are the ones handling other agencies' requests to have representatives in an embassy or visitors in the country, and taking care of the building's administrative and logistical services for other agencies. Given these responsibilities, "we run the building", said the author of the concierge metaphor (int. 26). While she may mostly have meant here that the State Department runs the administrative and logistical operations of embassies, FSOs and other State Department stakeholders seek to run embassies in a larger sense, even if they recognize that they do not always manage to do so.

Coordination, supervision and direction of other agencies

Interviewees underlined weekly country team meetings and the functions of the DCM as the two main organizational mechanisms in embassies to promote interagency cohesion and chief of mission authority (e.g. int. 21, 22, 25, 27). The DCM tries "to keep an eye on everything that's going on" and, like the ambassador, holds individual meetings with the various agency and section heads (int. 34). Another practice mentioned by some is the "mission program plan", which lays out what the essential objectives of the embassy are (int. 21, 34). "You want to make sure that each of the agencies understands the role they're playing in achieving those objectives", said a senior FSO with experience as chief of mission (Int. 34). The same interviewee also remarked, however, that "at some point, you have to sort of rely on the personal relationship and not the planning documents to ensure that the decisions are being implemented in a way that is consistent with the chief of mission's direction" (int. 34). She suggested that this is particularly true regarding USAID, given that they do their own planning documents and have "their own language almost" (int. 34).

In a number of missions (especially the larger ones), country team meetings are supplemented with State Department-led interagency working groups in distinct thematic areas, such as law enforcement for instance (int. 34; Oakley and Casey 2007). My interviewee who served as a head of section in London explained that at that embassy, these working groups, who were chaired by a State Department officer, were "the way of trying to keep at least an eye of what was going on... and if problems in coordination came up they [the chairs] were supposed to report them up to the DCM and the ambassador" (int. 34). The senior FSO explained that the

working groups were chaired by State Department people because of the department's statutory role as lead foreign affairs agency and, more pragmatically, because State Department officers are considered more directly part of the DCM's reporting hierarchy and have more incentives (given notably that their performance is evaluated by the DCM and ambassador, in contrast with other agencies) to “keep him happy” (int. 34).

State Department officers at embassies are also much involved in trying to keep track of the activities of other agencies and domestic officials travelling in a country by managing various aspects of their visits in that country and escorting them (or part of them at least) to their meetings so as to take notes on what is said (int. 34, 35; Hunter 2014). "There's a certain self-protective thing there", as the former London-based senior officer remarked, the point of escorting visitors being of course "to make sure that the embassy knows what’s said because the visitor seldom feel obliged to clear the embassy in" (Int. 34).

Other informal practices are promoted by veteran career diplomats and the State Department to foster chief of mission (COM) authority. For instance, George Staples, a former ambassador and director general of the Foreign Service, recommends new ambassadors to give everyone, at the first country team meeting, a copy of their letter of instruction as well as "a list of the overall foreign policy objectives of the mission and what they are expected to do to make them a reality" (Staples cited in Zeller 2007, 21). The Foreign Service Institute's handbook for new ambassadors also advises new ambassadors "to make it clear that the mission is a team, not a loose confederation of more or less independent entities" and to "repeatedly [stress] the need for full disclosure of agency initiatives" (Zeller 2007, 22).

According to some, chief of mission authority is generally respected. A senior interviewee said, "I've never seen an embassy where they didn't understand that the ambassador was the boss, and that there was one mission program plan for the entire embassy and they had to support that mission program plan" (int. 21). Similarly, Zeller (2007, 24) quotes a veteran diplomat saying, “99% of the times, agencies work hard to maintain the trust of the ambassador”. Further, according to a study based on over two dozens interviews with recently retired ambassadors, most of the latter felt that regional combatant commanders showed respect for their authority and were not competitive or displacing, even though they sometimes had problems at lower levels of the chain of command (Murray and Quainton 2014). "There have been a few cases", an officer admitted, "particularly where we have ongoing military operations in a country, where it’s been challenging for the ambassador to assert his or her authority in a clear way" (int. 16). Those cases, however, are exceptions according to him: "I think in the vast majority of cases, the ambassador is indisputably the representative of the president and the head of all US government departments in a country" (int. 16).

Shortcomings in the recognition of COMs' and the State Department’s jurisdiction

However, several interviewees underlined the challenges of ensuring de facto chief of mission authority and implied that there are shortcomings in the recognition of the ambassador’s jurisdiction (int. 12, 24, 25, 26, 34). As one might expect, the FSO heading the Canadian affairs office in the State Department could hardly deny that Washington-based officials from various agencies do not systematically show deference to the chief of the US embassy in Ottawa when they wish to travel in Canada on business: “A lot of times people just go or they

pick up the phone and they call and they don't think 'oh I should probably ask for permission from embassy before I talk to these people…' They just go" (int. 26). Regarding agency officials stationed at a diplomatic mission, a retired officer highlighted that representatives from non-State Department agencies "answer to their own bureaucracies in Washington" and therefore, "must communicate with their own agency to get their job done" (int. 24). For a senior FSO and experienced ambassador, ensuring embassy cohesion is "always kind of challenging" notably because "many of the section chiefs representatives from other agencies, their performance is not evaluated by the DCM and the ambassador, their performance is evaluated by their home agency", which results in a lack of bureaucratic incentives for these officials (for their future promotions) to always act in conformity with chief of mission authority (int. 34). Also invoking this bureaucratic feature as an obstacle to an ambassador's de facto authority, a senior interviewee drew on the example of the former USIA to suggest that the loyalty of non-State Department agencies at posts, like the USIA in the past, tends to be pulled away from the chief of mission:

> The problem was that, when they had that independence, that meant, even though they pretty acknowledged that in an embassy you work for the chief of mission, they also really worked for their headquarters. And their budget, their personnel evaluations, their promotions came from their headquarters, not the chief of mission. ...you didn't have a unity of thought about what the mission's objectives were supposed to be, cause the chief of mission can tell the State Department people what to do, but he could only suggest very strongly to the other people... Technically he could tell them what to do, but they didn't have to listen. And that's what you get with the proliferation of agencies overseas. (int. 25)

In a different perspective, some interviewees suggested that the symbolic power of ambassadors and visiting State Department representatives like assistant secretaries tends to be undermined by the resources and role of Defense Department officials and, to a lesser extent, CIA officers (int. 12, 24). A mid-level FSO raised doubts as to the capacity of chiefs of

mission to be seen as “CEOs of interagency teams” (in QDDR parlance) when it is obvious that other agency representatives are better materially resourced, as in this case for instance: "the chief of the CIA station in Tel-Aviv had this brand new beautiful armoured BMW 750 black car and the ambassador had an old BMW and a slightly newer Cadillac [which] was just chugging along" up the hills in Israel (int. 12). The same interviewee expressed the view that visiting assistant secretaries of State tend to be "marginalized" by the regional combatant commanders (COCOMs) in some parts of the world:

> They [COCOMs] have such phenomenal resources... that I feel sorry for an assistant secretary of State, who would be [a combatant commander's] equivalent in the diplomatic service, who shows up, let’s say, in a Gulf country on a commercial aircraft with one staffer to take notes and arrives with an embassy car and wants to talk about human rights issues, and then I see General so and so who arrives with his own plane with 25 guys carrying all his stuff and he wants to talk about making sure I get the latest and greatest American fighter aircraft... you know, that’s the guy I want to talk to. (Int. 12)

Retired career ambassadors and other observers make similar remarks and arguments than my interviewees concerning shortcomings in de facto chief of mission authority, suggesting overall that "the Ambassador is not sufficiently empowered to act effectively as the Country Team's leader” (Peck 2007; CSIS 2007; Oakley and Casey 2007; Marks 2014; Laney 2004). Declaring himself "impressed by how little authority State had over the occupants" of the embassy he headed in South Korea from 1993 to 1996, a former political appointee ambassador remarked that non-State Department agencies at post “are nominally responsible to you and you are nominally over them, but in fact, they have their own budget and their own personnel, and… it’s not really under your control… it’s separate agency stuff” (Laney 2004, 58). Among the various organizational factors invoked by Oakley and Casey (2007) and Marks (2014) to explain the lack of de facto chief of mission authority, are the facts, noted by

some of my interviewees, that officials from other agencies "always report to their department heads in Washington" and that ambassadors lack control over resources and over a key tool to ensure that heads of other agencies put priorities of the country team above the priorities of their agency, namely the employee performance reports. For their part, Murray and Quainton (2014) report that, while ambassadors feel like their authority is deferred to by the COCOMs, this does not apply to the Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the Special Operations Command (SOCOM); the ambassadors they interviewed perceived SOF as "more free-wheeling and less deferential to ambassadorial authority" (Murray and Quainton 2014, 167).

According to Oakley and Casey (2007, 5) - who cite a report from a Department of State's Overseas Presence Advisory Panel - and others, the core problem is that "Other agencies often view the Ambassador as the Department [of State's] representative, rather than the President's", which undermines the legitimacy of the ambassador's formal authority given that the Department of State, despite having a formal responsibility to coordinate foreign affairs, is not institutionally above, but at the same level than other federal cabinet agencies. If the ambassador is seen as a State Department representative, he or she is also likely to be seen by employees from other departments as privileging State's objectives to the detriment of other agencies' objectives (Oakley and Casey 2007, 5).

Oakley and Casey (2007) further suggest that chiefs of mission's symbolic power vis-à-vis other agencies suffers from a lack of attention to ambassadorial authority by the White House and to some degree by the Department of State itself: "In many cases, support for the Ambassador from State depends largely on the importance of the post, personal influence of

the Ambassador, or critical nature of the issue, rather than on the institutional role of the Ambassador as the President's representative" (Oakley and Casey 2007, 6).

Jurisdictional claims in favor of COMs and the State Department

Authors of the CSIS study "Embassy of the future" (2007)[51] noted "a strong desire on the part of State Department personnel to more effectively leverage the presence of all agencies overseas" (CSIS 2007). With others (e.g. Oakley and Casey 2007 Marks 2014), they argue that the authority of the chief of mission must be reinforced by addressing the shortcomings underlined above. For Oakley and Casey (2007), for the chief of mission to be endowed with effective authority, the key will be "changing the way other members of the Country Team perceive the ambassador". This notably involves making sure that other agency officials understand what are the ambassador's authorities, giving the ambassador a say in the performance evaluations of all members of the country team, and ensuring that ambassadors and DCMs have very good leadership skills (CSIS 2007; Oakley and Casey 2007). Underlying these recommendations is apparently the belief, as Peck (2007) put it, that "without meaningful direction by a higher authority in the field, US foreign policy risks being hamstrung at best, counterproductive at worst (Peck 2007, 29). While this "higher authority" is in most cases a State Department officer, Peck (2007) emphasizes that, pursuant to formal provisions, chiefs of mission are representatives of the president.

[51] The study was conducted by a commission composed of a former career diplomat and two former political ambassadors.

Beyond the issue of ambassadorial authority, some FSOs criticized more or less explicitly "the proliferation of agencies overseas" and the "never ending stream of visitors" in countries with which the US has a close relationship, these visits entailing a significant amount of logistical support activities, even for officers in political and economic sections[52] (int. 12, 25, 34; Grossman 2011; Kennedy in Lowengart 2010). In particular, one senior interviewee explicitly argued that the presence of other agencies abroad "is a bit overdone", especially in places like Paris or London, where she served: "we had 18 US agencies represented in the embassy, which was kind of a lot, and it's hard to figure out what a lot of them did. ... it's not clear to me that we need to have as many people on the ground since we visit back and forth constantly" (int. 34). She characterized as ironic that despite today's multiple means of nearly instantaneous communication, so many agencies want to have their own representatives abroad. Many embassies, she pointed out, "are not built or resourced at a level that accommodates a representative of every agency that has an interest", like the mission in Lebanon for instance: "in Beirut, the poor guy from the FBI had to sit in a little office in the basement and when they wanted to send someone else to help him out we had to say no cause there was no room" (int. 34). Therefore, the US government "ought to be relooking at the presence of all these various people" abroad, and potentially consider having State Department officers take care of tasks that other agencies would like to have done (int. 34).

In sum, Foreign Service officers claim jurisdiction of key embassy functions based on the formal prerogatives of the State Department and of the chief of mission. They seek to enforce

[52] Grossman talks of congressional visits as a traditional "cultural struggle" for the Foreign Service: "the announcement of a congressional delegation is still taken at too many embassies as a distraction from the real work of State Department officers" (2011, 93).

the social boundaries defining their formal jurisdiction as the coordinators and supervisors of multiagency embassies. Some suggest that stricter social boundaries should be established to regulate the presence of other agencies abroad, but claims to enforce stricter boundaries are made mostly regarding the jurisdiction of the chief of mission. The latter's institutional capital is not sufficiently recognized according to many, which limits his or her ability to effectively wield power vis-à-vis other agencies. In that context, Foreign Service advocates call for various organizational adjustments aimed at reinforcing chiefs of missions', and indirectly FSOs', jurisdictional boundaries.

Conclusion

Amid the increased involvement of a host of government actors within the US foreign affairs field, the FSO corps seeks to reproduce and improve its position in the latter through jurisdictional claims and boundary work. In relation to the White House's NSC staff and the Department of Defense, they seek to improve their position by claiming a greater role in policy-making and a rebalancing of national security resources and instruments in their favor so as to better enforce their policy implementation jurisdiction. In contrast with their situation vis-à-vis the traditional national security stakeholders, it appears that FSOs feel much more in a position of superiority, in terms of diplomathood, relative to other government agencies. Drawing symbolic boundaries that categorize many of them as more peripheral to diplomacy and foreign policy and as more narrowly-focused, they portray themselves as having a broader understanding of US foreign policy and the ability to balance the various specific interests of these agencies. They thereby imply that such cultural capital is inherent to diplomathood and justifies their partial jurisdiction over the foreign affairs of other agencies.

In the embassy environment, FSOs also appear to draw boundaries based on cultural capital, claiming overall more knowledge and know-how of embassy doings and of the appropriate behaviors abroad. Building on this cultural capital and on the formal prerogatives of the State Department, Foreign Service officers claim jurisdiction of the coordination and supervision of other agencies overseas and seek to enforce this claim through various organizational practices. Insofar as the position of chief of mission is concerned, they also claim jurisdiction of the direction of other agencies at post. However, this jurisdictional claim clearly faces practical limits, partly because of lacunas in the recognition, by non-State Department agencies, of the legitimacy of chiefs of mission's institutional capital. In this context, many call for reinforcing the ability of chiefs of mission to effectively wield institutional and symbolic power.

Conclusion

Arguing that diplomats constitute and reproduce themselves through social and symbolic struggles, this thesis has shown how members of the United States corps of Foreign Service officers (FSOs) aim to constitute and reproduce themselves as a status group of American diplomacy. On the one hand, this involves group-making practices whereby Foreign Service organizations work on fostering a common identity definition, among FSOs, as professional diplomats. On the other hand, FSOs' status group claim is enacted through boundary work and jurisdictional claims - and hence through social and symbolic struggles - vis-à-vis State Department civil servants and political appointees, and vis-à-vis public servants from other agencies or bureaucracies of the federal government. On balance, this status group claim appears only partly successful in securing the social and symbolic domination of the FSO corps as America's diplomats, given the challenges to their jurisdictional claims from political appointees and foreign affairs actors beyond the State Department.

Since the existence of a status group holding legitimate diplomathood is a function both of a social position and of a set of dispositions (identity), this conclusion further wraps up the findings by looking successively at each of these dimensions. I first assess the social position of FSOs vis-à-vis other groups in the fields of the State Department and of US foreign affairs. Secondly, I sum up how FSOs have constituted their collective identity relative to other groups of the State Department and foreign affairs fields. The subsequent sections address the contributions of the dissertation to the study of diplomacy and international relations, as well as future research avenues.

The Social Position of FSOs and the Challenges to their Jurisdictional Claims

Historically, the American Foreign Service acquired its social position by the institutionalization of a set of social boundaries following struggles against the prevailing politicization of the diplomatic and consular services. However, this institutionalization process has not been as successful as equivalent processes have been in many Western countries in restricting access to diplomatic and foreign affairs functions (e.g. ambassadorships, various mid-level and high-level functions) (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011). First, the US case presents the peculiarity that access to ambassadorships and a number of other functions in the State Department has remained open to a relatively large number of politically appointed outsiders. Second, a sizeable corps of civil servants, whose growth is seen as a threat by Foreign Service organizations and veterans, also serves within the State department in various foreign affairs positions. Third, like other Western countries, FSOs and the State Department face the competition of other executive government agencies for the control of foreign policy tasks, but this competition may be more acute than in other Western countries, given notably the particularly powerful position that the Defense Department has acquired (East and Dillery 1999; Adams and Murray 2014).

The three groups - political appointees, civil servants and other government bureaucracies - do not represent equal challenges to the diplomathood of FSOs. Vis-à-vis their civil service colleagues of the Department of State, FSOs have largely managed so far to reproduce their social and symbolic domination. While the political leadership of the department has been considering ways to weaken social boundaries between the two groups of career public

servants, FSOs still occupy virtually all career ambassadorships, most of the department's other senior positions reserved for career employees and essentially all other overseas positions at embassies and consulates. Their successful jurisdictional claim over the departments' regional bureaus has also helped, so far, in reproducing their dominant position, given the symbolic and institutional power of these bureaus within the department.

Political appointees represent more of a challenge for FSOs in the State Department field. In contrast with civil servants, political appointees occupy high-level and prestigious positions that the FSO corps considers part of its jurisdiction. The fact that these appointees obtain their positions without having gone through the merit system, and without having necessarily demonstrated that they have the competences that career officers deem required, challenges FSOs' sense of honor. There results symbolic struggles between career officers and political appointees over the criteria for legitimate diplomathood. FSOs exert some symbolic power over political appointees to the extent that the latter seek recognition and approval based on the criteria valued by career officers, such as knowledge of foreign countries, mastery of foreign policy issues, knowledge and respect for the Foreign Service's culture. Yet, the fact remains that about one third of ambassadorships and several high-level domestic positions of the State Department have so far escaped the jurisdictional control of FSOs. There are little prospects for a substantial reversal of this situation in the short or mid-term given the strongly established tradition in the US system of government for making such political appointments.

Among other executive government actors, the Defense Department and the White House are those that, overall, challenge most FSOs' and the State Department's jurisdictional claim over

foreign policy tasks, to the point of putting them in a position of inferiority to some extent. The massive allocation of resources to the Defense Department dwarfs the State Department and the increasing responsibilities that the military has acquired over the years, in part thanks to its impressive funding, have been regarded by FSOs and other State Department stakeholders as an encroachment on their civilian role as agents and instruments of national security. For its part, the White House, in addition to its control over senior level appointments of the State Department, has also challenged the latter's jurisdiction by centralizing the formulation and interdepartmental coordination of foreign and security policies in the NSC system.

In relation to other government agencies, the State Department has considerable institutional capital given its statutory authority as the lead foreign affairs agency and its control over the infrastructure and procedures for US diplomatic activities. This capital is not necessarily sufficient, however, to ensure its social and symbolic domination over other agencies. In US missions abroad, constant work must be done to enforce the formal authority of the ambassador over other agencies, an objective that, as shown in chapter six, often fails to be reached according to various observers, notably due to a lack of recognition by other agencies of ambassadorial authority.

The Reproduction of a Collective Identity

Amid the challenges that they face, FSOs cultivate and uphold a collective identity, thereby perpetuating the group as a social corps. For sure, the esprit de corps of the group is somewhat weakened, as seen in chapter three, by informal hierarchies among the five functional

subgroups of officers. Nonetheless, the collective identity of FSOs is fostered in two ways. First, the Foreign Service career system, by submitting officers to similar social conditionings, fosters common dispositions among them. Given these common dispositions, FSOs tend to reproduce similar symbolic boundaries vis-à-vis other groups of the State Department and foreign affairs fields. Second, the advocacy of veteran officers and the work of Foreign Service organizations (AFSA and AAD) contribute to further shape a collective identity by enacting boundary work and putting forth jurisdictional claims. These practices, aimed at defending the interests of FSOs, draw and emphasize the symbolic boundaries of the FSO corps vis-à-vis other groups in the State Department and foreign affairs fields.

Chapters three to six have put in evidence the symbolic boundaries that are constitutive of Foreign Service officers' identity as a corps. Underlying a number of these symbolic distinctions is the notion that they are not public servants like others, including State Department civil servants. They cultivate a sense of honor as an elite group in relation to other civilian public servants, construing the conditions of recruitment and employment in the Foreign Service as more rigorous and prestigious. This representation stems notably from their distinctive lifestyle of working abroad for about two-thirds of their career, as presidentially commissioned officers, with the hardships and risks that come with this lifestyle.

FSOs' distinctive identity also builds on their differentiation from civil servants in terms of experience and skills in foreign affairs. Portraying themselves as well-rounded foreign affairs professionals, they claim to have a greater breadth of foreign affairs experience and skills than most civil servants, thanks to the combination of various overseas and domestic assignments.

Chapters four and six also included evidence that they tend to regard themselves as having a broader, and hence more complete, vision and understanding of US foreign policy. Civil servants allegedly have a narrower perspective as they are mostly focused on specific foreign affairs issues, rather than on the overall relation with a country.

In relation to political appointees, FSOs emphasize less the *breadth* of their experience and perspective on foreign affairs, than the idea that the work that they perform requires a set of skills and that these are acquired through long-term experience. The skills that they highlight include general proficiency in international affairs, knowledge of US foreign policy and high-level government operations, and knowledge of prospective host countries. Beyond specific skills, members of the FSO corps draw symbolic boundaries relative to political appointees that underscore their non-partisan and long-term approach to policy-making.

The identity of the FSO corps is also shaped by the kind of tasks over which its members claim jurisdiction and the kind of work that they value most. In this regard, I have shown that, among the five career tracks of the Service, the one with the most symbolic capital is political affairs, while those with the least symbolic capital are consular affairs and management. As the greater value attached to political affairs tends to suggest, FSOs - particularly political and economic officers - value policy work and, accordingly, claim a role in the formulation of foreign policy options for decision-makers. They aim to play this role especially in the State Department's regional bureaus, as opposed to its functional bureaus, which are focused on thematic and transnational issues and which FSOs, by and large, value less. The jurisdictional domain of FSOs, as reflected by the positions that they occupy in the department and abroad,

corresponds primarily to the handling of bilateral relations with foreign governments, rather than to work on transnational issues and in a multilateral context.

Overall, given the various features of FSOs' collective identity - elitism, a generalist cultural capital, the greater value attached to political affairs and regional bureaus and their greater involvement in bilateral relations rather transnational issues and multilateral relations - it can be said that, by and large, FSOs maintain a traditional diplomatic culture. The same features characterized the Service in the first decades of its existence (Harr 1969; Schluzinger 1975). In a comparative perspective, at least part of these features - such as elitism, the propensity to emphasize their distinctiveness from other national public servants and the symbolic power of political affairs - are also found in other national foreign services, notably the French diplomatic service (Piotet, Loriol and Delfolie 2013; Neumann 2012). Regarding FSOs' lesser involvement in multilateral diplomacy, whose immediate cause is simply the much higher number of posts to be filled in bilateral missions, the research has suggested that this may be associated to a tendency to attach less value to this line of work, but more research would be required to assess the extent to which this is the case. Be that as it may, the fact that, since 1960, political appointees, and not career diplomats, have overwhelmingly occupied ambassadorial positions to multilateral organizations appears like an important difference in comparison with other Western countries (Cross 2007; Angers 2010).

Finally, the findings suggest that the symbolic boundaries upheld by FSOs - with the attendant claim to greater cultural capital as diplomats - can act as a sort of symbolic buffer against the increased role played by various civil servants across the government, inclining them to

disregard the diplomathood of these actors. However, to be really effective at protecting their jurisdiction over diplomatic tasks, the symbolic boundaries drawn by FSOs need to be recognized as legitimate by other governmental actors. In this regard, a future step of this research would be to gather more data on the representations and practices of non-State Department public servants, notably those serving in embassies, to better understand the extent to which they challenge or reproduce the symbolic and social boundaries promoted and defended by FSOs.

Contributions

Like other social studies of diplomacy (e.g. Sending et al. 2015; Adler-Nissen 2014a), this dissertation has advanced a relational rather than substantialist approach to diplomacy. Relationalism implies that the social world, including social agents themselves, is constituted through relations, while substantialism "claims that substances (things, beings, entities, essences) are the 'units' or 'levels' of analysis and that they exist prior to the analysis" (Adler-Nissen 2015, 211). Accordingly, I have argued for eschewing an understanding of diplomats as substances and emphasized instead that diplomathood is contingent on social relations, more specifically boundary work and jurisdictional claims, both of which involve relations of power and symbolic distinctions.

In showing that diplomathood is contingent on symbolic and social processes and relations of power, this thesis contributes to the denaturalization of conventional representations about who are diplomats. Scholars in International Relations (IR) generally reify the traditional representation of diplomats as state representatives and of "professional" diplomats as the

members of national foreign services (e.g. Berridge 2005; Slaughter 2004). And when they problematize conventional conceptions of diplomacy and diplomats, as several diplomacy scholars have done over the last 20 years (e.g. Sharp 1999; Kelley 2010; Cooper 2013), they still gloss over the fact that who and what are considered as "diplomatic" depend on ongoing social and symbolic processes whereby meanings (i.e. boundaries between diplomats and non-diplomats) are being reinstantiated or contested among practitioners. This dissertation contributes, notably with the concepts of boundary work and jurisdictional claims, to the theoretical understanding of these processes, which, as I have argued in introduction, are important because diplomatic standing brings with it entitlements.

Incidentally, this thesis suggests that to understand dynamics of change in diplomacy, we should pay more attention to the social and symbolic processes that constitute (or prevent from constituting) certain actors and activities as "diplomatic". Various authors have suggested that change in diplomacy is attested by the many and more diversified actors, issues and modes of conducting relations and governing across polities as well as by the increased diplomatic capabilities of non-state actors (e.g. Cooper et al. 2013; Wiseman 2004; Hocking 1999; Kelley 2014). Such accounts are largely divorced from the analysis of actors' practices and intersubjective understandings and the analysis of authority relationships between traditional diplomatic actors and newer players. Hence, they beg the question, to what extent are new actors and activities recognized as truly “diplomatic” in practice? Do newer actors conceive of themselves as diplomats and seek recognition as such? To what extent do new actors' authority claims challenge the authority claims of traditional diplomatic actors? To answer these questions, which are important in order to assess the nature and extent of change, it is

necessary to examine practitioners' intersubjective conceptual distinctions (symbolic boundaries) and jurisdictional claims and the extent of social recognition of these distinctions and claims.

On a different note, while social studies of diplomacy and other diplomatic studies have mostly paid attention to relations between state agents in multilateral settings and between state and non-state agents, it is also important to examine, as I have done in this thesis, relations at the state level between different governmental actors laying claim to diplomatic tasks. This is an important locus of inquiry given the increasing involvement, in recent decades, of a diverse array of government bureaucracies in national foreign affairs. The study of relations among these actors and their respective jurisdictional claims and boundary work offers a vantage point on the extent of change in diplomacy. In this regard, my research has notably shown, as mentioned above, that in the US case, members of the US career diplomatic service tend to reproduce traditional jurisdictional claims and symbolic boundaries, and maintain strong claims to superior diplomathood vis-à-vis other parts of the American government who are also involved in foreign affairs. This contrasts with the prescriptive claims of some scholars and former practitioners, in recent years, that members of foreign ministries and diplomatic services have to redefine their role and relations with other national bureaucratic actors of foreign affairs (Hocking 2013; Nowotny 2011).

The dissertation also highlights the value-added of studying, at a microsociological level, practices, representations and relational dynamics within foreign ministries to understand the extent of change within these traditional diplomatic institutions, in response to globalization

and the rise of a host of other international actors. Looking at an organization like the State Department from an institutionalist perspective like that of Hocking (1999, 2005), one can find evidence of change, such as the development of much more specialist skills and of functional policy capacities, in contrast with the traditional generalist skills and geographically-defined tasks that have long characterized foreign ministries. However, considering the patterns of relations between the foreign and civil services in the State Department brings some nuance about these evolutions, given that specialist skills and functional tasks have been mostly taken over by civil servants, who tend to be considered as second-class citizens in the department. Hence, one needs to look at the practices and sense-making of those who inhabit organizations and relations of power therein to assess properly the extent of evolution of traditional diplomatic institutions.

Future research avenues

With respect to the US case, the present research could, as already suggested, further explore the boundary work and jurisdictional claims of other government agencies vis-à-vis State Department officials, so as to assess more thoroughly the extent to which they challenge or reproduce the latter's jurisdictional claims and symbolic distinctions. This could be done by looking at specific sectors of foreign affairs, such as commercial matters, political-military affairs or negotiations in the environmental domain, for instance. Alternatively, interagency relations could be examined at specific US diplomatic missions that comprise many agencies, such as the US embassy in Canada. Targeting the research on specific sectors and/or sites could facilitate the examination of more subtle practices through which symbolic and jurisdictional boundaries are drawn, enforced or contested. Of course, to assess the extent of

regularities and variations across national contexts, the US case could be compared with other national cases with respect to struggles for legitimate diplomathood among governmental actors.

In a different perspective, future research could fruitfully use the key concepts mobilized in this thesis - especially boundary work and jurisdictional claims - to explore the extent to which, and how, non-state actors challenge or emulate traditional diplomatic actors and, how, on the other hand, the latter relate to these newer diplomatic actors. This would contribute to refining the analysis of the evolution of diplomacy, since existing studies have tended, as remarked by some (Sending et al. 2015; Adler-Nissen 2014a), to focus exclusively on the capacities of new diplomatic actors, at the expense of an analysis of their relations with traditional actors and the role of symbolic resources in these relations.

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Appendix A: List of Interviewees

Code	Category of interviewee	Rank and main domain of specialization (career track for FSOs)[53]	Date and place of interview
0	FSO	Mid-level, economic affairs	Washington, DC, April 23, 2013
1	FSO	Senior and ambassador, political affairs	Washington, DC, April 24 2013
2	FSO	Mid-level, economic affairs	Washington, DC, April 25, 2013
3	FSO (former)	Mid-level, political affairs	Washington, DC, April 26 2013
4	Expert and former civil servant of the USIA	Senior, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, May 3, 2013
5	FSO (former)	Mid-level, political affairs	Washington, DC, May 9, 2013
6	FSO (retired)	Senior, economic affairs	Washington, DC, May 16, 2013
7-8	FSO	Senior, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, May 22, 2013
9	Civil servant	Senior, energy and environmental affairs	Washington, DC, May 24, 2013
10	FSO	Mid-level, economic affairs	Washington, DC, May 28, 2013
11	FSO	Senior, political affairs	Washington, DC, May 30, 2013
12	FSO	Mid-level, political affairs	Washington, DC, March 27, 2014
13	FSO	Mid-level, political affairs	Arlington, VA, March 28, 2014
14	FSO (retired)	Senior and ambassador, political affairs	Arlington, VA, April 2, 2014
15	Expert and former appointee in State Department	Mid-level, security and defense matters	Interview on *Skype*, April 14 2014
16	FSO	Mid-level, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, April 15 2014
17	FSO	Senior, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, April 16 2014
18	FSO	Lower mid-level, management	Arlington, VA, April 24, 2014

[53] At the time of the interview.

19	Civil servant	Mid-level, public affairs	Washington, DC, April 26, 2014
20	FSO (retired)	Senior and ambassador, political affairs	Washington, DC, April 26, 2014
21	FSO	Senior, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, April 29, 2014
22	Political appointee (former)	Ambassador in European country	Washington, DC, April 29, 2014
23	FSO	Mid-level, public diplomacy	Washington, DC, May 1, 2014
24	FSO (retired)	Senior, public diplomacy	Arlington, VA, May 6, 2014
25	FSO (retired)	Senior, consular affairs	Arlington, VA, May 8, 2014
26	FSO	Senior, economic affairs	Washington, DC, May 9, 2014
27	Civil servant	Junior, foreign affairs	Washington, DC, May 9, 2014
28	Civil servant	Senior, foreign affairs	Arlington, VA, May 12, 2014
29	FSO	Mid-level, political affairs	Washington, DC, May 12, 2014
30	FSO	Mid-level, economic affairs	Washington, DC, May 15, 2014
31	Political appointee (former)	Ambassador in Caribbean country and appointee in the State Department	Washington, DC, May 15, 2014
32	Civil servant	Mid-level, public affairs	Washington, DC, May 21, 2014
33	Political appointee (former)	Appointee in mid-level and senior domestic positions of the State Department	Washington, DC, May 22, 2014
34	FSO	Senior and ambassador, political affairs	Washington, DC, May 22, 2014
35	Civil servant	Mid-level, foreign affairs	Montreal, July 3, 2014

Appendix B: Foreign Service Officer Qualifications (Recruitment documentation)

Foreign Service Officer Qualifications - 13 DIMENSIONS

What **qualities** do we seek in FSO candidates? The successful candidate will demonstrate the following dimensions that reflect the skills, abilities, and personal qualities deemed essential to the work of the Foreign Service:

- **Composure.** To stay calm, poised, and effective in stressful or difficult situations; to think on one's feet, adjusting quickly to changing situations; to maintain self-control.
- **Cultural Adaptability**. To work and communicate effectively and harmoniously with persons of other cultures, value systems, political beliefs, and economic circumstances; to recognize and respect differences in new and different cultural environments.
- **Experience and Motivation.** To demonstrate knowledge, skills or other attributes gained from previous experience of relevance to the Foreign Service; to articulate appropriate motivation for joining the Foreign Service.
- **Information Integration and Analysis.** To absorb and retain complex information drawn from a variety of sources; to draw reasoned conclusions from analysis and synthesis of available information; to evaluate the importance, reliability, and usefulness of information; to remember details of a meeting or event without the benefit of notes.
- **Initiative and Leadership.** To recognize and assume responsibility for work that needs to be done; to persist in the completion of a task; to influence significantly a group's activity, direction, or opinion; to motivate others to participate in the activity one is leading.
- **Judgment.** To discern what is appropriate, practical, and realistic in a given situation; to weigh relative merits of competing demands.
- **Objectivity and Integrity**. To be fair and honest; to avoid deceit, favoritism, and discrimination; to present issues frankly and fully, without injecting subjective bias; to work without letting personal bias prejudice actions.
- **Oral Communication.** To speak fluently in a concise, grammatically correct, organized, precise, and persuasive manner; to convey nuances of meaning accurately; to use appropriate styles of communication to fit the audience and purpose.
- **Planning and Organizing**. To prioritize and order tasks effectively, to employ a systematic approach to achieving objectives, to make appropriate use of limited resources.
- **Quantitative Analysis**. To identify, compile, analyze, and draw correct conclusions from pertinent data; to recognize patterns or trends in numerical data; to perform simple mathematical operations.
- **Resourcefulness.** To formulate creative alternatives or solutions to resolve problems, to show flexibility in response to unanticipated circumstances.
- **Working With Others**. To interact in a constructive, cooperative, and harmonious manner; to work effectively as a team player; to establish positive relationships and gain the confidence of others; to use humor as appropriate.
- **Written Communication.** To write concise, well organized, grammatically correct, effective and persuasive English in a limited amount of time.

Please note that we require no specific education level, academic major, or proficiency in a foreign language for appointment as a Foreign Service Officer.

Source: Department of State (Bureau of Human Resources), 2016d.

Appendix C: Organizational Chart of the Department of State (next page)


United States
Department of State
Secretary of State
(S)
Counselor (C)
Chief of Staff
(S/COS)
United States Agency for International Development
United States Mission to the United Nations
Deputy Secretary of State
D
Deputy Secretary of State
D – MR
Executive Secretariat
(S/ES)
Executive Secretary
Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance
(F)
Director
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
(P)
Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and Environment
(E)
Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs
(T)
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
(R)
Under Secretary for Management
(M)
Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights
(J)
African Affairs
(AF)
Assistant Secretary
South and Central Asian Affairs
(SCA)
Assistant Secretary
European and Eurasian Affairs
(EUR)
Assistant Secretary
Western Hemisphere Affairs
(WHA)
Assistant Secretary
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
(EAP)
Assistant Secretary
International Organizations
(IO)
Assistant Secretary
Near Eastern Affairs
(NEA)
Assistant Secretary
Economic & Business Affairs
(EB)
Assistant Secretary
Energy Resources
(ENR)
Assistant Secretary
Oceans and Int'l Environmental and Scientific Affairs
(OES)
Assistant Secretary
Office of the Chief Economist
(OCE)
Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
(AVC)
Assistant Secretary
International Security and Nonproliferation
(ISN)
Assistant Secretary
Political-Military Affairs
(PM)
Assistant Secretary
Education and Cultural Affairs
(ECA)
Assistant Secretary
International Information Programs
(IIP)
Coordinator
Public Affairs
(PA)
Assistant Secretary
Administration
(A)
Assistant Secretary
Budget and Planning
(BP)
Director
Consular Affairs
(CA)
Assistant Secretary
Diplomatic Security
(DS)
Assistant Secretary
Foreign Service Institute
(FSI)
Director
Comptroller, Global Financial Services
(CGFS)
Director
Human Resources
(HR)
Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Human Resources
Information Resource Management
(IRM)
Chief Information Officer
Office of Medical Services
(MED)
Director
Overseas Buildings Operations
(OBO)
Director
Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation
(M/PRI)
Director
Conflict & Stabilization Operations
(CSO)
Assistant Secretary
Counterterrorism
(CT)
Coordinator and Ambassador-at-Large
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
(DRL)
Assistant Secretary
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL)
Assistant Secretary
Population, Refugees and Migration
(PRM)
Assistant Secretary
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
(TIP)
Ambassador-at-Large
Office of Global Criminal Justice
(GCJ)
Ambassador-at-Large
Intelligence and Research
(INR)
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs
(H)
Assistant Secretary
Office of the Legal Adviser
(L)
Legal Adviser
Office of Inspector General
(OIG)
Inspector General
Office of Policy Planning
(S/P)
Director
Office of the Chief of Protocol
(S/CPR)
Ambassador
Office of Civil Rights
(S/OCR)
Director
Office of Global Women's Issues
(S/GWI)
Ambassador-at-Large
Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator
(S/GAC)
Ambassador-at-Large
Special Envoys and Special Representatives
Approved March 2014

Appendix D: AFSA's and AAD's Comparison of FSOs and the Civil Service System

FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS	CIVIL SERVICE (GS and SES)
Excepted personnel system (based on US Navy) for global service	General Schedule (GS) personnel system for USG employees
Presidentially commissioned at the officer level; commissioned by the secretary at the specialist level	No Commission
Rank in person	Rank in position through GS15; rank in person in the SES
Selection through written and oral exam and assessment of potential for advancement through the ranks	Hired to position openings based on subject matter expertise typically via US jobs
Recruits to be representative of all 50 states and the American people	No mandate to be representative of the nation in terms of geography or academic institutions
Tenure requires foreign language proficiency certification plus satisfactory performance	Tenure requires three years of substantially continuous creditable service
America's diplomatic service governed by Vienna Convention international legal responsibilities and rights as wells as US laws, regulations and obligations	America's domestic USG employee service governed by US laws and regulations.
Worldwide availability (including family), based on needs of our diplomatic service including rotational assignments	No rotational requirement; mobility at employee's initiative
Annual promotion boards by panel of peers with assessment of potential to perform at next rank; (2 percent low ranked with consequence)	Pro-forma review for satisfactory performance
Up or out career mobility (like military)	Mobility at initiative of employee
Time in class/rank (TIC) selection out	Indefinite tenure
Mandatory retirement at age 65	No mandatory retirement age (except for law enforcement)
SFS seven-year TIC (time-in-class) to advance from FE-OC to MC and seven to CM or be involuntarily retired; mandatory rotation; and retirement at 65	SES no competitive annual promotion or up or out requirement; no required rotations; no mandatory retirement age

Source: AAD 2015, 23; AFSA 2013c.

Appendix E: AFSA's Recommended Guidelines for the Selection of Chiefs of Mission

- **Leadership, character and proven interpersonal skills**: The nominee has demonstrated the interpersonal skills necessary to represent the United States, including utmost integrity, honesty, moral courage, fairness, empathy, an appropriate measure of humility, awareness of personal strengths and weaknesses, overall judgment and decisiveness, and the ability to inspire, as well as a proven ability to be effective in taking on new challenges. A demonstrated understanding and mastery of working in a complex environment where the objectives of multiple and sometimes competing organizations must be balanced, and a demonstrated ability to prioritize wisely, especially concerning issues of one's staff and facilities. A key skill is the ability to listen in order to better understand the host country's perspectives, as well as the mission staff's views and concerns. These skills can be demonstrated through leadership and management of government organizations, private sector companies, or non-governmental and private volunteer organizations.

- **Understanding of high level policy and operations, and of key U.S. interests and values in the country or organization of prospective assignment**: The nominee possesses the knowledge and capacity to lead the operations of a diplomatic mission effectively; to participate constructively in the formulation of policy and implement policy in a creative manner that yields positive results where possible; and to communicate persuasively with government stakeholders (White House, State Department, other executive agencies and Congress), host nation officials, political leaders and civil society. He or she demonstrates the capacity to negotiate, and has the proven ability to take on various challenges, including working with U.S. and foreign business communities and other nongovernmental interests, and providing services to U.S. citizens.

- **Management**: The nominee has relevant management experience. He or she possesses a commitment to team building, innovation, problem-solving, strategic planning, mentoring and career development. He or she also possesses experience in setting goals and visions, managing change, and allocating resources. He or she has the capacity to work well with a deputy and other members of a team, and to delegate effectively.

- **Understanding of host country and International Affairs**: The nominee has experience in or with the host country or other suitable international experience, and has knowledge of the host country culture and language or of other foreign cultures or languages. He or she has the ability to manage relations between the U.S. and the country or organization of assignment in order to advance U.S. interests, including the interests of U.S. commercial firms as well as individual U.S. citizens and nationals. The nominee skillfully interacts with different audiences – both public and private.

Source: AFSA 2014, *Chief of Mission Guidelines*, online: http://www.afsa.org/chief-mission-guidelines.